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ABSTRACT 
This work examins three areas of contributory factors that 
shaped the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) response towards two 
international crises in regions which traditionally fell within the 
Chinese sphere of influence : the Korean War (1950) and the American 
War in Vietnam (1965-66). It analyzes and isolate2 the domestic and 
international political aspects which shaped the foreign policy 
towards the two conflicts including the conflict between Mao Tse-tung 
and others in the CCP over China's socialist construction; it also 
considers the specific relations with the two former vassal states. 
Once decision-making factors are identified, the formulation of the 
foreign policy output in both cases is described. A broader historical 
perspective is provided through a discussion of imperial Chinese 
attitudes towards Korea and Vietnam and through an insight into the 
effects of western and Japanese encroachments in the two areas. 
The study uses the two periods to gauge the success achieved 
by a newly independent China's efforts towards gaining international 
status, creating spheres of influence and avoiding domination by the 
Americans or the Soviets over the first decade and a half of the 
People's Republic's existenceo The significance of the two former 
vassals is placed in this contexto The study ccncludes that although 
decision-making with regard¢ to the Vietnam conflict was freer from • 
foreign influence than in the case of the Korean War, the improvement· 
in Chinese international standing and effectiveness in international 
politics was nominal, although a better use of deterrents and 
diplomatic communications can be observed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When one surveys Chinese history, it becomes evident that 
events within the regions which border China have continually 
been of great concern to the Chinese elite, be they Imperial 
mandarins or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cadres. An understand-
ing of the factors which created the Chinese response to these 
events can tell one a great deal about the political conditions 
within the country; it can also lead to a comprehension of how 
the leading political figures viewed themselves, Chinese society, 
and the significance of China within the world power matrix at the 
time. It is the object of this study to achieve such an understand-
ing by identifying'and analyzing the decisive factors which, during 
the first two crucial decades of the major cc-ntemporary Chinese 
state, the People's Republic of China (PRC), shaped Chinese policy-
making with regard to two globally significant conflicts in what 
have been traditionally viewed as key border nations. 
Korea and Vietnam were both vassal states of the imperial 
Chinese court and remained, though to varying degrees, under its 
influence for most of their histories. They constituted an 
integral part of the Chinese mechanism of foreign relations known 
as the tributary system. There was no doubt in the perception of 
the Confucian Chinese elite that they fell within what was naturally 
China's sphere of influence. The Chinese attitude towards them was 
a clear expression of the chauvinistic, sinocen~ric nature of 
Chinese foreign policy during the imperial dynasties. It is therefore 
logical that a thorough investigation of the jecision-making factors 
" . which contributed to the CCP's foreign policy output vis a VlS 
crises in these nations can idicate how much, if at all, the 
communist leadership was influenced by traditional teachings on 
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international relationso Therefore, this study begins by describing 
how imperial foreign policy manifested itself in China's dealings 
with these two bordering states. This is reflected in the attitudes 
it engendered within the native elites in the vassal states and 
provides us with a firm foundation from which to gauge the interac-
tions between the Chinese and the rulers of the former vassals 
during the post-imperial periodo 
Any appreciation of how the CCP views China's global position 
and of how this view differs from that of its predecessors - must 
be put within the context of the Western encroachments on the Chinese 
Empire and its vassals which began in earnest with the Anglo-Chinese 
Opium Wars of the nineteenth century. This significantly undermined 
the Chinese world order and had an effect on the Chinese concepts 
of international power relationso It proved to be a shock to the 
Chinese national ego that transformed their self-image radicallyo 
The Chinese Revolution which culminated with the founding of the 
PRC in 1949 can be seen as the era of this transformationo Those 
involved in the CCP saw it as the regeneration of Chinese greatness; 
they saw it as China having "stood up". after years of Western 
subjugation. Therefore, their reaction to further Western activities 
in their vicinity, represented primarily by the United States' (US) 
position in the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, can provide us with 
an intimation of how this feeling of national rejuvenation displayed 
itself in foreign policy decisionso An analysis of the factors 
which influenced these decisions can not only give us an indication 
of the significance which former vassal states have had in post-
Liberation foreign policy, it also tells us something of what the 
CCP believed China's role to be as an Asian, ~nd as a global power. 
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The events which led to the Chinese incursion in the Korean 
War in 1950 and to the formulation of the PRC's response to the 
American War in Vietnam in the mid-1960's provide us with two other 
vantage points from which to understand the development of Chinese 
international behaviour. As mentioned above, they can be put into 
the wider context of Chinese reaction to a long period of Western 
domination; they can also help chart the development of Chinese 
foreign policy over approximately the first decade and a half of 
the PRC's existence. The PRC's role within a global system dominated 
by the two post-World War Two superpowers, the US and the Soviet 
Union, obviously evolved - but was this evolution one towards greater 
sophistication and skill in international relations? In other words, 
what were the factors that can account for the CCP's ability to 
avoid a direct involvement in the more prolonged US action in 
Vietnam but not to do so during the US-led United Nations (UN) 
reaction to the Korean conflict? A comparison of the decisions which 
formed the Chinese policy towards the two conflicts may indeed show 
that more consumate skills in the areas of crisis management and 
the use of deterence had developed. 
Of course a proper investigation into what inputs produced a 
foreign policy response cannot avoid an analysis of the internal 
political elements which may have contributed. ·It can be argued 
that many external conflicts are not only a reaction to internal 
pressures, both social and economic, but in some cases are manufactured 
for the effect which they could have on domestic politicso 1 Therefore, 
I 
it is imperative that when identifying the factors which led to a 
foreign policy output in relation to the two conflicts in question, 
that all of the relevant domestic considerations are taken into 
accounto As will be shown below, the domestic political situation 
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in China in 1950 was radically different from that. which existed 
during the mid-1960's. This means that the degree and nature of the 
domestic political capital that could be gained from foreign adventures 
also differedo Therefore, if this study is to effectively identify 
the crucial factors involved, it must portr~y the balance between 
international and domestic considerations during the two periodso 
Every aspect of post-Liberation Chinese history has to be put 
into the context of the thoughts and actions of Mao Tse-tung. 
Even the events since his death in 1976 must be seen in relation 
to his effect on the Chinese nation. Obviously, he was also the 
primary figure in the decision-making process which created CCP 
policy towards the US activities in the wars in former vassal states. 
Consequently, his thoughts and what influenced them must be identified 
and understood if the factors which led to the foreign policies 
with which this study concerns itself are to be coherently comprehended. 
Moreover, any shift in foreign policy behaviour between~e two wars 
must be placed within the context of Mao's iaeological development. 
For example, the rejection of the Sino-Soviet alliance, formulated 
in February 1950 a few short months before the PRC entered the 
Korean War, produced many foreign policy constraints in the mid-
1960's which must be considered as contributory factors in the 
CCP policy towards the Vietnam War. The rejection of the alliance, 
as will be shown, was a direct product of the shift in Mao's 
attitude towards desiring a more pure Chinese road to socialism and 
a state of greater independence from any foreign power. In light 
of this, one must take note of the long history of internecine 
conflict between Mao and his CCP colleagues dating back to many 
2 years prior to the founding of the PRC, and, consequently, the 
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degree to which intra-CCP politics affected foreign policy 
decision-making during the periods in question must be determined. 
The formation of foreign policy decisions by Mao and the other 
major figures in the CCP involved in international relations did 
not occur in isolation from the wider global atm.osphere that 
prevailed during 1950 and the mid-1960's. Foreign policy responses 
by the PRC must be seen in relation to the state of world affairs 
at that time. Any of the decisions which were reached concerning 
the tumultuous events in Korea and Vietnam had to take into account 
the effect which they would have on China's position within the 
international community. Obviously,·in a world dominated by two 
powers the relationships with those powers must be given the most 
weight; yet, if the CCP truly desired to restore China to her rightful 
position in the world then its foreign policy decisions had to take 
into account what effect, if any, policies would have on the PRC's 
position amongst the underdeveloped, or "semi~colonial" countries 
with which the Chinese felt an identification. 
In a more specific case, the relationship between the PRC and 
the governments in control of the former vassals which were in 
combat with the us is an important indicator which may allow a much 
wider interpretation of the events to be achieved. An analysis of 
the interaction between the respective governments can provide an 
effective indication of the extent to which any vassal-like situation 
remained. In other words, were Vietnam and Korea considered to 
be satellites that were to be protected because of a policy of 
patronage, or were they simply considered to be strategic buffers 
that would protect China from a direct attack? It will also have 
to be determined whether the CCP had any ideological influenc~ over 
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the two former vassals in order to discern the strength of the bonds 
between them, a factor in decision-making which cannot be ignored. 
One may ask why this study is time-specific, especially in 
the case of the CCP's response to the American War in Vietnam. 
While it is easy to comprehend that the PRC entered the Korean 
conflict in 1950 and that all of the relevant dscision-making factors 
were present in that particular year, it is also easy to question 
why the time period of the analysis of the Vietnam War is centred 
around 1965-1966 when direct American military involvement lasted 
until 1972. In fact, it can be said that the probability of war 
between the US and China was also high in the later period of the 
war when the Nixon administration inititiated intensification of 
the US air attacks on North Vietnam. Yet, as will be shown below, 
the pattern of the CCP's response to the war was unquestionably 
set between 1965 and 1966 and the decision-making factors which 
kept the Chinese from becoming direct combatants in the struggle 
in that period were decisive enough to preserve the status quo. 
The reader may note that a lot more space has been given to 
the Vietnam conflict than to the earlier Korean War. There are two 
main reasons for this apparent lack of balance. Firstly, because of 
the vicissitudes of scholarly interest, and as a reflection of the 
Cold War mentality which existed in the early-1950's, less was 
written about China which was considered to be a mere "puppet" of 
the Soviets. Interest did pick up over the years, however, and by 
the time of the escalation of the US involvement in Vietnam a fair 
range of materials was being produced. Secondl~·, the chapters 
concerned with the Vietnam question contain necessary background 
material which explain the relevant events occuring during tlte 
years between the two conflicts. 
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The transliteration of Chinese used in this study is the 
Wade-giles system as opposed to the Pin-yin because the sources 
were written before the latter came into popular use. For the 
sake of consistency between the quotations and text, the Wade-Giles 
system of romanization, the McCune-Reischauer system for Korean 
names, and the standard french transliteration of Vietnames have 
been used throughouto 
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FOOTNOTES INTRODUCTION 
1. Liao Kuang-sheng, "Linkage Politics in China: Internal 
Mobilization and Articulation External Hostility in the 
Cultural Revolution", World Politics, July 1976, Vol. 28, 
No. 4, pp. 592-596o 
2o For an example of some of the infighting during the early 1930's 
see Wilson, Dick, Mao: The Peoples Emperor ,London: Futura 
Publications, 1980), pp. 149-160. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Korea, Vietnam, the Imperial Chinese Tractition, 
and the Rise of Nationalism 
Korea and Vietnam developed under the shadow of the cultural and 
political colossus that was Imperial China, but for various reasons 
Chinese behaviour towards the two vassals varied despite the theoretical 
equality of their position within the Chinese world order, Moreover, 
and perhaps as a consequence of Chinese actions, the attitude of the 
respective leadership of the two states diverged over the centuries. 
Politics in traditional Vietnam fluctuated between Confucian orthodoxy 
and other internal and external influences, while the approxima·:-,ely 
five hundred years' rule of the Korean Yi Dynasty (1392-1910) saw 
Confucian beliefs become deeply entrenched in government, although 
native culture continued to flourish. NeverthelesR, the two states 
both saw themselves as being part of the Chinese world system and the 
Chinese continually showed that they believed these vassals to be 
integral units within the Confucian international order, The malleable 
nature of the Chinese approach shows the flexibility of that system and 
indicates that pragmatic strategic considerations often lay under the 
I 
implementation of the Confucian code of interna tionnl patronage, 
The ideology behind the Confucian world order has been explained 
at length in many sources and therefore will not be discussed in detail 
in this study. 1 Suffice it to say that it was in essence an expression 
of chinese chauvinism that relegated all those who refused to pay homage 
to Chinese civilization to the ranks of barbarians, Submission to 
the culture primarily entailed the despatching of tribute missions 
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from the vassal state to the Chinese capital, the adoption of the 
Chinese dynastic calendar, and the seeking of the Chinese Emperor's 
approval for the investiture of a new king, It was the ultimate 
expression of the Chinese belief that the virtue of Confucian ethics 
placed China at the centre of the world and gave the Emperor the right 
to claim "all under Heaven", or tien hsia, as his domain, 
It is logical that the states within what has been called the 
"Sinic Zone", those including Korea and Vietnam that had cultural roots 
closely linked to the Chinese, 2 were to be considered better than 
"barbarians" by the Chinese and the sinicized mernber of their own 
population, Chinese culture set the standards in that area of the 
world because its sheer energy and vitality allowed it to spread easily 
throughout vast regions where there was no other cultural force that 
could match it, Yet the vassal states also gained concrete benefits 
from joining the system of tribute: not only did it allow a great deal 
of trade to be carried out via tribute missions, it also offered the 
guarantee of protection from hostile third parties,3 A related benefit 
which proved to be of particular importance to Vietnam's rulers was 
that it served to protect kings who had loyally sent tribute throughout 
their reign from internal rebellion.4 But it must be stressed that 
was primarily a sinocentric ideology and that it wacs Chinese interests 
which it furthered, The tributary system was not based on equality 
between nations. The relationship was not betwAen friend and friend, 
but rather that between a father and son, as seen within the Confucian 
context. Therefore the protection of the "father" predominated and 
the use of the tributary state as a buffer from totally "barbaric" 
nations was quite freely referred to in Imperial writings.5 
Consequently, the relationship between China and the vassal was shaped 
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1n part by the nature of the threat from which China was being 
buffered in that particular part of the "Universe". 
A state qualified for inclusion within the tributary system 
by virtue of its willingness to "come and be transformed", or 
lai hua. 
----
Theoretically this was a totally voluntary act: the 
Chinese Confucians did not espouse an expansionist creed and 
officially they professed that states joined without coercion. 6 
Nevertheless, the Chinese did actively plant the seeds of the 
tributary relationship through colonies, in the case of Korea, and 
through official annexation, in the case of Vietnam, during the 
expansionist periods of the Ch'in and the early Han dynasties. 
These injections of Chinese culture proved to be remarkably resilient 
and in later years, during periods of dynastic instability when 
political influence over the vassals was not strong, Chinese culture 
never died, even though it may have been eclipsed at times by 
domestic or external creeds. 
The ancestorsof the Korean and the Vietnamese people were non-
Chinese tribes that migrated south into zones of Chinese influence. 
The former were probably North Asians who spoke an Altaic language; 
the latter were of Mongoloid origins and spoke a Sinic tongue. 
Chinese influence began in pre-history and the or1g1ns of sedentary 
agriculture in Korea and the rice-based culture of the Red River 
Basin in Northern Vietnam can be linked to Chinese influences. 7 Not 
surprisingly, the first states with recorded h1stories in both Korea 
and Vietnam were founded by ethnic Chinese or by clients of the 
Chinese. These states rapidly adopted the Chinese language. for 
official use and copied Chinese governmental procedure, but they 
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developed a varying degree of actual unity with the Chinese. 
North Vietnam was actually included in the Chinese successionist 
state of Nan-Yueh and was administered from Canton from the third 
century B.C., around the time of Chinese unification. Yet 
although the earliest Korean state Choson had been heavily under the 
sway of the pre-Ch'in state of Yen, and was consolidated in the third 
century B.C. by a man named Wei Man (Wiman in Korean), who was either 
actually Chinese or a Chinese client, it was never ruled directly 
from China. 8 
The reign of Han Wu-ti (141- 87 B.C.) marked a turning point 
for both vassal states. In 108 B.C. the expansionist Han Empire 
succeeded in conquering Nan-Yueh, bringing North Vietnam under central 
Chinese administration - a situation which was to 0xist in varying 
degrees for nearly one thousand years. Three yearo after the 
annexation of Nan-Yueh, the Han founded its colonies in Northern 
Korea, principally the one at Lolang, near present day P'yongyang. 
These colonies lasted for approximately four hundred years and, 
although they were eventually defeated by the Korean Koguryo state, 
the lasting influence which they had over the Korean outlook insured 
that the Confucianism that was being officially patronized by the 
Han won acceptance in Korea. 
the Yi. 9 
This trend was to culminate during 
Obviously, the inclusion of Korea and Vietnam within the 
Chinese sphere of influence had little in common with the Confucian 
ideal of a voluntary transformation, and Confuciani~m seems to have 
had little effect on the foreign policy behaviour of Han Wu-ti. 
After the initial expansion into these areas the Han tried 
r. 
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vigorously to sinicize the native elite. In Korea they assiduously 
attempted to control the early Koguryo state (119 B.C. - 668) by 
fostering its role as a client. This was done via the colonies 
and entailed the use of Chinese intermediaries who influenced the 
Kogury~ chieftains and eventually succeeded in enlisting them 1n 
a common struggle against the Hsuing-nu tribes. Chinese 
domination was so complete that the early Koguryo only vaguely 
.. d th . . . . 10 recogn1ze e1r own ch1efta1ns as be1ng supreme rulers. Never-
theless, since the area was never officially annexed, the Chinese 
could not bring the Koguryo leaders directly into.the central 
administration, in contrast to Nan-Yueh where they consciously 
created a Confucian elite that went through the official examination 
system. This proved to be very successful and officials of 
V. t . . ll t . 11 1e namese or1g1n were eventua y pos ed throughout the Emp1re. 
Although engulfed in the sinicization process, both nations 
strove for a degree of freedom in their actions, but because of 
differing circumstances this manifested itself in distinct ways. 
Prior to gaining total independence during the decline of the Tang 
in the tenth century, the Vietnamese strove for self-governing 
autonomy. Of course there was a great deal of flux in the movement 
over the centuries, depending on the stability of the central 
authorities in China. Sometimes, for instance, the Vietnamese 
would drift slowly into a degree of autonomy because of dynastic 
political chaos. 12 As a consequence of these aspirations there 
developed ~ strong heritage of rebellion against the Chinese -
beginning with the revolt led by the Trung sisters in 40 A.D. In 
the case of the Koreans, rebellion against Chinese domination some-
ti~es surfaced in the form of interstate agression. Of the three 
Korean states that existed prior to the unification under Silla in 
668 this tendency was most marked in the case of Koguryo. The 
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first evidence of such a trend was in the third fuld fourth 
centuries when Kogury~ actually tried to gain territory at the 
expense of the Chinese. This occurred at a time of dynastic 
decline, though ironically in the long run this did not enhance 
Koguryo's chances of eradicating Chinese dominance; for not only 
were they defeated militarily, but the influx of Chinese 
scholar refugees fleeing the chaos partially caus,-~d by these 
military exploits actually strengthened Chinese cultural 
. 13 ~nfluences. Koguryo assertiveness did not end there. Its 
battles with the Sui (589 - 618) along the Liao River eventually 
contributed to the downfall of that short-lived, but important 
14 dynasty. 
With these precedents in mind one is forced to question why 
the emergence of an independent Vietnam in the tenth century and 
the unification of Korea in 668 both created states which, seemingly 
following Confucian tenets, readily and without coercion joined the 
tributary system and therefore declared their political inferiority 
to the Chinese state. Was this a confession of cultural inferiority 
as well ? Obviously, one thousand years of Chinese influence 
had an effect on the developments of both states, yet one must 
note that both of these events occurred in the era of the T'ang 
dynasty. The T'ang regenerated the belief of the Chinese themselves 
~n the supremacy of their culture and of their empire. They strove 
to reassert Chinese hegemony in all of the areas -~hat were within 
the realm of the Han empire. Consequently, they revitalized the 
tribute system which had fallen into a very erratic state. 15 The 
T'ang did not delude themselves - they were powerful enough to 
influence the world view of Korea to stave off the threat that the 
mass infiltration of ideas into Vietnam from India and other 
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Southeast Asian states could irreversibly remove that country 
from China's sphere of influence. Yet the vassals may have 
been motivated by the domestic gains which they hoped to procure 
by joining the tribute system; because by doing so they had 
access to Confucian institutions for their own internal political 
use, which proved to be an asset in both cases. 
The use of Confucianism as a cohesive factor in the rule of 
an elite within a vassal state reached its zenith during the Yi 
Dynasty in Korea. It has been said that the power and the prestige 
which the tribute system itself gave the Yi, i.e., the moral 
force which the backing of the Chinese Emperor had within the 
conscience of the Korean people, was one factor which accounts for 
the dynasty's long life. They were rather creative in their 
adoption of Chinese institutions, however, for they gave the 
Censorate much more power than it had in the Chinese court. But 
the sheer pervasiveness of Chinese political cult;lre, and the 
consequences which it had on traditional Korean foreign policy, 
h d . 16 s oul not be 1gnored. 
After gaining independence the Vietnamese also found adherence 
to the Chinese tribute system to be expedient. In neither case was 
acceptance imposed upon them by the Chinese autho.:.·i ties: it was 
rather more of an instinctive action that had its roots in the 
centuries of Chinese cultural and political dominance. In 
addition the constraints placed on them by compliance were minimal. 
The Vietnamese found the importation of Confucian institutions 
and mechanisms of government very useful, yet they also found that 
by the most superficial displays of homage they were able to have 
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a great deal of freedom ~n their policies. They received the 
benefits of protection, as will be shown belo-w·, because the 
Chinese felt that it was their duty as the source of civilization, 
but they could simultaneously pursue their own path, and even 
crea~their own sphere of influence. This became especially 
evident during the Nguyen Dynasty in the early nineteenth century 
when Vietnamese expansionism was persistent, and when the Vietnamese 
court strove to create their own separate tribute system based on 
the Vietnamese being the "Son of Heaven" in h:i s own right. 17 
It is the question of independence in foreign policy which 
most differentiates Vietnamese and Korean development vis a vis the 
Chinese Empire. Following the last, brief annexation of Vietnam 
in 1407- 1427, during the reign of the Yung-lo Emperor of the 
Ming, the Vietnamese showed an increasing tertcency towards southwards 
expansion. Paradoxically, the Ming annexation also laid the 
foundations of an otherwise stricter Confucian state because it 
imported Nee-Confucian ideas and practices, such as the revitalized 
exam system, which the Vietnamese eagerly import2d for their own 
internal stability. 18 Notably, it was also ouring the Ming that 
the traumas of the Japanese invasion of Korea in the late sixteenth 
century caused the highly Confucian Yi to become P.ven more orthodox 
in its approach to foreign relations. The shock caused by the 
attack resulted in the Koreans seeking security and stability 
through a stricter adherence to the Confucian world order. Con-
sequently, the Yi became almost totally isolated from the rest of 
the world and dutifully sought the· direction of the Chinese whenever 
a third party made an approach, as was the case during the 
nineteenth century, (see below, PP·l8-19 ). It is at this point 
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that the attitudes of the rulers of the vassals towards Chinese 
institutions and patronage clearly diverged: the Vietnamese 
found that Confucianism gave them the internal cohesiveness which 
facilitated their own territorial expans1on; while the Koreans 
found that Confucian foreign relations allowed them to feel safe 
in an isolation that was comforting after the havoc of the 
J . . 19 apanese 1ncurs1ons. 
As a consequence of their differing attitudes the Koreans 
became more faithful and regular givers of tribute than their 
Vietnamese counterparts. Thelf diligently consulted the Chinese 
court over procedural matters and during the Yi they became the 
most frequent tribute-bearing guests, averaging at least three 
times a year. By contrast, Vietnam (or Annam as it was known from 
T'ang time onwards) gave tribute only once every three to five 
20 years. Even though the Yi's main loyalties rested with the 
Ming, having come to power as explicitly so, the;}• continued to be 
faithful during the Ch'ing as well. The Ch'ing reciprocated and 
showed favouritism towards the Koreans by such measures as lifting 
the time limit on trade following the presentation of tribute that 
. t t• 21 appl1ed to o her na 1ons. 
Relations between Korea and Imperial China had not always 
been as close as they were during the Yi, however, and during the 
earlier dynasties of Silla (668 - 935) and Koryo (935 - 1392) the 
foundations of a strong native culture had been bolstered. In 
fact they were not always so loyal a tributary nation because during 
the Koryo they developed relations with Khitan, Jurchen, and the 
Mongols which conflicted with their obligations to the Chinese. 
The Yi, however, being allies to the Ming, rectified the situation. 
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Even so, they were not sycophantic and the legacy of previous 
Chinese incursions into the peninsula meant that their relationship 
with China could be circumspect, especially before the Japanese 
22 invasions of the sixteenth century. 
The Yi came to power as avid converts to Nee-Confucianism, 
yet they could not eradicate the legacy of native Korean culture -
and one doubts whether they desired to do so. The distinct 
Korean heritage was far too embedded for the Yi to have ever 
contemplated creating an exact model of China in miniature, no 
matter how deep their respect for Chinese culture. During the Kory~ 
Buddhism had flourished and received substantial amounts of state 
support at times when it was out of favour in China. Native 
shamanism had also received official approval and lts ceremonies 
" . 23 were often attended by the Koryo k1ngs. The Nee-Confucian wave 
that began with the Yi swept out the Buddhist establishment and 
eroded the official standing of shamanism, yet native Korean culture 
survived. The music, dress, architecture and cuisine remained 
intact. Official Chinese ideology may have influenced the Yi elite 
but the native subculture never died, thus leaving Korea with a 
distinct national identity despite being dominated by her more 
powerful neighbour. 
Vietnam also retained a distinctive cultural identity, though 
through a different means from Korea. As mentioned above, the 
primary contact that Korea had with dynamic forei~1 culture was 
through China; the Vietnamese, on the other hand, were geographically 
placed between two great sources of culture and ideas China and the 
Indian subcontinent. Although the classical Chinese language and 
philosophy were dominant amongst the rulers in the north of the 
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country, the slow but relentless drive south exposed the 
Vietnamese to many foreign cultures to which the Koreans did not 
have access, e.g., the Champa and Khmer civilizations. Consequently, 
as the Vietnamese annexed greater territories thf:y became less 
homogeneous and Confucian orthodoxy suffered many setbacks as the 
people from the more newly incorporated, less sinicized areas strove 
f . H . 24 or power 1n ano1. 
So evident were the non-Chinese aspects of Vietnamese culture 
that when the Ming annexed Vietnam in the fifteer:.th century they 
were convinced that the people there could never b0 truly civilized, 
d . . 1 . . . . . 25 esp1te the1r ong her1tage of Slnlc1zat1on. Religion in Vietnam 
was also distinctive when compared to the Chinese model because 
Buddhism was imported directly from India and therefore became a 
popular force before the Chinese had a chance to propagate Taoism 
or popular Confucianism. 26 Hence it is clear that although the 
Chinese did undoubtedly dominate Vietnam's cultur~ development, the 
Vietnamese did not blindly imitate Chinese culture to the extent that 
they did Chinese government institutions. Their propensity for 
southward expansion and their geographical situation allowed them a 
. . t . ll d 27 spec1al path of wh1ch hey were espec1a y prou • 
Thus we have evidence of two vassal states with similar long 
exposure to Chinese culture and dominance, but with varying degrees 
of external expansion. Vietnam had a consistent tendency towards 
imperialism; 28 Korea had almost none. Consequently, although the 
Vietnamese usually felt very little constraint on their actions, 
they did experience intervention in their internal affairs when it 
appeared to the Chinese that they may be ready to leave the tributary 
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system. While the Chinese had no real fears ·.)f the Koreans 
leaving the Confucian order, the degree of independence that the 
Vietnamese had shown in their foreign affairs meant that the 
Chinese felt it necessary to ensure that a loyal king ran the 
Vietnamese court, and they occasionally acted directly in the 
pursuit of this goal. Generally speaking, the Chinese only inter-
vened in the internal political affairs of the Koreans in order to 
protect their own security, and this did not occur to any great 
extent until the nineteenth century when the Japanese were forcing 
themselves a foothold on the Korean peninsula, as will be shown 
below. Nevertheless, the two vassal states discovered that the 
regular sending of tribute gave them sufficient independence in their 
internal affairs. The Vietnamese found that playing the role of the 
dutiful vassal generally kept the Chinese at a distance and provided 
them with the freedom that they needed to implement policies that 
were sometimes in direct conflict with the Confucian ideal. 29 
An explanation for this rather benign attitude on the part of 
the Chinese was the shift towards a defensive foreign affairs 
posture which accompanied the advent of the Nee-Confucian age during 
the Sung Dynasty (960- 1279). The humiliations of the tenth and 
eleventh centuries which stemmed from the Liao movP.s against the 
Sung caused the Chinese to become increasingly introverted and to 
insist that foreign regimes which desired to become "civilized" come 
. d . 30 to the Ch1nese an not v1sa versa. Of course the explorations of 
the Ming could be seen as an exception to this rule, as could their 
annexation of Vietnam 1n the fifteenth century, b1~t essentially the 
days of conquest such as had occurred during the Hon and the T'ang 
had ended. The Ming annexation of Vietnam is a case in point. 
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It was simply an attempt to reestablish the Tran Dynasty 
(1225- 1400), a vassal regime which had proved loyal to the 
Confucian order. Their successors, the Ho, h&d displeased the 
Imperial Court by "uncivilized behaviour" and locked very unlikely 
to accept the tributary system wholeheartedly. When the Tra:..1 
pretender to the throne was executed by the Ho, the sinicized 
Vietnamese elite requested that the Ming annex the territory in order 
to restore "civilization". Hence what has often been interpreted 
as Ming aggression was in fact the accommodation of a people who 
h d f d d . t . "rml •t . . 31 a pro esse a es1re o rema1n f1 y w1 h1n tbe Ch1nese sphere. 
The Ch'ing also showed that they were prepared to act to 
keep a loyal tributary dynasty in power when they tried to save 
the Le Dynasty (1418- 1798) from collapse during the Tyson 
Rebellion. Nevertheless, when the Nguyen successors promised 
tribute, and adverse weather conditions allowed it to be claimed that 
the Le had indeed "lost the mandate of heaven", th0 Ch 1 ing promptly 
ll t . 32 ca ed off the opera 1on. Once again, as long as a successor 
regime met the minimal requirement by simply accepting the tributary 
system the rulers of China were satisfied. 
Prior to the Japanese encroachment in the nineteenth century 
the primary precedent for Chinese intervention 1n ·che internal 
affairs of Korea was the role which the T'ang had played in the 
unification of the peninsula under Silla in the seventh century. 
Although this was executed under the justification of protecting 
Silla's tributary route from Koguryo's attacks, it should primarily 
be seen as an attempt to replace Koguryo, which had actually 
moved aggressively against the Sui and the T'ang, viith a more 
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deferential state. Silla had rapidly adopted T'ang institutions 
and they were the most sinicized state on the peninsula, so they 
naturally received Chinese patronage. Nevertheless, it was the 
desire to remove the destabilizing presence of Kogury~ from the 
sensitive Northern frontier which was the main T1 ang motive in 
this action - the patronage of Silla simply provided legitimacy. 
It was this question of security which had no corresponding 
precedent in China's relations with Vietnam, until, of course, the 
33 colonization by the French in the nineteenth century. 
The outstanding example of the strategic significance which 
the Chinese placed on Korea was the action of the Ming during the 
invasions of the peninsula by the Japanese ruler !tideyoshi during 
the late sixte~nth century. It is an interesting period because 
it not only illustrates how the Imperial Chinese viewed the danger 
of Korea being in hostile hands, but it also portrays the great 
respect with which lesser states held China. It is mistaken to 
believe that the Ming were reluctantly drawn into the cohflict -
Hideyoshi had made it clear that Peking was his primary objective 
years before his actual attack. In his perception, the paramount 
earthly achievement was to become Emperor of China and Korea was 
. . al 34 . merely a steppJ.ng-stone towards thJ.s go • AJ.though the Ming 
rescue of Korea could be presented as a noble act of self-sacrifice 
by an already tottering dynasty, it was more of an act of self-
preservation which used Korea as a buffer against Hideyoshi. This 
presents an interesting comparison with the war in 1950 which will 
. . 35 be discussed J.n later sectJ.ons •. Ironically, the financial strains 
of the campaign hastened the Ming 1 s collapse, yet the indebted Yi 
gravitated even closer to China as a result. Thus the most 
perfect Confucian-based international connecti?n in Chinese history 
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was fashioned out of the collapse of one of Cbina 1 s major 
dynasties. 
As mentioned earlier, the Yi had come to power as a pro-Ming 
regime and the rigid Confucian orthodoxy which followed the 
Japanese invasion simply re-enforced an existing trend. They 
clearly indicated this when Hideyoshi offered them mercy in return 
for cooperation and they responded by dutifully informing the Ming 
of the Japanese intentions. Whether this constituted Confucian 
ethics or a desire for protection is problematic. It is possible 
t t . f . '1' . 36 ha the Koreans were protect1ng the source o world ClVl 1zat1on, 
or they may have wanted to preserve the degree of autonor~ which 
they had enjoyed under Chinese patronage but could not take for 
granted under Japanese dominance. 37 
Until the nineteenth century there was no corresponding 
threat to Chinese security from an invasion of Vietnam. The Chinese 
may have been wary of cultural influences spr~ading from Southeast 
Asia, but their security was never threatened militarily from this 
flank. It was traditional, in fact, because of the history of 
invading nomadic tribes across the northern frontier, to treat 
international relations on the northern boundaries of the Empire 
differently from those on the East and South. The Manchus 
institutionalized this division by establishing a separate board 
for the management of affairs with the Ch'ing's northern neighbours~ 
This is not surprising, however, when one conside~s that the Manchus 
themselves originally seized power after invading from the north. 38 
But the western encroachment changed these circumstances, as it did 
many others. In the nineteenth century, for the first time, the 
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the Chinese were under heavy pressure from the North, South and 
East simultaneously, yet the residual traditional attitudes 
towards each respective region continued to shape their responses. 
The pivotal character in the Chinese response to the West, Li 
Hung-chang, proved that Imperial Chinese foreign policy could be 
flexible, but only through this ancient tradition of differentiating 
between frontiers. He may have broadened the parameters of 
Chinese foreign behaviour, but he did not, in his own perception, 
breach any of the basic Confucian tenets, keeping in line with the 
philosophy of the "Self-Strengthening Movement" with which he was 
associated. He and his colleagues claimed that they were merely 
adapting basically sound Chinese traditions to new circumstances. 
Even his much discussed acceptance of the treaty system of internat-
ional affairs was said to be simply an adherence to the traditional 
"loose-rein" approach of handling barbarian affairs in a non-rigid 
manner. There was, however, an element of self-deception in his 
action: he blindly told himself that the West would have to conform 
to Chinese ways as other barbarian invaders had done in the past. 39 
This attitude should be remembered for it was Li who devised the 
Chinese policy towards Western imperialism in both Korea and 
Vietnam, and the flaws in his analysis could help to account for the 
failure to block effectively their forced removal from the tributary 
system. 
The epoch of Western imperialism found the Chinese struggling 
to adjust to the new circumstances in which international affairs 
had to be conducted on terms of equality, a totally alien concept 
which some tried to ignore despite the unavoidable reality that the 
world had changed. Western politicians resolutely refused to 
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acknowledge China's cultural strength, which all other "barbarians" 
had eventually conceded. With the establishment of the Tsungli 
Yamen, the quasi-foreign ministry, the Ch'ing were forced in 
1861 to negotiate on equal terms. Nevertheless, there was no 
official change in the principles by which foreigners were handled: 
in internal communications they were still referred to as 
"barbarians" • 40 Thus the Chinese faced the challenge of foreign 
imperialism in a dialectical manner in which old concepts were 
inexorably transformed by a new set of circumstances. But some 
traditional beliefs lingered longer than others, including the great 
strategic importance placed on the Korean peninsula in relation to 
other areas on China's frontiers. This coincided with a faith in 
the loyalty of the Yi and shaped a response to pressure in that area 
which was much different from the reaction towards the French presence 
in Vietnam. 
Until approximately the mid-nineteenth century, Korea 
succeeded in remaining fairly isolated from the Western powers and 
Japan by resolutely adhering to her role as a vassal. This was 
aided by a lack of interest on the part of the West. Ironically: 
it became Chinese policy, as formulated by Li, to force the Koreans 
to establish official relations with the foreign powers, but under 
Chinese guidance. Although this could be interpreted as capitulation 
under foreign pressure, it was in fact an inspired use of traditional 
Chinese foreign policy methods. Through using the Western powers, 
who did not represent the primary threat to the vassal, to counter-
balance the rising power of the Japanese, who for various reasons 
felt a great need for a presence in Korea, Li applied the tactic of 
i-i chi-i, i.e., "using barbarians to defeat barbarians", with 
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significant, yet temporary, success. By pushing the Koreans 
towards the West, particularly the Russians and the British, Li 
deterred the Japanese, who did not feel strong enough in the 1870's 
41 to confront the West. Thus Li Hung-chang bought ten years of 
much needed peace, from 1885 until the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, 
but the failure to exploit that period by consolidating the Chinese 
military position vis a vis Korea meant the eventual loss of the 
. "1 42 vassa state. 
Li was convinced that a foreign presence in Korea represented 
the greatest possible threat to Chinese security - even greater 
than a direct assault on some of the coastal provinces of China 
proper. Interestingly, he cited the Ming precedent as one of the 
primary factors in his reasoning. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that he openly told the British ambassador in 1883 that he thought 
that Korea was uniquely linked to China and inherently different 
43 from other vassals such as Annam. At the same time he denied 
that the Chinese desired a presence in Korea greater than that of 
an advisory level. Nevertheless, following the initial success 
of his policies in the 1880's, he began to spread Chinese influence 
and control throughout the Korean bureaucracy in a manner that 
had never occurred previously. The process was constantly resisted 
by pro-Japanese elements within the Korean hierarchy and 
paradoxically it represents the approaching end of the Chinese 
monopoly over cultural and political influences within the Korean 
• • • Mi' 44 el~te that had ex~sted s~nce the ng. 
The resolute nature of Li's policy towards Korea is in marked 
contrast to the equivocal and ambivalent approach that he adopted 
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towards the French incursion into Vietnam during the same period. 
Circumstances did differ in the two cases: the Vietnamese court 
was not so dominated qy Peking; and the security of Vietnam was 
not considered as essential for the continuation of Ch'ing rule. 
The French desired the territory as a base for expansion into the 
fairly peripheral province of Yunnan. Li's primary objective ln 
regard to Vietnam was to protect China's suzerainty without 
committing Chinese troops, which he realized would be a futile 
wasteof resources. 45 The protection of Vietnam seems to have been 
more of a matter of pride and obligation than conviction when 
compared to the importance that Li placed on Korea. Thus Li 
vacillated between negotiations and threats, carrying out neither 
convincingly. The French were not deterred and the War of 1885 
was inevitable - as was its outcome, the complete and rapid defeat 
. 46 
of the Ch'ing forces. 
When put in context the Chinese attitude towards Vietnam 
during the nineteenth century shows their failure to cope with the 
unprecedented need to defend most of China's frontiers simultaneously. 
The Confucian world order was under attack and they stumbled between 
traditional responses and ineffectual innovation. The image of 
the Chinese "umbrella of protection" became tattered as rulers and 
incipient nationalists in the vassal states watched the Chinese 
being consistently humiliated and saw the impotence of the Ch' ing 
defence of her vassal states. The doctrine of the strength of 
Chinese civilization was being questioned in Korea and Vietn~ as 
much as it was in China itself. Moreover, the roots of the 
nationalist movements in all three countries can be linked to this 
t . . 47 ques lOnlng. 
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The rise of the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) in China did 
not bring about an abrogation of the traditional claims to a 
sphere of influence in the areas of former vassal states. Though 
Japanese, and later Russian and American, occupation precluded the 
possibility of this becoming as apparent in their relations with 
Korea, it became abundantly clear in their dealings with Vietnam. 
As early as 1905 Sun Yat-sen, the father of the KMT, tried to 
convince Pham Bai Chan, the early leader of the Vietnamese nationalist 
movement, that the Vietnamese nationalist movement should become a 
branch of the KMT rather than an independent organization. In 
light of the traditional Vietnamese attitude towards Chinese 
d . •t . . . d 48 om1nance, 1 1s not surpr1s1ng that Pham flatly refuse • 
Forty years later, however, the KMT's desire for a presence 
in North Vietnam became even more obvious. Following the Japanese 
surrender in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek occupied North Vietnam, as 
mandated by the allies at the Potsdam Conference of July 1945, and 
proceeded to interfere in domestic Vietnamese affairs to a degree 
rarely matched during Imperial times. Although the KMT initially 
received universal acclaim amongst the Vietnamese for their refusal 
to allow the French to regain control, they soon angered the Viet 
Minh, led by Ho Chi Minh, by the corrupt nature of their occupation 
and, paramountly, by their attempts to create a Chinese satellite 
through patronizing right wing nationalist groups. It has been 
suggested that the resentment which Ho felt over this treatment 
continued to influence his attitu~e towards the Chinese, both KMT 
and Communist, for decades to come. 49 This is a factor that can 
be greatly exaggerated, but it illustrates the point that 
nationalists in former vassal states showed less of an inclination 
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towards the acceptance of Chinese dominance than even some of 
their most rebellious predecessors during traditional times. 
The relationship between the Korean and Vietnamese 
Nationalists and the KMT had little in common with that which existed 
between the vassal states and the Confucian elite in China during 
the Imperial period. Though the thoughts of Chinese Nationalists 
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did 
influence the ideological development of the others, especially in 
Vietnam, they were not the only source of new ideas, and a host of 
other beliefs, many of them Western in origin, had a considerable 
effect. Following the 1917 Revolution in Russia many Nationalists 
in Asia found strength in a creed whose international base was in 
Moscow: Lenin's promise of liberation from imperialism had a 
relevance which few in Canton or Shanghai could match. 
For various reasons, not least geographical ones, the links 
between the Chinese and the Vietnamese Nationalists on the whole 
seemed to be more solid than those between the Chinese and the 
Koreans. The Vietnamese found it comparatively easy to flee to 
South China, and in particular Canton, one of the main centres of 
KMT power, when escaping the French colonial authorities. Here such 
Nationalists as Pham Bai Chan, who had earlier been inspired by the 
writings of Lian Ch'i-ch'ao and other early Chinese Nationalists, 
worked alongside Sim Yat-sen and the heroes of the Chinese Revolution 
of 1911. Following the initial setbacks for the Chinese Republic 
the KMT dec'ided to use Canton as a base for campaigns against the 
warlords in the North, and the city eventually became a "Mecca" for 
exiled Vietnamese. In the period between the two World Wars as many as 
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forty young Vietnamese graduated from the famous KMI' Whampoa 
Military Academy. But it was also in Canton that the Vietnamese 
Nationalists first came in contact with the Comintern advisers sent 
by Moscow to guide Chiang during the period of KMT-Communist 
unity. Amongst them was a young Vietnamese interpreter who was 
later to be known as Ho Chi Minh. He arrived in 1924 to work 
with the Russian mission led by Borodin and General Bleucher. 50 
As early as 1912 Ho had travelled to Europe and become radicalized 
through his experience in the West and, though he had always been an 
ardent Vietnamese Nationalist, he had made a conscious political 
decision to be guided by Western thought. The Chinese had little 
to do with shaping his early consciousness, though his later 
experience with the Chinese Eighth Route Army may have had some 
effect on him. 51 
Another important meeting place for Vietnamese and Chinese 
Nationalists prior to the Second World War was Japan. It was there 
that Pham Bai Chan first met Sun Yat-sen and that the two groups 
held long discussions over relevant issues. Japan was held in some 
esteem by the Nationalists because the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 
had proved that the West could be defeated by men of the East. 
Prior to the Japanese invasion of Vietnam many such as Pham felt that 
Japan might be a possible model to emulate, a true indication that 
Chinese prestige in East Asia had waned.52 This phenomenon was 
present within Korean Nationalist circles as well, but pro-Japanese 
sentiments were present in Korea as early as the 1870's, at the 
time of Li Hung-chang's interference in Korean domestic politics. 
Dealings with Japanese became less palatable for the Koreans 
following the Japanese occupation in 1895 - although those who 
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looked towards Japan for inspiration did not entirely disappear. 
Many Koreans in the 1920's were not radicalized by Russian or 
Chinese, but by Japanese Communists in universities in Japan. 
Unlike the Chinese and the Vietnamese, however, they were under 
constant surveillance by the Japanese authorities who, ever wary 
of a threat to their position in Korea, showed great efficiency in 
curtailing the activities of the Korean radicals. 53 Therefore, 
Japan was not a place where the Koreans could freely organ~ze and 
solicit foreign aid and ideas, but unlike the Vietnamese only a few 
turned to China for such conditions. 
Some of the early Korean Nationalists found inspiration and 
support from the American missionaries in their country, their 
Christian and liberal attitudes being popular among the young and 
laying the foundations for the anti-Japanese March First Movement of 
1919. Woodrow Wilson's support for "national self-determination" 
increased American prestige still further; but his failure at 
Versailles caused a rapid disaffection to occur. 54 The Koreans 
then turned to the new champion of "national liberation" - revolutionary 
Russia. Official Soviet support for their cause and the geographical 
convenience of Siberia as a sanctuary created the circumstances in 
which Russia became the main bastion of the Korean Nationalist, and 
later Communist, movements. The Koreans flourished in two main 
areas o·f Siberia, the Maritime Province and the Onsk-Irkutsh Region, 
where Russian ethnic Koreans provided them with much aid. Many 
heroes of the resistance against the Japanese, such as the former 
royal general Yi Tong-hui, went to Siberia thinking that the Soviets 
offered real hope.55 This optimism caused some Koreans to compare 
the Chinese Revolution of 1911 unfavourably with the Russian 
achievement. One young Korean activist wrote : 
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"Whereas the Chinese Revolution passed by completely 
unnoticed by the broad Korean masses, the Russian 
Revolution, which from its very first days dealt a 
fatal blow upon the decaying bourgeois system, woke 
up the Korean masses." 56 
Although there was some Korean Nationalist/Communist 
activity in China prior to the Second World War, it was marginal 
when compared to the importance of the Siberian bases. There was 
even an attempt to set up a provisional government in Shanghai, but 
by 1923 the activities of this group had almost ceased - its 
structure having been irreparably damaged by the traditional Korean 
proclivity for political factionalism and a scandal over embezzled 
Comintern funds.57 The Koreans in China went on to have some 
strong individual ties with the Chinese Communists, a development 
which will be discussed below, but as a group their contacts . were 
not substantia1. 58 As in the case of the Vietnamese, the epoch of 
East Asian nationalism saw the traditional deference towards Chinese 
political culture dissipate. Chinese influence over the Nationalist 
movements prior to the establishment of both Korean and Vietnamese 
independent states had to compete with other, more vibrant foreign 
movements. It was only in 1949, after the establishment of the 
Peoples' Republic, that Mao Tse-tung could hope to match the image 
that others had created. Whether he succeeded and thereby helped 
to fashion an effective regional foreign policy which could affect 
the outcomes of great power conflicts in East Asia 1s a question 
of integral importance to this study which will be discussed 
thoroughly below. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Chinese Domestic Politics at the Time of 
The Korean War Decision 
An effective analysis of the CCP's decision to enter the 
Korean conflict and of that decision's implications for later 
events in the People's Republic of China's (PRC) history cannot 
be realized without a clear understanding of the domestic 
political climate of the period. Obviously, this decision was 
made when the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) consolidation of its 
rule over mainland China was hardly completed, and the adverse 
internal situations must have weighed heavily on the minds of the 
top CCP leaders as they made the difficult decision to battle the 
greatest power in the world less than a year after the declaration 
of the PRC. This raises a mass of ~uestions: Did the Korean War 
debate cause schisms to develop in the CCP central elite, or were 
divisions already evident ? What did the military, whose domestic 
role was great at the time, think of embarking on foreign ventures ? 
How could a decimated economy recover while trying to support a 
foreign war ? From these ~uestions, and what we know of later 
events, it is hard to believe that the decision was unanimous or 
without dissension in lower echelons. An investigation of the 
economic conditions at th~ time, coupled with an attempt to isolate 
areas of concern within the Party, and the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) in particular, may bring to the surface some of the domestic 
arguments of relevance to the debate. 
The central elite of the CCP was a core of several hundred 
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high officials who had devoted most of their lives to the 
Chinese Revolution and had had extensive service within the FLA. 
As will be shown, the PLA's role in domestic administration ln 
1950 was necessarily extensive, so the divisions within this elite 
would have shown themselves most obviously within the context of 
the PLA command, in which all the luminaries of the day, for example, 
Mao, Chou En-lai and Liu Shao-Ch'i, can be placed. Therefore, the 
PLA was the primary link between all those important figures 
involved with policy making, as it also proved to be in subsequent 
periods. Moreover, we are discussing a single elite which is not 
divided up through institutional identities, and "whose political 
ties and concerns cross institutional boundaries". 1 In other 
words, in 1950 there was very little differentiation between the 
Party, the heads of state and the PLA, and therefore any evidence 
of factionalism will not be found in isolation within three separate 
bureaucracies. This lack of differentiation could be seen from 
the lowest levels of authority to the highest heads of state, 
because the process of consolidating rule following the Civil War 
can best be described as military personnel walking into positions 
of civil administration (often using what remained of the KMT 
organization at the urban level) without, in many cases,relinquishing 
their military authority or command. It was hard to distinguish a 
cadre's military role from his civil position in the village; the 
administrative regions into which the country was divided 
' 
corresponded exactly to military regions, with the commander of 
the local Field Ar.my usually in control of both. At the highest 
level the PLA's ruling body was the People's Revolutionary Military 
Committee (PRMC), which had Mao as its chairman and Chou En-lai and 
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Liu Shao-ch'i as its vicre-chairmen - all of whom held the highest 
positions within the Party and the state structure as we11. 2 
Consequently, it could be said that the PRC's domestic politics 
in 1950 were the politics of the PLA. 
Though national reconstruction was clearly the primary 
desire of the military/administrative figures, there existed 
residuals, as it were, of decades of strife that had to be dealt 
with before complete, stable control could be achieved. During 
1950 these proved to be a constant concern of the PLA and they 
certainly thwarted the achievement of other pressing objectives. 
These residuals came in two forms: major operations to bring 
traditional areas of Chinese territory into the fold of the PRC, i.e., 
Tibet, Hainan Island and, it was hoped, Taiwan; and the less 
massive, yet nonetheless exhausting, mopping up of KMT remnants 
known as "bandit suppression". A brief description will suffice 
to show that the PLA had domestic strife to contend with on a 
significant scale at the time concurrent with the Korean decision. 
The invasion of Tibet was prepared for as early as January 
1950, though the actual event did not take place until early 
October, the same month as the presence of Chinese troops in Korea 
became conclusive. Its decisive battle, the battle of Chamdo, was 
fought on 10 October. Although the actual fighting proved to be 
less than intensive, the PLA committed a fairly large number of 
troops from two Field Armies to the operation. These troops 
numbered 40,000 and they included men from Liu Po-cheng's Second 
Field Army and Peng Te-huai's First Field Army. The invasion of 
Hainan Island took place in April and involved the use of thousands 
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of junks sent from Kwangtung Province, the southern regional 
base of Lin Piao's Fourth Field Army. 3 It is interesting to 
note that Lin Piao's troops were also garrisoned in Manchuria and 
were reportedly the first elements to be sent into Korea. 
The invasion of Taiwan - the only one of these major military 
objectives to be thwarted - is of great interest to this study 
because the Korean conflict interfered directly with its success. 
It was undoubtedly of the utmost importance to the CCP, as is 
indicated by the great expenses which were incurred during its 
preparations, and any decisions concerning Korea must be put into 
this context. It was reported that five thousantl junks had been 
massed in East China; an army of fifteen thousand paratroopers 
were also being assembled; and as many as thirty airfields were 
under construction in Fukien and Chekiang province. It is 
believed that at least three hundred thousand of Chen Yi's Third 
Field Army were committed to the invasion. 4 
The problem of "bandit suppression" was also very pressing 
throughout 1950. Some sources have indicated that the eruption of 
violence on the Korean peninsula, and the US/UN reaction to it in 
the summer of that year, actually provoked more sabotage on the 
part of the remnant KMT soldiers and officials. It is said that 
the belief that the war would bring US troops into China was 
prevalent amongst these people and therefore their activities 
. . d . •t d 5 1ncreased 1n number an 1n magn1 u e. The numbers of these "bandits" 
were reported to be as high as 800,000, and Lin Piao in a speech 
delivered on 12 April reported that there were 150,000 in Western 
• II • • t• b t II 6 Hunan prov1nce alone engag1ng 1n con 1nuous sa o age • Though 
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the last organized resistance on the mainland sputtered to a 
halt during March in Sinkiang,7 these incidents of espionage 
continued to plague the PLA throughout the year. One source of 
havoc did, however, emanate directly from Chiang Kai-shek during 
this period: air raids on coastal cities continued to endanger 
vital bridges, water supplies and power plants. Damage to 
Canton and Shanghai seems to have been particularly intense. 8 
Unfortunately for the CCP, antiaircraft weapons were not widespread 
at the time. 
One means of dealing with KMT remnants, at least those who 
had operated at an administrative level, was to draw them into 
the local government bureaucracy that they had run before the 
CCP victory. There were explicit orders that these people should 
be allowed to continue their roles as operatives in the civil 
service, though they did little to please the rural cadres who had 
liberated the cities and who had an inherent dislike for the city 
and its bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the rural cadres had trouble 
with the local dialects and did not usually have the level of 
literacy needed for the administering of urban centres, so this move 
proved to be highly expedient. 9 
As the military/civil administrators wrestled with the problem 
of the troublesome mass of KMT supporters, they simultaneously had 
to overcome an even more daunting problem - the fragmentated state 
of China's economic base. This battle had to be fought throughout 
1950 and on a number of fronts: hyperinflation had to be 
conquered and money had to regain value; industrial production had 
to be increased from an exceedingly low level; poor communications 
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and transport had to be rectified; and agricultural production 
had to be raised at a time when famine caused by interrupted 
harvests and national disasters threatened millions. The enormity 
of these problems is self-evident and, naturally, they must have 
caused both the regional commanders, who dealt with their effects 
from a close vantage point, and the state planners in Peking to 
view a commitment to the Korean conflict as a grave threat to the 
salvaging of the nation's economy. It is in the economic sphere 
that the greatest reasons for opposing entry can be found. 
Inflation had plagued the KMI' throughout the Civil War years 
and had reached incredible levels by the time of the CCP victory. 
The fact that the price of wheat in Peking had risen by four 
thousand five hundred times in the year prior to Liberation attests 
to this fact. 10 Prices in Shanghai had risen seven and one half 
million times from March 1946 to March 1949, and by the latter year 
people would be paid daily to enable them to rush to the markets 
before their money would be further devalued. 11 As Alexander 
Eckstein states, for the CCP, and all people influenced by socialist 
thought, the vagaries and instabilities of economic cycles are 
complete anathema. They were therefore attacked with vigor. 12 
Paradoxically, the military men in charge of the PRC saw the decline 
in numbers of the military as the key to the salvation of the 
nation's economy. 
One of the primary causes of' the endemic inflation in China 
at the time of Liberation, and for many months thereafter, was the 
cost of keeping nine million people in arms. It is estimated that 
the military cost the CCP over sixty percent of its budget. 13 
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Therefore, the demobilization of the forces was of the utmost 
importance. It was considered desirable for many reasons. 
Firstly, the release of able men, whose energies could be 
channelled into both industry and agriculture, would prove to be 
.an efficient means of combating the low production in both of 
these areas. In addition, it was politically wise because it 
would enable highly loyal men of little military capability to work 
as cadres in the on-going agrarian reform movement. They would 
1 f 1 . . 14 ff t a so prove use u 1.n secur1.ty work. In e ect, the forces tha 
had militarily consolidated the CCP's rule over China were being 
freed for constructive work that would advance the social and 
industrial aims of the movement. Their continued existence in 
their prior role was having detrimental effects on the achievement 
of these goals, while their transfor:ma.tion into a productive force 
was deemed by many in the CCP as an essential element in the recovery 
of the nation. Sending large armies on foreign adventures seems 
incongruous when put into this context. 
It could be said that a large war might prove beneficial to 
the domestic economy and to the political stability of the regime, 
in that the large number of urban unemployed and other potential 
dissidents in the ranks of former KMT troops could be eliminated or 
at least occupied. 15 Nevertheless, the degree of inflation 
mentioned above was unequivocably more of a threat to social order 
than these factors when assessed in balance. The KMT had lost 
any claim to legitimate rule in the minds of most of the populous: 
its corruption and brutality were bitter enough memories for the 
urban dwellers to give the CCP a chance. If inflation increased 
incessantly, however, that period of grace would have been shortlived. 
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Vice-Premier Chen YUn, the Chairman of the government's 
Finance and Economic Conmii ttee, designed the CCP' s measures for 
economic stability. These entailed stringent, orthodox fiscal 
and monetary policy, such as balancing the budget and restoring 
confidence in the monetary medium through controlling the 
purchasing power of money and by regulating credit. This 
confidence was attained by such measures as encouraging savings. 
Chen YUn ensured that the amount of money deposited in a bank would 
be worth the same value in commodities when it was withdrawn 
through using a commodity basket unit system whose rate was 
regularly set. The government also kept prices steady by purchasing 
commodities through the state trading companies and then dumping 
them in areas where they were most needed. 16 Nevertheless, prices 
could not be stabilized unless the supply of goods remained constant, 
which necessitated increasing agricultural and industrial production -
not to mention beginning to face the massive problem of population 
control. Yet the supply of goods to the existing population could 
not have been guaranteed unless the means of distribution were 
vastly improved, primarily through rebuilding the nation's railways, 
many of which had been destroyed during the war. This project 
made good progress throughout 1950 because many of the scarce 
resources available were poured into it and eventually the amount of 
goods entering channels of distribution was able to expand. 17 
However, agricultural expansion, a prerequisite of industrial 
expansion, proved to be an arduous task, thus hampering progress 
in manufacturing sectors of the economy. 
Throughout the first half of 1950 reports, many of which 
originated from the CCP itself, indicated that large sections of 
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the country were facing the possibility of a severe famine. 
The lack of food was attributed by Western sources at the time to 
natural disasters in the North and the unsett:'.ed conditions in the 
agricultural centre in the Southern and Central regions of the 
country. The Chinese government stated that agricultural 
production was only 75% of its pre-Sino-Japanese War level and that 
the peasants in some areas had begun to eat valuable seed grain. 
On 16 March Vice Premier Pi Wu reported the existence of seven 
million famine victims and blamed the shortagEs on the destruction 
of dykes during the war. He also said that some relief was being 
obtained by the collection of wild vegetables. 18 
Although the land reform movement during the immediate post-
Liberation period was milder than those that had preceded it, it 
was by nature disruptive and therefore the focJ. shortages caused 
its postponement until the August harvest of 1951 in the newly 
liberated areas of South Central China. 19 Thus it can be seen that 
bad harvests were causing the CCP setbacks of a very serious nature. 
Industrial progress was also severely hampered during 1950, 
though the CCP's policy of increasing producti~n through encourage-
ment of the national bourgeoisie was not faltering because of any 
inherent faults of its own. Although the government selected the 
firms into which resources were invested, and also dictated where 
products were to be allocated, it put very little pressure on the 
internal management. It was still, however, saddled with great 
problems caused by the outflow of capital prior to Liberation, the 
concomitant exodus of managerial talents, and the lack of foreign 
currency which traditionally came from overseas Chinese. 20 In 
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addition, the KMT blockade of PRC ports was proving to be very 
effective at stopping the flow of needed raw matt·rials and food 
imports to many of the industriai centres, with Sh3nghai reportedly 
being particularly hard hit. 21 But any reliable appraisal of the 
economy's prospects for real growth at that time would certainly 
have concluded that chances of an upturn without the inflow of 
foreign capital were very bleak indeed. Improved harvests might 
have helped raise the revenue for investment, but, as shown above, 
agriculture production was also poor. This is an important factor 
to remember when considering the significance of the Sino-Soviet 
Treaty of February 1950, which will be analyzed below. 
Additionally, it must be noted, especially when questioning 
the strategic importance of Korea in the view of the PRC leadership, 
that there was only one area within the PRC which p::.'omised immediate 
potential in both the agricultural and industrial spheres. That 
area was Manchuria. For example, the evidence seems to indicate 
that agricultural production in this region was doing rather well: 
there is certainly no evidence to the contrary. During all the 
reports of famine in 1950, none mentioned Manchmia as an affected 
area, and, significantly, in a speech dated 18 April Chen Ylli1 listed 
Mru1churia as one of the main areas from which relief supplies were 
b . 22 e1.ng sent. Though one could argue that this is evidence of 
Soviet aid being channelled through Manchuria, this would only 
serve as evidence of the very important rail link which would have 
enhanced the province 1 s strategic value in the e;y es of the CCP 
leadership. This also points to Manchuria's indu~trial importance, 
for not only was it the PRC's main industrial base, it was also free 
from naval blockade because of its access to resources via rail. 
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Compared to the other sectors of the economy ( the traditional 
agricultural sector and the relatively small industrial sector 
built around the old treaty ports), the Japan~se-built Manchurian 
industry was a prize asset. Though very badly maimed by the Soviet 
invasion at the end of the Second World War, it was far from 
destroyed and it therefore proved to be the one bl~ssing in the 
. . 23 post-L1berat1on economy. Also, it was one of the first areas to 
be liberated and consequently had enjoyed a period of stability up 
to 1950 which other areas lacked. One byprod'lCt of this stability, 
however, was the entrenchment of Kao Kang in a position of great 
power in the region - a factor which would have repurcussions a 
few years later. 
This brief overview has given fairly conclusive evidence that 
strong domestic reasons did exist for Chinese 'mwillingness to 
enter the Korean conflict. It presents an image of a nation facing 
great difficulties in trying to cope with the ravages of years of 
war and underdevelopment; it does not seem to havt: been a m.tion 
that was preparing for a confrontation with a far superior military 
force. Therefore, when the prospects of war suddenly increased, 
there .must have been doubts about it on the pa;.·t of the military 
figures who were burdened with the immediate crisis of adminstering 
these domestic circumstances. The inclination to resist war at 
all costs must have been strong and must have had its advocates. 
As stated before, the politics of 1950's in the PRC were intertwined 
with politics with the PLA. Any attempt to expose political 
divisions at the time of the Korean War decisic.n must take this into 
account, so it is important to discern what, if any, factions or 
informal groupings existed within the PLA at that time. Moreover, 
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J.n order to understand the political circumstances which 
facilitated the formulation of a war strategy which totally 
contradicted the Maoist concept of "people's war", as the PLA's 
Korean campaign did, it is necessary to identify which ideological 
differences within the military hierarchy affected decision-making 
vis ~ vis the hostilities on the Korean peninsula. A description 
of the prevailing climate at the time would be incomplete without 
some indication of the groups vying for ideological or other forms 
of influence. Only then can we conclude whether the decision to 
embark on a military venture in Korea which ignored the Maoist 
precepts of "people's war" indicated a refutation of the Maoist 
approach by another ideological grouping in ascendancy at the time; 
or rather that it indicated a consensual political atmosphere 
marked by flexibility on behalf of Mao and his closest colleagues. 
The definition of ''faction" is not a simple m.1.tter. It may 
be a section within a larger political group that distinguishes 
itself by receiving the "political spoils" from a particular leader. 
Tn~sewithin this section share what Andrew J. Nathan describes as 
"clientalist ties", which are marked by a close one-to-one 
relationship between a superior and his or her in~mediate subordinates. 
The latter gives loyalty; the former reciprocates with political 
24 
appointments and other advantages. This representation of the 
working of factions stressed the ideological conformity within the 
faction, and indeed within the larger group. It states that 
factions work within a broad ideological consensus which they all 
share and the boundaries of factions are not def~ned by doctrinal 
. 25 dJ.fferences. Hence, one is forced to look for ~egional and 
historical bonds which can explain the creation of distinct factions. 
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In the case of the PLA these bonds are shown to be evident in 
William Whitson's study, The Chinese High Command, in which he 
asserts that to a large extent the Field Armies developed 
independently and that some (particularly thos.= from South Central 
China) continued to be under the same officers and had "retained 
d • t • t • • d • • II 26 a 1s 1nc 1ve group 1 ent1ty for s1xteen to twenty years . 
Despite the non-random nature of the sample, it does show enough 
evidence of a regional basis for factionalism for this contention 
not to be totally disregarded. 27 Nevertheless, the periods 
following the Korean War seem to be marked by a great deal of 
doctrinal conflict which regionalism does not properly explain. 
The primary ideological split within the PLA during its 
history.was the well known division between those who favoured 
professionalism within the milita~ and those who preferred 
ideological purity over expertise. This difierence manifested 
itself throughout the history of the post-Liberation period of CCP 
rule by PLA leaders arguing that a compact, highly trained force 
armed with modern weapons should be the aim of military development, 
while the Maoists professed to believe in a massive guerilla arrow 
using men led by political commissars and armed with Mao Tsetung 
Thought in battle against sophisticated forces. Some have argued 
that this was always just a smokescreen to hide an inability to 
modernize, 28 but during periods when the PLA pla~red an important 
role in society, such as in 1950, this certainly could have been used 
as an efficient means of promulgating doctrine. This surely was 
the case during the "Learn from the PLA" movement of the early 
1960's. Though this domestic use of Maoist lllili tary doctrine 
should not be overlooked, it must be remembered that the trend 1n 
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1950 was demobilization. The goal of making ev~rybody a Maoist 
soldier was definitely a few years away. 
From what is known of the PLA hierarchy during the period 
immediately following the Civil War, it appears that the 
"professionals" were in a predominant position. Strong evidence 
of this phenomenon is provided by the appointment of Nieh Jung-chen 
as Deputy Chief of Staff towards the end of the Ci.ril War. Nieh 
had a good knowledge of European military technology and was 
sympathetic towards the desire for elite armed forces. 29 The 
ascendancy of P'eng Te-huai at this time also points this way. 
Although he was only a Field Army commander at the end of the war, 
he is believed to have been second only to Chu 'l:eh within the PLA 
command and following the entry of Chinese troops lnto Korea his 
position strengthened further. 30 As the nature of the Civil War 
changed, and guerrilla war gave way to more conventional tactics, 
it seems probable that the men with skills in conventional warfare, 
like Nieh and P'eng, gained greater influence. It therefore is 
likely that they rode the crest of this wave thrvugh the relatively 
short period between the wars and into the Korean conflict. Whether 
they represented a loosely-knit ideological group, or men who had 
strong regionally based faction, or both, cannot be stated with any 
degree of certainty. 
There are differing opinions about the natu:.:e of the power 
structure in the highest circles of 'the Par.ty at this time. It 
has been argued that this was a period of general concensus with 
none of the regionally based factions trying to 011tplace the others, 
or indeed trying in any way to upset the exis+,ing equilibrium. 
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This again stresses a lack of ideological confrontation. 31 The 
lack of open political debate at the time may be an indication 
that this was actually the case. Conversely, it could be stated 
that one ideological faction completely dominated the political 
scene (e.g., the "professionals") to such an extent that other 
ideologies were smothered or that a leader of a regional faction 
which disagreed may have treated a dominant faction deferentially 
~n order to protect his position. Any dissent may have been stated 
~n purely pragmatic terms stemming from a faction leader's 
knowledge of the difficulties in his region durin6 whatever debate 
took place over the Korean question. 
The lack of known, extensive debate can also be explained 
by the possibility that there existed a strong coalition between 
Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i from 1945 until the day~ in the late 1950's 
of the Great Leap Forward, which transformed itself into an 
institutionalized power centre without much ideological conflict. 32 
This would seem to fit the general mood of moderation which the CCP 
and Mao himself were displaying during the immediate post-Liberation' 
period. A good exapmle of this is the mild nature of the Agrarian 
Reform Bill of 1949. Also, the Korean War i-~self was fought in a 
distinctly non-Maoist manner, i.e., it was fought primarily on 
conventional battlefronts, with very little of the guerrilla 
activity which is the "people's war" model which the Maoists credit 
with the successes during the Civil War. Was this a period when 
Mao had softened his ideology and had accepted more "professionalism~'1 
out of a pragmatic need for national reconstruction ? It is 
interesting to note the lack of sensational purges in the top 
leadership of the CCP that can be directly related to the Korean 
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War, which would indi~ate that dissention on this 1ssue was not 
dealt with harshly. (Kao Kang's purge a few years after the 
beginning of the war was never publicly linked to the decision 
to enter the conflict.) Nevertheless, it is likely that regional 
and economic interests did cause some disagreement and it has been 
reported that not all of the generals were in agr~ement over 
Korea. 33 Whether the lack of great conflict over this decision 
can be explained by the dominance of a Mao-Liu coalition or by 
Nathan's belief that no one faction was strong enough to dominate 
so that consensus was protected in a more subt~e manner, 34 cannot 
be proved. One can conclude, however, that a;general consensus does 
seem to have been present amongst the CCP /PLA eli"t;e in 1950. 
Whether it was caused by the nature of the factional relations or, 
rather, out of a need for unity in the task of national reconstruction 
and in the face of foreign threat, is open to speculation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The International Political Climate at the 
Time of the Korean War Decision 
The international political climate whicL produced the great 
power crisis over Korea was, essentially, that into which the PRC 
had been born. This period of persistently high international 
tension was marked by what was interpreted at the time to be an 
increasingly bi-polar world with lesser nations gravitating towards 
the power centres of Moscow or Washington. It appeared to 
Western observers that the new Chinese gover~ent in Peking was 
unquestioningly placing itself in the "Moscow camp"; the myth, as 
we now know it to be, of Mbscow being in complete control of 
hundreds of millions of Chinese was widely believed. It J.s evident, 
however, that the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 
period between the founding of the PRC and the beginning of the 
Korean War did not result from a blind Chinese subservience to the 
"leader of the socialist camp", but was rather an expedient means 
towards the achievement of certain well defined national goals, i.e., 
the construction of a strong economy, national reunification, and 
the global recognition of China 1 s proper place amongst the world 1 ·s 
leading nations. The achievement of these goals was probably 
perceived by Mao and other CCP leaders as being hindered by Soviet 
interference or lack of enthusiasm, but not, at tlJis stage, as being 
directly threatened by Russian dominance. The US, on the other 
hand, had given many indications that it found the "new China" 
less than acceptable, and had done so in ways which the CCP thought 
indicative of blatant imperialism. The US was thought of as a 
- 51 -
deadly threat which could ohly be countered by "leaning to one 
side", the side of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, this move was 
accompanied by a distruct of the USSR which stemmed directly 
from unsympathetic Soviet actions, both in the p~st and during the 
immediate period leading up to to the formation of the alliance. 
At the time when the Chinese revolution was first showing 
signs of success, the USSR displayed a great preoccupation with 
Europe. The year which saw the turning point in the revolution, 
1948, was also the year of the Berlin blockade anl of Tito's 
defection. Therefore, the eyes of the Soviets we1·e natural:ly :on 
Europe (they had fought two massive wars there in the last thirty 
years), and the resources which they were willing to divert to the 
Far East were limited. 1 Moreover, the unwillingness to divert 
more was apparently accompanied by the acceptance of a non-
communist China, which may be seen as the reason .Jehind Stalin's 
1948 directive to the CCP to continue guerrilla wai and to refrain 
from pushing for total victory. At the time this was explained by 
fears of direct US involvement in the Civil War, but it has been 
reported that as early as 1945 Stalin had informed US envoy Averill 
Harriman that he had recognized the Chinese Nationalists instead 
of the CCP because of the latter's "exorbitant deuands for the 
industrialization of China". 2 In addition, Stalin and others in 
the Soviet leadership had grave distrust of Mao's credentials. As 
Khrushchev later recalled, Mao was regarded by Stalin as a 
"margarine Marxist" and there was consternation at his unorthodox 
reliance upon the peasantry. 3 Stalin's lack of support for Mao 
has been attributed to suspicion of any foreign cummunist leader 
who was not handpicked by him personally, so Mao, w.1o had no strong 
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connections with Moscow, had purged excessively pro-Moscow 
elements of the CCP during the Kiangsi period, and who emphasised 
his own contribution to Marxist-Leninist thought, was a prime 
target for Stalin's displeasure. 4 There are many examples of 
this displeasure and they must have contributed to any difficulty 
that Mao had in making his own personal decision to "lean to one 
side". 
The Soviets showed little enthusiasm for the CCP throughout 
the Civil War and in many ways actually worked against Chinese 
efforts towards achieving their goals. They certainly did not 
exemplify the 11 fraternal ally" which many in the West thought they 
were. Besides providing little material support for the Chinese 
Revolution, as manifest by their reluctance to turn over Japanese 
arms to the Chinese guerrillas following the Japanese surrender in 
Manchuria,5 diplomatically they showed equal reluctance to break 
ties with Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT until the ve~y end of the 
conflict. It is significant that while all the ambassadors 
remained ln the Nationalist capital of Nanking after it ;fell to the 
CCP, the Soviet ambassador fled with the KMT t~ their capital of 
Canton. There are reports that as late as May 1949 the Soviets 
were negotiating with the KMT over Sinkiang, even though the final 
CCP victory later that year seemed an increasing c~rtainty. It 
has also been said that following the signing of the Friendship 
and Non-Aggression Pact with Chiang in 1945, the USSR had the 
distinction of being second only to the US in its support for the 
KMT. 6 In addition, many observers b'elieve that the Soviet Union 
showed definite predatory designs upon territory in Northern China. 
They, who include members of the CCP, the Red GuarJ during the 1960's 
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and Western commentators, have pointed towards the development 
of a Soviet sphere of influence in Sinkiang, the uprising in Inner 
Mongolia in 1946 which PLA troops had to crush, the economic 
concessions in the Soviet-KMT Pact, and the nurturing of pro-Soviet 
Kao Kang's position 1n Manchuria, as all being evi<lence of Soviet 
territorial desires 1n Northern China. .It may have been that the 
Soviets wished China to be comprised of a satellite in the north 
and of a friendly KMT controlled south. There are also indications 
that during 1946-1947 the Soviets hinted to Chiang that they would 
arrange a truce between the KMT and CCP if the fermer granted the 
USSR economic concessions and also promised to detach itself from 
the Us. 7 Though it is not the aim of this paper to prove these 
points, it can safely be said that, in general, the policy of the 
USSR towards the Chinese revolution points towards their validity. 
There is very little that ·indicates wholehearted support for the 
CCP, to whom these trends must have been very disconcerting. 
The negotiations which culminated with the signing of the Sino-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on Valentine's Day, 16 
February 1950, did not mark a drastic reversaJ in Soviet attitudes, 
but they possibly increased the apprehension which Mao and his 
colleagues felt about the venture. The personai slights towards 
Mao during the negotiations were many. For example, he was met 
only by Molotov at the Moscow train station and there were no public 
messages of greetings (other communist leaders were showered with 
praise by Moscow on their birthdays, not to mention on their 
arrival for important discussion), and he was entertained in the 
less than salubrious Metropole Hotel and not the Great Hall of the 
Kremlin. 8 Khrushchev has revealed that Mao even threatened 
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to leave bec~use he was being neglected for days while he sat 
isolated in his hotel.9 
,; 
More significantly, the Sinkiang and 
Manchurian delegations were treated almost as if they were separate 
entities, and they included Kao Kang, who had signed a separate 
treaty with the Soviets in July 1949. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
bargained fairly well and they did extract concessions which they 
believed to be vital. They conceded to the Soviets on the 
independence of Outer Mongolia, and agreed to set up joint stock 
companies in Sinkiang and Manchuria which would develop :•.1atural 
resources at an advantage to the Soviets; but they did receive' a 
guarantee of $300 million ~n credits. This was grossly inadequate 
for the nation's needs and resentment was probably generated by the 
aid being given as a loan and not as a gift. But, significantly, 
this was the first step towards achieving international support for 
a revitalized Chinese economy. In addition, it guaranteed military 
assistance against Japan and any state in alliance with her, in case 
of an attack on either of the agreeing parties. This was a great 
relief to the PRC, as the preliminary unilateral moves by the US 
towards a separate treaty with Japan, and MacArthur's New Year's 
Day speech which called for a rearmed Japan, both evoked images of 
a strong US-Japanese military alliance which was one of the CCP's 
greatest fears. It is in this fear of US imperialism in co-
ordination with the Japanese that the primary significance 'of the 
Sino-Soviet Alliance can be found. 
The body of opinion within the CCP against au alliance with 
the Soviets existed to a very evident degree. An indication of 
this was the contents of the first issue of the theoretical journal 
HsUeh Hsi, which was published just prior to the negotiations which 
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ended with the signing of the Friendship Trea-cy. In an article 
entitled "Soviet Friendship", the anonymous author tackles such 
questions as: "Why is it only China that has got to lean to one 
side; why not the Soviet Union as well?". 10 The overriding 
point to Mao and the CCP leadership was, however, that "leaning to 
one side" and the consequent treaty provided the PRC with the 
possibility of an ally when the new state 1 s VE;ry existence was at 
its most vulnerable. 11 Many of the doubts which were evident in 
the above mentioned article were undoubtedly present in Mao's mind 
as well, but the strategic importance of a link with the "socialist 
camp" could not be ignored. The threat from the United States, a 
capitalist nation in an "advanced imperialist stage", was necessarily 
more of an imminent danger to the PRC than the neighbour to the 
north, even though the latter had shown a proclivity for putting 
its own national interests above those of China. The slightest 
hint of a "military umbrella" from the Soviet Union could only work 
in the PRC's favour in its stance vis~ vis tP.e US. Therefore, no 
matter how tempting the "Titoist Road" may have seemed, the 
exigencies caused by the increasing signs of US encirclement ruled 
out any moves towards non-alignment. From the U8-backed moves 
of the French in Indochina, to the strong possibility of a separate 
US-Japanese treaty, every indication was that the US would continue 
the same policy that it had displayed by its &upport for Chiang 
Kai-shek during the Civil War, i.e., opposing the PRC's control 
. t. t . •t . 12 over all of Ch1na and attemp 1ng o conta1n 1 s spread. · The 
US, through its support for the KMT, had become the latest example 
of an imperialist power threatening Chinese sovereignty. This was 
anathema to the CCP, for imperialism, more than indigenous 
capitalism, was perceived as the primary enemy in the struggle for 
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a strong Chinese state. 13 This was the lesson l€arned during 
the last century or more of the Western encroachment on China. 
In short, the leadership of the PRC mistrusted the Soviets, but 
their perception of history caused them to fe-~r the US, especially 
if it were allied with the last power to invade Chinese territory, 
the Japanese. 
In the US those with influence who believed in the threat of 
a monolithic communist bloc asserted a great deal of pressure 
upon the Truman administration in their demanc for strong action 
against the PRC, but concurrently there were officials in the 
State Department who pointed to Mao's great nationalism and declared 
him to be an Asiatic Tito. The consequence was an ambiguous policy 
which engendered more distrust on the part of the CCP. The utmost 
example of this equivocable position prior to the outbreak of 
the Korean War was the US policy vis a vis Taiwan. The stated 
policy toward the Chinese Civil War, after Chiang had fled to 
Taiwan, was officially to ''let the dust settle". It seemed 
apparent from Truman's 5 January 1950 speech that the administration 
had decided that the defence of Taiwan was not important to 
America's national interest. However, the PRC could not take this 
at face value because there were indications cf continued aid to 
the KMI'. For example, the unexpended balance of a $24 million 
special fund for arming the KMT was never cut off after Truman's 
14 
speech. The PRC did not,even so, believe that +.he US resolve 
to save Taiwan was great enough to block an invasion, and consequently 
preparations continued until they were curtailed by the outbreak of 
war in Korea. It was Taiwan which was the m~in obstacle towards a 
bettering of Sino-American relations, because of the insistence 
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by the PRC that all nations that wished to develop relations with 
the new state had to cut ties with the "reactionary forces" on 
Taiwan. In 1950 Britain seemed on the verge of reaching a 
viable compromise; the US refusal to abandon total recognition 
of Chiang's government, however, left intact the possibility in 
the CCP's eyes of foreign intervention. 
Another factor in the CCP's decision to seek an alliance 
with the USSR was probably the unfavourable attitude of the US 
ambassador who had remained in Nanking following its fall towards 
the end of the Civil War. The ambassador, Dr. Leighton Stuart, 
had been President of Peking's Yenching Univer3ity and the CCP 
official sent to ask him about the normalization of relations was 
one of his former students, Huang Hua. Huang was also sent to 
enquire about the ambassador's willingness to travel to Peking to 
attend a celebration in honour of his birthday. Stuart asked the 
US government for authorization, but after a long delay he simply 
received a message stating that the North Atla:1tic powers had 
agreed to a coordinated delay of recognition until after a government 
acceptable to all the Chinese people had been found. 15 This was 
not the last conciliatory move on the part of the 0CP to be ignored 
by the Americans. After the fall of Shanghai, Chen Yi, the new 
mayor and the future foreign minister of the PRC, vublically 
proclaimed that Soviet aid would be inadequate for China's.recon-
struction and that the US would be welcome to offer assistance as 
. t 1 "t 16 long as 1t was on terms of mu ua equa11 y. This also fell on 
deaf ears and shortly afterwards Mao wrote his famous attack on 
Western imperialism in which he castigated all those who believed 
that China could benefit from the West. The essay, "On People's 
Democratic Dictatorship", scoffed at the idea :)f help coming from 
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the British or the US governments by declaring: "This too is 
naive in these times. Would the present rulers of Britain and 
US, who are imperialists, help a people's state?".17 He firmly 
believed that they would not. 
In the CCP's view, it was also the US who blorked the entry 
of the PRC into the UN Security Council, thereby robbing the new 
government of a victory of great symbolic importance, for the 
goal of a new, independent China taking her proper seat amongst 
the great nations was a matter of dignity for the Chinese. Some 
argue that the USSR 1 s angry walkouts over the que .st ion of the 
Chinese seat were actually a clever ploy designed nt isolating the 
PRC and forcing the new regime into greater dependence on the 
S . 18 ovJ.ets. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that the CCP saw the 
Soviet moves as their obstacle. It is more likely that they saw 
the US as employing the same diplomatic technique that they were 
using towards Taiwan: they were issuing stateme~ts which declared 
a policy of non-intervention, but their actions denoted a continuation 
of a strong anti-PRC stance. Although the US delegate to the UN 
declared on 12 January (the same day as Secretary of State Acheson 
had declared that Taiwan lay outside tbe US "d.efence perimeter") 
that the US would abstain from voting on the admission of the PRC 
to the Security Council and that he would not use the veto, he 
followed this by stressing that the US still recognized the KMr 
government. Not surprisingly, the US-dominated Security Council 
rejected the motion for a PRC seat. 19 Mao must have felt extreme 
indignation towards this new move to block "New China's" entry into 
the world of the great powers. 
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From this description of both the US and the USSR's moves 
concerning the newly formed PRC, it may appear tbat the new govern-
ment was not given much choice and that both of thr two maJor 
powers acted to a degree in the role of an adversary. This had 
led some authorities to speculate that the "leaning to one side" 
period was simply a modern version of the Imperial tactic of 
"using a barbarian to control a barbarian". 20 But this theory 
tends to disregard the ideology which both the ruling communist 
parties shared. Although they may have disagreed on tactics, and 
Mao's visions may have been too sinocentric for the Russians, they 
did both see the primary struggle in the world as being between the 
"socialist camp", which also served the needs of the colonial and 
semi-colonial people, and the "US-led imperialists". Stalin and 
his colleagues may not have liked the Maoist lead0rship, but they 
certainly would not have made an alliance so unattractive as to 
force China into the opposite camp in her search for aid in its national 
. 21 
reconstruct1on. In addition, the Soviets had supporters 1n the 
Chinese government, e.g., Kao Kang, for whom ti1ey may have had 
aspirations. Predominant in the CCP leadership's mind at this time 
must have been the choice between ~ power that ha0. proved its 
imperialist nature by pouring $3 billion into the K~'s fight during 
the Civil War and thereby interfering in domestic Chinese affairs; 
and a power which had declared itself anti-imperialist, although it 
did often tend to have policies dominated by national self-interest. 
They had a great many reasons for being apprehensive of the Soviet 
Union, and they had shown that they were not aver::~ to making 
gestures towards the US in the hope that an arrangenents could.be 
made, but at the time, in the midst of the Cold War, "l~aning towards 
the Soviets" was the CCP's only logical stance. 
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wrote: "Both Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchei." regarded the 
United States aB the last and dying champion of world 
capitalism. The differed in their concepts of how the 
sick man was to be eased out of his misery and who was to 
administer euthanasia to him to make way for socialist 
liberation". Stalin and Khrushchev believed that only a 
Soviet-led bloc offered any hope; Mao saw the reemergence 
of a strong and vital China as the primary factor in the 
eventual. defeat of imperialism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Relations Between the Chinese Communis~ 
Party and the Leaders of North Korea:" 1945-1950 
The dominant "Cold War" analysis of international relations 
at the time of the Korean War has had an adverse effect on present 
studies of the period. The belief that the Soviet Union directed 
the policies of all the communist parties involved in the conflict 
precluded an indepth study by Western analysts of the relations 
between the CCP and the communist leaders of North Korea which may 
have revealed a clear picture of the imperatives behind the CCP's 
decision to enter the Korean War. The paucity of available inform-
ation on the subject indicates that the decision took place at a 
time when the relations between the two parties we~e not close and 
that national interests and not "socialist solidarity" provided 
the impetus behind Chinese intervention. A brief description of 
the poor reception which Korean communists ret11rning from China 
received from Kim Il-sung 1 s dominant Kapsan faction, and of the 
nature of interparty relations at the time will further illustrate 
this point. 
The distinct lack of close, formal interparty ties during 
this period is not indicative of a total lack ;f CCP influence on 
sections of the Korean communist movement. Contacts between 
individual Koreans and the CCP had begun as early as the 1920's, 
as will be discussed in greater detail below. 1 MJreover, by 
1945 there existed a large body of Koreans who had received their 
political education in Yenan under the tutelage of the CCP. 
- 63 -
After the removal of Japanese authority over Kor~a in 1945, 
these individuals began to return to Korea from th~ir exile in 
China. They also brought back Maoist ideas with them. 2 They 
immediately began to build spheres of•influence in both us-
administered South Korea and in the somewhat more favourable 
political climate of Soviet-administered North Korea. They are 
commonly referred to as the Yenan Faction, and during the immediate 
post-war period they vied for power with four othe1· factions: the 
Domestic Communists who had remained in Korea or Japan during the 
Pre-liberation period and were led by Pak Hon-yong; the Soviet 
Koreans who were mainly Soviet citizens of Korean descent that had 
entered North Korea with the Soviet troops in 1945; the popular 
Nationalists led by Chok Man-sik; and the partis3n guerrilla 
faction known as the Kapsans who were led by Kim !~-sung and who 
eventually succeeded in subjugating all of the other political 
groups. 3 Although they eventually found themselves devoid of 
power, before their downfall the Yenan faction succeeded in gaining 
support from certain key sectors of society and in having their 
leaders placed in important governmental positions. Paradoxically, 
this apparent success in government had simply incurporated the 
Yenan Faction's leadership, silenced them as an effective opposition, 
and left their leaders vulnerable to the purges which culminated in 
1950, ironically, the year that the CCP entered the Korean War. 
The Yenan Faction enjoyed some of its greatest successes 
within the communist front organizations in the South, such as the 
trade unions, and in the communist created youth movement on 
both sides of the border. The Korean Democratic Youth Movement 
was founded on 25 April 1946, and it quickly began to show Maoist 
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inclinations. The Yenan Faction's influence over the Youth 
Movement has been attributed to the lack of charisma that the 
young, but dedicated, leftists found in both Pak Hon-yong and 
K. 4 ~m Il-sung. For whatever reason, the Yenan Faction's leaders 
seemed to have this needed,eharis:ma. Possibly it Jlas because their 
exploits in the ongoing Chinese Revolution had cre~ted a certain 
appeal, or maybe it was because of the distinctive Asian road to 
socialism which they were advocating, in the form of Mao's 
strategies. The Youth Movement seems to have been a potential 
source of great influence for the Yenan Faction that was never 
properly exploited. 
Nevertheless, the organizations that proved receptive to the 
Yenan Faction were, especially in the South, simply fronts for the 
communist movement which backed them and not proper sources of 
power in their own right. In order for the Yenan Faction to 
achieve real influence, it was necessary for them to gain power 
within central communist circles. They began this process 
immediately after their return, using the title of the Korean 
Independence League. The creation of local support groups all over 
the North and South was attempted and in many cases achieved a 
measure of success. Strongholds were developed in certain areas 
where conditions were especially favourable, 5 yet although the 
Yenan Faction had acquired knowledge of organizational skills from 
the CCP which was respected by their opponents, they were never 
able to use these skills to spread their influence into other 
regions. It must be noted, however, that soon after their initial 
return to Korea the Yenan Faction had to face the reality that the 
Kapsan Faction was enjoying Russian patronage during an era of 
direct Soviet control. This considered, the Yenan returnees can 
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be said to have achieved a fair amount of success in creating 
their much needed popular support. 
The creation of the New People's Party in the spring of 1946 
marked a turning point in the development of the Yenan Faction's 
power base. In six months it had a membership of 90,000, much 
of which comprised members of the middle classes, such as the 
intelligentsia and technicians - the very people that Korea would 
need for its independent development. Feeling secure because of 
the initial gains of their new vehicle, the Ne·r People's Party, the 
Yenan Faction made a tactical error a mere six months after its 
creation: 1n August 1946 they merged with the Kapsan Faction to 
form the Korean Worker's Party (KWP). A similar merger occurred 
in the South in November. What appeared to the Yenan Faction as 
a means towards achieveing greater influence bJ joining with the 
Soviets' favourites was, in fact, the opportun~ty which Kim Il-sung 
needed to consolidate his position. The merger allowed Kim Il-sung 
to avoid facing a strong united opposition because it alleviated 
the possibility of the Yenan Faction siding with his immediate 
adversaries, Pak Hon-yong's Domestic Communists. 6 His moves 
against the Yenan Faction were simply delayed ·oy this tactic, though 
eventually they proved to be very effective. 
The Kapsan Faction's strategy proved to consist of swift, 
direct attacks upon the Domestic Communists and the Nationalists, 
followed by slow attrition against the Soviet Koreans and the 
Yenan Faction from within the KWP's structure. The Soviet Union 
apparently consented to the former action and ·'jreated the latter 
events~ which occurred mainly after direct Soviet occupation had 
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ended, with indifference. The Nationalists had widespread 
support and represented a major barrier to the Russian influence 
which they bitterly opposed. The Soviets ini tia'.ly had attempted 
to curb their power by incorporating them into the power structure 
where they could be easily dominated. They offered Cho Man-s;k 
the Presidency of North Korea and promised that Kim Il-sung would 
remain his subordinate in the position of Defence Minister, with 
the stipulation that he accept the proposed Russian trusteeship 
over the country. Cho predictably refused, and ras placed under 
house arrest shortly afterwards following public cJashes with the 
Soviets ~n January and February 1946. 7 
Although they did not have any ideological differen~es of 
great importance with Pak Hon-yong and the Domestic Communists, 
the Soviets are reported to have come to regard tim as representative 
of the great factional strife which plagued Korean communism in 
the pre-World War Two period. 8 Therefore, they were unsympathetic 
towards his political aspirations and gave their approval to Kim's 
plans to move the locus of the nationwide communist movement's 
political activity away from Pak's power base in Seoul and to Kim's 
base in P'yongyang. Pak protested and did not 1ollow the move 
until the pro-US Rhee government in Seoul forced h~m to flee; when 
he came north he found Kim entrenched and himself isolated. 9 The 
Domestic Communists acquiesced by joining the KWP, though from the 
start they found their position untenable and their power negligible. 
The Yenan Faction's fall from power within the KWP proceeded 
slowly but relentlessly. One of its top leaders, Kim Tu-bong, 
began his career in the KWP in the exalted post of Chairman of the 
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Presidium of the First People's Assembly; when the war began 
he was the head of an insignificant military acade~ in a remote 
10 part of the country. Another pointed example of the Yenan 
Faction's plummeting fortunes was the history of Mu Chong, a 
much admired man in Yenan who had been a first commander of an 
artillery regiment in the PLA, was a close friend of Chu Teh, and 
had served as one of the eight delegates from Yer.an at the Second 
Border Region Congress in January 1946. As a leaJer of the Yenan 
Faction he had held many high posts within the KWP, but when the 
Korean War began he was simply serving as a military commander. 
In December 1950 the great purge of the Yenan Faction began and 
Mu was made a scapegoat for the earlier fall of P'yongyang. It 
has been reported that the Chinese People's Volur.teers ( CPV) 
rescued him from prison and had him transferred ba~k to China. 11 
It 1s highly unlikely that Kim's opposition to the Yenan 
Faction went unnoticed by the CCP leadership rrior to its decision 
to enter the Korean conflict. Salient evidence of this implic~t 
policy of limiting indirect Chinese influence wa~ displayed by the 
Korean authorities' initial reluctance towards allowing the 
Korean Volunteer Army, a substantial force of ethnic Koreans who 
had been fighting as an integral division of the PLA, to enter 
Korea via the town of Antung. When they finP.lly relented in 1949, 
for reasons which will be discussed below, the individuals with 
CCP membership were carefully screened before th~y were given their 
freedom; those with membership in the Soviet party, on the other 
hand, were granted immediate, unhindered entrance. 12 
Nevertheless, despite repeated insults and aggression towards 
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former comrades, the CCP apparently never displayed explicit 
indignation towards the actions of the Kapsan Faction. Although 
they were undoubtedly interested in the plight of their past 
associates, the exigencies of the ongoing Civil War certainly 
narrowed the Chinese leadership 1 s concern with .:~orean affairs to 
the extent that they were unable or.unwilling to become involved. 
When the domestic crisis lessened and they were given more of an 
opportunity to investigate the conditions in the former Chinese 
sphere of influence, the Chinese were presented with the fait 
accompli of Kapsan control. All the known evidence suggests that 
any subsequent efforts at exerting influence wau done directly 
through the existing leadership: there are no indications that they 
every attempted to work indirectly through the Yenan Faction. 13 
Although they possibly sympathized with the plight of the Yenan 
returnees, the ties with them were not close enough, nor was their 
interest great enough in the period prior to the Korean War for the 
CCP to nurture a bastion of Chinese influence adively in 
opposition to the desires of the Soviets, on whoiit they depended 
for future support, as shown in Chapter Three. 
Though Kim Il-sung made great efforts t0 remove from power 
those who were closest to the CCP, there is, however, evidence 
which implies that Chinese ideology was not tot~lly abhorent to 
Kim. Indeed, some go so far as to say that Kim joined the CCP 
in 1931, 14 though the North Koreans themselves deny that Kim ever 
left the country at any time prior to 1945, 15 possibly in an attemJt 
to stress the great nationalism of their lea1er. Nonetheless, 
Kim and the KWP did propagate the Thought of Mao Tse-tung prior to 
the Korean War, and, moreover, openly drew from it in their own 
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official writings. For exapmle, Kim clearly uses the idea of 
the "mass line" as outlined in Mao's 1943 essay "On Methods of 
Leadership" in his own "Report to the Second Congress of the 
16 Worker 1 s Party". There were other signs of Kim's admiration 
for the Chinese movement. Not only were thb works of Mao 
published in great quantity in 1946 and 1947, the North Koreans 
also showed active support for the CCP's efforts in the Civil War 
at the time. The best example of this support occurred at the 
end of 1946 when PLA units fled across the border following the 
KMT occupation of Antung. The Koreans clothed, fed, and reequipped 
them until conditions were favourable for their return. The PLA 
units did not reenter China until, 1947. 17 
No matter what Kim's past connections were with the CCP, it 
must be remembered that his rise to power was achieved under the 
direction of the Soviets. Though.he was not as reliable as one of 
the Soviet Koreans, the Soviets may have favoured him because he 
had recently been under their tutelage and had a ~ationalist image 
that would make him more acceptable to the Korean people. When 
he was first presented to the Koreans at a rally on 14 October 
1945, he was clearly a Russian protege - even his hair was cut in 
a Russian style. It is likely, however, that his background as 
a partisan, nationalist guerrilla would have made his total sub-
jugation to the Russians difficult to attain. I~cidents such as 
the reported rapes and lootings in which the Russians engaged 
when they entered Korea prob~bly provided Kim with a motive for 
an immediate search for more independence once a native power base 
within Korea had been achieved. 18 The use of Mao's Thought may 
have been the first indication of this - a latter day adaptation 
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of the Confucian tradition of using "barbarians to fight 
barbarians". But total dependence upon the Russians for aid 
made any strong deviation from the prescribed pt.th very risky, 
especially for one who had such a lofty goal as t.1e forceful 
reunification of his country. Moreover, no matter how much Kim 
may have wanted to balance his international connections, the 
Chinese were too busy with their own affairs to facilitate this 
desire. Although Kim may have had such motives during 1946-47, 
he showed almost no inclination towards them in the period 
beginning in 1948. It was his attitudes during ·vhis latter 
period which the Chinese had to consider when they were formulating 
their policy towards the Korean conflict. 
At the official party level, such relations as did exist 
between the CCP and the KWP from 1948 onwards were indifferent at 
best, and at times were marked by conflict. The Chinese pointedly 
did not send a representative to P 'yongyang until July 1950 (after the 
start of the war) and did not send an ambassador until 13 August. 19 
Although the period from 1945 to 1948 was marked by some 
definite acts of inter-party cooperation, such as the harbouring 
of the PLA units and the signing of a pact concendng the trans-
portation of goods (notably signed with the Transportation Committee 
of the Chinese Northeast Administration, who was later shown to 
have strong Soviet connections),20 after 1947 CCP-KWP relations 
were highlighted by the dispute over the Suphong Dam across the 
Yalu - the most apparent reason for the subsequent deterioration 
in cooperation. The dam was damaged by floods iu 1946 and was 
badly in need of repairs. The North Koreans chose a Soviet plan 
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for the dam's repairs which totally excluded Chinese participation. 
Moreover, this plan called for the sealing of the gates on the 
Chinese side and the diverting of all the overflow to Korean 
territory. The CCP representative in the area protested that 
half of the river ran through Chinese territory an~ that a large 
section of the dam was on Chinese soil. The Koreans, however, 
began unilateral construction in 1948 which continued into 1949. 
The Chinese, in turn, responded by barring Korean workers from 
acces~ to their territory. The dispute over the allocation of the 
dam's electricity was so bitter that the Soviets had to intervene 
in early 1949 to ensure that the surplus power was allocated to 
the Chinese. Nevertheless, reports that the ~hinese continued to 
interrupt railroad shipments of material to the dam persisted 
21 throughout 1949. 
It seems paradoxical, in the context of the above dispute, 
that some sources have reported that a mutual defence treaty was 
. . 1 4 22 . s1gned by the CCP and the KWP 1n March 9 9. Although 1t 1s 
possible that Soviet pressure on both sides produced a treaty that 
was designed principally to provide the Soviets w.!.th a surrogate for 
any future dispute. in Korea, it seems improbable ttat two parties 
which did not previously exchange ambassadors, and were in the 
midst of a dispute over power supplies, would embark on such a 
venture. The Chinese readiness to approve of a Republic of Korea 
(ROK) presence in North Korea following the September 1950 routing 
of the DPRK troops, as discussed in the following chapter, also 
tends to place the existence of such a treaty in d(ubt. 
Thus the CCP decision to enter the Korean War was not based 
on international socialist solidarity with a fraternal ally of long 
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standing. What is certain, however, is that this decision was 
based on a perception of national priorities, and that any 
assistance given to North Korea was intended to be1.efit or 
protect the PRC and not necessarily to save the KWP. It is 
interesting that the Chinese rarely used "socialist solidarity" 
as an explanation for their involvement: they always referred to 
the help and assistance that the Korean people had given their 
revolution. 23 Further evidence of their preoccupation with 
national interests is given by their lack of concel'n over the 
plight of thos.e Koreans who had helped the most, i.e., the Yenan 
Faction. There is no evidence that the CCP increased its support 
for this group even after the events of 1950 forced them to take 
a more active interest in Korean affairs. 
Although the possibility that the Chinese intervened partially 
to reestablish a presence in an area which was traditionally within 
their sphere of influence cannot be ruled out, the lack of a 
consistent, pro-Chinese stand by Kim in the years that followed 
the war either indicates that this policy was ineffective or that 
it did not exist. Although Kim did show an inc1eased tendency 
towards Maoist ideology in the period immediately :allowing CCP 
intervention, for example by directly copying the "Three Anti's 
II 24 . . • • Movement of 1952-53, th1s may be JUdged as exped1ency 1n that 
the survival of his regime totally depended upon the presence of 
Chinese troops in Korea. In the years following the war Kim Il-sung 
followed an evenhanded approach towards Peking ru.d Moscow. This 
probably suited the CCP, which at the time sought co be considered 
as Moscow's equal within the world communist bloc. A good 
indication of Kim's neutrality is the way in which he purged both 
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the Yenan and the Soviet Korean Factions extensively during the 
1950's. 25 The Kim regime may not have represented a: Chinese 
sphere of influence either prior to or ~allowing the Korean War, 
but neither did it represent a threat to Chinese sc-.vereignty. 
This is a point which must be considered when questioning the 
Chinese intervention which saved Kim Il-sung's regime. 
Although they probably had very little bearing on the Chinese 
decision to enter the war, the similarities betwe~n the nationalistic 
attitudes of Mao and Kim are noteworthy. Both leaders stressed 
their policy of guiding their nations·to true independence; both 
partially pursued this policy by purging foreign influences from 
their own parties. Mao had displayed this tendency as far back as 
the 1930's during his campaign against "The Returned Student 
Group" who had studied in Moscow when he was consnlidating his 
power within the CCP. 26 Kim did the very same thing in the 
'40's and '50's, except that one of the influences. he was militating 
against was Chinese in origin. One major difference was that Kim's 
!' 
moves were made with Soviet consent and Mao's were in defiance of 
Soviet authority. This does not, however, make Mao more national-
istic than Kim. Nevertheless, when Mao decided ~a commit the PRC 
to intervening and thereby saving the' KWP, Kim prob9.bly realised 
that this was not an act of altruism but rather one of protecting 
Chinese self-interests. Given their mutual proclivities and 
their knowledge of CCP-KWP relations prior to intervention, it is 
doubtful that either leader conceived of this act in any other way. 
- 74 -
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER FOUR 
1. Lee, Chong-sik, "Politics of North Korea : Pre-War Stage", in 
North Korea Today, Scalapino ed. (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1963), p. 4. 
2. For a brief description of the or1g1ns of the Yenan Faction 
see Sohn, Pow-key, Kim, Chol-choon, and Hong, Yi-sip, 
The History of Korea (Seoul: Korean Nat~onal Commission for 
UNESCO, 1970), pp. 298-299. 
3. Lee, "Politics of North Korea - Pre-War Stage'·', p. 13. 
4. Scalapino, R., and Lee, C.S., Communism in Kor~ (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1972), p. 267. 
5. ibid., p. 334. 
6. ibid., pp. 352-355. 
7. ibid., pp. 338-339. 
8. Lee, Chong-sik, "Kim Il-sung of North Korea" , Asian Survey, 
Vol. 7, (June 1967), p. 378. 
9. op. cit. , p. 329. 
10. ibid.' p. 371. 
11. Lee, Chong-sik, "Korean Communists and Yenan", The China 
Quarterly, (January-March, 1962), p. 184. 
12. Scalapino, R., and Lee; c.s., p. 4oo. 
13. Suh, D.S., and Lee, C.J., Political Leadership in Korea 
(London: University of Washington Press, 1976}, pp. 181-182. 
14. Simmons, R.R., The Strained Alliance (New Yc~k: The Free 
Press, 1975), p. 26. Interestingly, Scalapiro and Lee, in 
Communism in Korea, one of the most thorough works on the 
subject, never mention a direct link between Kim and the CCP. 
As Lee points out, the largely accurate records of the 
Japanese Consulate in Korea do not even list Kim as a member 
of the Korean Communist Party in 1931. See, Lee, Chong-sik, 
"Kim Il-sung of North Korea", p. 375. 
15. The Party History Institute of the Central Committee of the 
Worker's Party of Korea, Brief History of the Revolutionary 
Activities of Comrade Kim Il-sung (P'yongyalg: Foreign 
Language Publishing House, 1969), pp. 19-61. 
16. Simmons, pp. 30-31. 
17. ibid., p. 32. 
- 75 -
18. Scalapino and Lee, pp. 318-325. 
19. Kalicki, J.H., The Pattern of Sino-American Conflict 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 28. 
20. Simmons, p. 32. 
21. Whiting, A., China Crosses the Yalu, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1960), pp. 43-44. 
22. Simmons, pp. 32-33. Simmons's only source for this alleged 
treaty is Kyo.do Tsunshin, the major Japanese news agency, 
reporting in May 1950. The author himself points out the 
lack of documentary evidence. 
23. Whiting, A., p. 129. 
24. Scalapino and Lee, p. 164. 
25. Suh and Lee, p. 164. 
26. Waller, D.J., The Government and Politics of Communist China 
(London: Hutchinson University Library, 1970), pp. 28-30. 
- 76 -
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Korean War : 
The Decision to Enter the Conflict 
As the Sino-Soviet dispute became apparent, and the Cold 
War fear of monolithic communism subsided, it became increasingly 
accepted by scholars that the leadership of the PRC had little, 
if any, part in the planning of the outbreak 0f hostilities on 
the morning of 25 June 1950. There are, however, divergent 
opinions about the motivation behind the deployment of the Chinese 
People's Volunteers (CPV) and about the amount of information which 
the CCP was given by Moscow or P'yongyang in the preparations for 
battle. However, most evidence indicates that the PRC was surprised 
by the timing of the initial attack and that .;_t was only under what 
the CCP leadership believed to be extreme provocation which 
threatened their newly established regime that the PRC became 
involved in the conflict. A primar-y factor in tbe reluctance 
shown towards involvement was certainly the knowledge that a war 
with US-led troops would lead to an even greater dependence on the 
Soviet Union. The decision by the Chinese t0 become involved was 
widely interpreted by the Western world to be in strict keeping 
with her declared "leaning to one side" foreign policy, but, as 
Chapter Three has shown, the ''leaning " was not vury steep and the 
Chinese could have taken cognizance of the possibility that they 
were basically choosing the lesser of two adverse outcomes. 
It now seems fairly certain that the exact date of the North 
Korean advance into South Korea took the CCP by surprise. While 
it is widely assumed that the Soviet Union was in control and 
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therefore made the decision to begin the invasicn, there are 
those who argue that the war was instigated solel~- by Koreans, and 
that Stalin himself was surprised by the timing, though he was 
aware of the plan. Some believe that there was an understanding 
that the invasion would start in August, thereby glvlng the PRC 
time to complete the planned takeover of Taiwan and the Soviets 
a chance to return to the UN as the presiding na~ion over the 
Security Council, as they were scheduled to do. The 25 June 
invasion occurred, it is argued, because of factional fighting 
between Korean communists. This theory states that the Kapsan 
Faction started the invasion in order to catch their opponents the 
Domestic Faction, which was s~ill prominent ln the south despite 
the fact that its leader, Pak Hon-yong, had fled north, offguard 
and thereby consolidate its power over the entire country in one 
. f . 1 swl t stroke. The opinion that neither of the two major communist 
powers knew of the North Koreans' plans for the invasion has also 
been put forth by Wilbur Hitchcock, a former member of the US 
military government in South Korea, who as early as 1951 analysed 
any of the possible reasons for the Soviets to p~an an attack in 
June and found them all lacking. He also concluded that Kim had 
2 
acted without Moscow's knowledge. As Chapter Four has shown, 
Soviet influence over Kim Il-sung's government was evident, though 
not total, but the PRC did not even have an ~bassador in North 
Korea until July 1950. Therefore, while the theory that Stalin 
had no idea of the invasion seems slightly tenuous, it appears 
likely that the Chinese may have been totally ignorant of develop~ 
. . 3 
ments 2ns2de Korea. It has been said that the plans to invade 
were so secret that only a few cabinet members in North Korea were 
informed of them; that even top secret Korean Worker's Party 
documents covering the period from January to June 1950 made no 
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mention of them; and that only the highest officers in the 
Korean People's Liberation Army (KPLA) planned the buildup and 
< 4 
the subsequent attack. It is plausible that the PRC was totally 
barred from this exclusive cabal. 
While it is possible that the Chinese were uninformed about 
the actual starting date of the invasion, it is unlikely that they 
did not know that it was probable, if not inevitable. As 
Khrushchev remarks in his memoirs, the question of Korea was raised 
during the negotiations which culminated in the signing of the 
Sino-Soviet Friendship Agreement in February 1950. Mao's reaction 
to the possibility of war on the peninsula typified the apparent 
concensus within both Moscow and Peking: he did not believe that 
the US would enter the conflict because the Americans would v1ew 
it as an internal struggle, and consequently l.e favoured an invasion 
of the South by the North.5 Although this statement is attributed 
to Mao by Khrushchev, who may have harboured personal resentment 
against him and who could have wanted to show him in error, there 
is much evidence to corroborate that Mao thought US intervention 
unlikely. Though there were signs that the PRC was making prep-
arations for a conflict in Korea during the period from late 1949 
to mid-1950, these were ambiguous gestures at best. First there 
was the transfer of approximately 12,000 Korean Volunteer Corps 
troops who had fought in the Civil War with the PLA in Manchuria 
to the KPLA command. These transfers occurred throughout the 
period, and although they could be interpreted as support for the 
North Koreans' invasion preparations (the v1ew of the US 
government to a large extent), they could also be seen as a q:uid-
pro-quo for Korean compromises over the Yalu dam dispute. 6 In 
- 79 -
addition, there was concurrently the redeploymen·i.; of Lin Piao' s 
crack Fourth Field Army from the Southwest, where it was engaged 
J.n "bandit suppression", to Manchuria. Although this also could 
be interpreted as .a preparatory move, it was nonetheless done 
during a period of general demobilization and Lin Piao's troops 
were being returned to their home base where they could not only 
back up the KPLA, but also play an important role in the recon-
struction of the PRC's industrial heartland.7 The evidence, on 
balance, suggests that the Chinese knew that a war could break out 
in Korea, but felt that American involvement was so unlikely that 
they were making only the most minimal of preparations. 
The support for the PRC's belief in American non-intervention 
came, ironically, mostly from American sources. Most salient of 
these statements with American origin was the famous speech given 
by the then Secretary of State, Acheson, on 12 January 1950. In 
this speech he explicitly left both Taiwan and Korea out of the 
American "defence perimeter" in the Far East. In addition, there 
were statements made during the debate in Congrebs on the Korean Aid 
Bill such as the following from Congressman Donald Jackson, a 
Republican and a sympathiser of the anti-communist "China Lobby": 
"What kind of policy for the Far East would put economic 
aid into Korea, which bears no relationship to ot1r national 8 defence, and at the same time refuses to put .aid into Formosa". 
Even General Douglas MacArthur, a maJ.n antagonist in this 
plot, in a 1949 speech which concluded that US aJ.r power would turn 
the Pacific into an "Anglo-Saxon lake", pointedly neglected to 
include South Korea in the "defence perimeter". The result of 
these statements was Chinese indignation when Truman's 27 June 
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announcement following the advance of KPLA troops on 25 June 
reversed the implication of American policy towards both Taiwan 
and Korea. 
There were, however, hints that the stated US policy was not 
static. For instance, Truman stressed the words "at this time" 
when he ruled out the possibility of interven~ng to save Chiang's 
position on Taiwan in his 5 January speech. In addition, there 
was the provocative speech given by John Foster Dulles, then qpecial 
advisor to the State Department, to the National Assembly of the 
Republic of Korea on 19 June when he pledged US support for the 
ROK "in facing the challenge of communism". 9 It could be that 
the inexperience of the PRC in foreign relaticns precluded any 
accurate sensing of subtle changes in the American stance; or 
possibly the Chinese leaders believed that these were simply 
statements made to placate Truman's Republican critics. Whatever 
the reason, the PRC leadership was shocked and angered by Truman's 
27 June announcment which not only placed a US presence in the Korean 
conflict, but was also the advent of direct US interventibn in the 
Chinese Civil War in the form of the 7th Fleet patrols of the Taiwan 
Straits. The latter event was of primary concern to the CCP 
leadership. Although Truman described the action as "neutralising 
the Taiwan Straits", to the CCP it was anything but neutral. 
They perceived it to be a counter-revolutionary act cast in the 
same mould as the Allied intervention during tne Bolshevik Revol-
t . 10 U lOll. In the initial period of the conflict it was this 
involvement by the US in Chinese domestic matters which appeared 
to the CCP to be the greatest threat to their security. In their 
perception the US had shown its true imperialist nature for all to see. 
- 81 -
The 27 June statement meant that the Chinese plans for 
reuniting Taiwan with the mainland had to be cancelled, but it 
. 
remained to be seen whether the statement represented just a 
tentative declaration by a US President whose words were now highly 
unreliable. The basic pattern of PRC statements from this time 
until the full scale engagement with UN troops in mid-November 
was of showing great moral and ideological abhorence of Truman's 
actions while at the same time showing reluctance to fight. It 
can be presumed that the strategy was designed to give Truman 
every opportunity to change his mind again. 
It must have become apparent to the CCP that while for the 
forseeable future the US would effectively bl·:)ck any move against 
Taiwan, it would not direct its energies towards an invasion of 
Fukien province. Its actions were being concentrated on Korea 
and the move concerning Taiwan was essentially to place it officially 
within the "defence perimeter". The Chinese must have noticed 
that the actual presence of the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Straits 
was minimal, and that the majority of its ves,>els were in action 
off Korea and Okinawa. 11 
While the PRC press did not ignore the hostilities in Korea, 
the journalistic offensive for much of the initial period of the 
war was indeed "low-key". A statement by Truman on 30 June 
proved that the US was going to the extent of bombing targets 1n 
North Korea and of imposing a full .naval blockade, but this was 
met by the 14 July announcement in the authoritative foreign 
policy journal Shih-Chieh Chih-Shih that it would be wrong to 
assume that Chinese support for the nPRK meant that China would 
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enter the war. It was this type of announcement which typified 
most of the statements issued throughout July and lasting well 
into August. These did not prepare people for war, but they 
d;d th f 1. 13 ~ prepare em or any eventual ~ty. This was, nonetheless, 
the period of the KPLA's greatest success, and when the UN forces' 
Pusan beachhead did not fall, and the USSR showed no indication 
of sending material for a last offensive, the Peking press became 
markedly more cautious. Hints of this shift were most pronounced 
in the 26 August issue of Shih-Chieh Chih-Shih which unequivocably 
stated: "North Korea 1 s friends are our friends. North Korea's 
enemies are our enemies ••• North Korea's defence is our defence". 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the phrase, "North Korea's 
enemies are our enemies", was deleted from foreign language broad-
casts which carried the article. 14 The possibility of conciliation 
had not disappeared. 
The essence of the PRC's moves to compromise was the acceptance 
of South Korean forces entering North Korea, but not those of the 
US. The clearest evidence of this stance is contained in the 
account given by Indian ambassador Pannikar of his famous midnight 
meeting with Chou En-lai, during which the Premier unequivocably 
stated that the South Koreans did not matter, but that a US crossing 
of the 38th parallel would initiate a response by the PRC. 
Pannikar promptly sent this message to the British ambassador, who 
relayed it to the Americans. It must be assumed that either Mr. 
Pannikar was considered suspect by the Americans; that the message 
was classified a bluff; or that the US did not care to avoid a 
conflict with the Chinese, for on 7 October they pressed ahead with 
the resolution in the UN which authorised MacArthur to reunite all 
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of Korea. 15 This apparent insouciance towards Chinese threats, 
plus the earlier rejection of Nehru's proposal to remove foreign 
troops from Korea and to settle the matter within the Security 
Council with the PRC sitting as a full member, combined to create 
the impression that the US leadership was willing, if not eager, 
to fight. Moreover, during this period the UN commander, General 
MacArthur, had been making a series of increasingly virulent 
statements which could have only led the CCP to view the situation 
with increasing alarm. 
MacArthur's pronouncements must have been a source of worry 
for the PRC since his New Year's speech of 1950, in which he 
advocated rearming Japan - one of the CCP's greatest fears. Al-
though his statements continually contradicted official government 
statements, it is possible that the Chinese believed that he was 
indeed voicing the true US position; or that he was a rebel 
general (something not foreign to the Chinese experience), whose 
fanatical belief in a "preventive strike" might cause him to invade 
Manchuria without governmental approval. His close relations 
with ChiangKai-shek were probably particularly worrisome. On 
1 August 1950 he flew to Taipei without permission to confer with 
Chiang and promptly promised "effective military co-ordination 
between Chinese and American forces". 16 However, his most 
provocative statement occurred in October, after US troops had 
crossed the 38th parallel. In defiance of an earlier statement 
by President Truman that only ROK troops would actually reach the 
Yalu, he denied that non-Korean troops would halt before they reached 
tbc river and emphatically stated that his goal was to "clean 
Korea" in accordance with the UN resolution. 17 It J.s doubtful 
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that the CCP was surprised when MacArthur threatened to attack 
Manchuria following the disclosure that the PRC had intervened. 
The PRC, taking cognizance of the UN advances, logically 
turned to the Soviets in the first test of the February agreement. 
It has been stated that the Russians, alarmed by the imminent 
collapse of a buffer state as a consequence of MacArthur's 
advance, allowed the Chinese to enter in an effort to avoid direct 
. . . l . 18 
confl1ct w1th the US and a poss1ble global couf agrat1on. 
There is also the argument that they pressurised the Chinese into 
the conflict, not only for the above reason, but also to increase 
Chinese dependence on Soviet aid. There 1s much support for the 
conclusion that the Russians were working towards both ends. 
Whatever their motivations, it can be shown that the Russian 
policies at the time were a source of considerable discontent on 
the part of the Chinese. In fact, during the initial year of 
the war there was a noticable coolness surrounding PRC-USSR 
. 19 
relat1ons. This could be attributed to the possibility that 
not only was the USSR's support for the PRC's defensive intervention 
too little - it was also too costly. 
During the Cultural Revolution documents were released which 
support the theory that the Soviets used the Koree.n War to increase 
their hold on China. Those who hold this theory point to the 
Soviets' bad management of the move to gain a seat in the Security 
Council for the PRC as further evidence of Russian attempts to 
isolate China from the rest of the world. This was the price that 
Mao had to pay in a bargain which included, on the positive side, 
protection for Manchuria and a supply of arms. These arms, 
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however, had to be purchased from the Russians at a considerable 
monetary cost. There were reports during the Cultural 
Revolution that the debt was not repaid until 1965. As early 
as 1957, General Lung Yun, Vice-Chairman of the National Defence 
Committee, complained that it was "totally unfair for the People's 
Republic of China to have to bear all the costs of the Korean 
W 11 20 ar • It appears that the PRC leadership was forced into 
the uncomfortable position of being a proxy who had to pay for 
the privilege. 
The amount of arms which the CPV received from the Soviets 
was far from sufficient. Documents captured from the 26th Army 
of the CPV during the Chang-jin Reservoir campaign of November 
1950 declared how badly equipped the Chinese troops were when the 
decision to intervene was made. These documents, which cited 
shortages of transport, escort personnel and food, also stated 
• • II • 1 • 11 21 that the f1re power of the ent1re army was bas1cal y 1nadequate • 
The arms used in the first months were predominantly US-made 
weapons captured from the KMI' during the Civil War. It has also 
been noted that the USSR did not sell the PRC enough 'planes to 
counter the UN forces until late 1950. It may be that this 
paucity of arms can be attributed to the fears that too great a 
Chinese success could initiate massive US retaliations which could 
draw the Russians into the conflict. 22 But the effect was that 
the CPV troops were underarmed and that the PRC was dependent upon 
the Soviets for every piece of new equipment. It can be 
concluded that the threat to Manchuria must have been perceived as 
grave for the leaders of the CCP to put the independence of China, 
for which they had struggled so long and tenaciously, in jeopardy 
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such a short time after Liberation. 
The hydroelectric dams on the Yalu must have also entered 
into the strategic debate in Peking, but there is inconclusive 
' 
evidence over the importance they were allocated. It is true 
that the dams were powering,China's industrial base ~n Manchuria, 
and that Hanson Baldwin of the "New York Times"at the time of the 
Chinese intervention stated that a buffer zone around the dams 
C • 1 II • • • t • II 23 was h~na s m~n~mum obJec ~ve • Moreover, the CCP's 
willingness to protect China's interests in the dams was displayed 
during the 1948-1949 disputes with the DPRK over access to the 
electricity. Conversely, it has been shown that the Chinese 
press gave very little importance to the dams in the period from 
25 "l . . t• 24 ·June unt~ Ch~nese ~nterven J.On·. In addition, when Chou 
En-lai transmitted his warnJ.ng through the Indian ambassador,· and 
stated that the "South Koreans do not matter", he did so without 
pro vi so, i.e. , he did not state that they had to stay away from 
the dams. In balance, the evidence is inconclusive. It may be 
assumed, however, that an actual invasion of Chinese territory was 
the most pressing worry at the time and the Chinese economic 
interests in Korea were logically a secondary concern. 
There appears to be no clear evidence of factional stances 
during the debate within the CCP on intervention, but there are a 
few clues. Essentially, Mao seems to have been in favour of 
intervention and had the final word on how the battle should be 
2'-fought after a long discussion within the party. J The disregard 
of the shortage of arms certainly bears a Maoist stamp, but the 
actual tactics were not of the "protracted war" style. This was 
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not, however, a case of an indigenous army strug5ling in a war 
of national liberation: it was, in actuality, an action by a 
foreign army in another land. It is therefore plausible that 
the "people's war" tactics which had won the Civil War for the 
(,I 
CCP were not applicable and consequently Mao ·decided to adopt a 
more orthodox strategy. Nevertheless, it should be remembered 
that this was a period of ideological compromise on the part of 
Mao, as discussed in Chapter Two, and it is likely that these 
factors played a less critical role in the decision making process 
th t . . f . . 26 an he ex1genc1es o repell1ng the UN advance. 
It was reported during the Cultural Revolution that the 
economist Chen YUn and General P'eng Te-huai were opposed to the 
. t . 27 1n ervent1on. In the latter's case this seems linlikely because 
it is improbable that a man who opposed the war would be put in 
command of the armies involved. As for Chen YUn, any evidence at 
this time is very scant and inconclusive; the accusations of the 
Red Guards during the polarized political scene of the Cultural 
Revolution cannot be given too much credence. 
There were two men who made strategic statements at the time 
which definitely bore the Maoist stamp - but in one case the 
individual involved has been shown to have been more of a believer 
in the "professional" military ethic than a strictly orthodox 
Maoist officer. His statements only prove that officials showed 
respect for Mao's dictates in public, not that a Maoist faction 
existed which influenced strategy vis a vis the Korean conflict. 
It only manifests the extent to which ideological factors were of 
debatable consequence at the time. The man in question was 
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General Nieh Yen-jung, whose "professional" credentials are 
28 discussed in Chapter Two. He reportedly told the Indian 
ambassador, Mr. Pannikar, when being questioned about the possible 
use of atomic weapons by the Americans, that China lives on farms 
against which the bomb was useless. He also stated that a loss 
of a few million people would be of little long term importance 
to China. This is a clear reflection of Mao's "atom bombs are 
paper tigers" policy of the time. 29 The second to make Maoist 
comments was Chou En-lai, who was reported to have stated that the 
PRC was willing to retreat into the interior if the US attacked, 
and to rely on the Northwest and the Southwest a~;. rear bases during 
a "prolonged war" against the Am.ericans. 30 Of co~rse, this could 
have been more of a diplomatic warning to the Americans than a 
profession of ideological purity. Such statements are marked by 
Maoist phraseology, yet they are not proof that a strong Maoist 
faction formed around the Korean question. 
There is evidence, however, that during the d;~bate Mao :nay 
have discussed certain byproducts of intervention which could improve 
China's position in dealing with other nations, especially the 
Soviet Union. From later statements, it seems possible that the 
idea that the prestige that intervention could bring would be useful 
in negotiations may have been evident. For example, ln a 1962 
statement to the 10th Party Plenum, Mao declared that it was on;Ly 
after the sacrifices of the Korean War "that the Soviets trusted 
• II 31 the CCP and thought of them as true cornmunlsts • 
The CPV crossed the Yalu approximately on 16 October· 1950, and 
the .final decision to intervene was probably mad,e aroundthe time 
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that the UN resolution of 7 October, which gave MacArthur 
authority to cross the 38th parallel, was passed, although it 
should be noted that massive buildups began in Manchuria in 
September following the Inchon landing and the subsequent UN 
counter-attack. It is als'o noteworthy that conciliatory moves 
continued following the crossing of the Yalu. The actual desig-
nation of the troops involved as volunteers showed that the PRC 
wanted to display to the world that it was not solidly committed 
at the state level. They described the action as being similar 
to that of the foreign brigades during the Spanish Civil War. 32 
In addition, the Chinese were reported to have avoided contact 
from the time when their presence was first known until mid-
November, and there are some reports that as late as 23 or 24 
November the CPV had released ROK and US POW's with a message 
. t d. t 33 say1ng hat they 1d not wan war. When fighting began in earnest, 
however, the Chinese fought with great resolution and the US Ar~ 
consequently suffered one of the greatest defeats in its history. 
This chapter has attempted to isolate and illustrate some of 
the prime considerations which must have been in the minds of the 
PRC leadership when the decision to enter the Korean conflict was 
made. Their decision was formed in the face of what were perceived 
as grave threats from an adversary who was showing little 
responsiveness to the PRC attempts at compromise. This decision 
was the PRC's first experience in the arena of superpower politics 
and the impressions which were gathered during this time cert~inly 
had an effect on how future international dealings were managed. 
These ramifications will be analyzed in following sections. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CCP Policy on Vietnam: Domestic Political Factors 
The years 1965-66 saw the plainest public manifestations of 
the great intra-CCP conflict that had been developing for almost 
ten years previously. The political consensus that had marked 
the summer and autumn of 1950, when the CCP response to the Korean 
conflict was being formulated, had long since disappeared. There-
fore, the domestic considerations involved in the strategic debate 
over the escalating conflict in Vietnam were of a fundamentally 
different nature: 1n 1950 th~ entire Party was consolidating 
its power over China; in 1965-66 the doctrinaire Nia.oists were trying 
to re-establish their control over the Party. The conflict that 
was brewing was so perv~sive that it necessarily had ramifications 
for the course that the Chinese government was to follow in its 
policy towards Vietnam. The Maoists, ~eaded by Mao and his heir 
apparent, Marshal Lin Piao, felt that their battle was for the 
soul of the nation, a quasi-religious crusade for ~he revolutionary 
purity of t·he Chinese nation. They perceived the primary threat 
to their interests to be internal. Nevertheless, this internal 
threat had international undertones. The origins of the conflict, 
known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution(CR), can be 
found in the 1950's when Mao rejected the Soviet tutelage that 
had marked the early part of the decade and strove for an original, 
purely Chinese means of economic development, as was epitomized 
by the Great Leap Forward (GLF). When the GLF faltered and 
opposition tovrards it grew within the CCP and then surfaced with 
the attacks of Marshal P'eng Te-huai at Lushan in 1959, it was the 
implied opinion that Soviet ways were required for China that Mao 
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found the most disturbing. From Lushan onwards Ma0ist policy, 
both domestic and international, was to lessen Soviet influence. 
Begining in 1965 the conflict became increasingly Sinocentric 
as Mao looked with vigour towards eliminating ti:10se "revisionists" 
within the CCP who were likely to allow the spread of non-Chinese, 
i.e., Soviet, influences. 
The rejection of Soviet-inspired econom~c planning was ironic 
because the First Five Year Plan, influenced by the Russians, had 
produced some encouraging results. On the surface the First Five 
Year Plan appears to have been predominate in plans for economic 
development. The increase in industrial production of the PRC 
since Liberation had been phenomenal and rivalled s.ome of the 
most successful economies in the world. Kang Chao, using his own 
set of economic indices design~d to rule out the exaggerations that 
may have been present in the official statistics, estimates that 
industrial production rose by an average of 14.4% per year during 
those five years. Japanese production, by comparison, rose by 
1 15%. According to official Chinese statistics the Gross National 
Product (GNP) of the PRC grew by 76% during the First Five Year 
2 Plan. The reasons for abandoning such an approach must have been 
very convincing. 
The Soviet aid to China during 1952-1957 was significant ~n 
quantity, but far from sufficient to achieve the g:::-owth rates men-
tioned above. The greater part of the investment wtich fired this 
growth in heavy industry came from the Chinese themselves, which 
meant from the agricultural production of the peasantry. 3 Therefore, 
agriculture was the base of the economy, yet it received little or 
none of the investment. In addition, Soviet aid had to be repaid 
from 1954 onwards, thus compelling the Chinese to export much of 
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their agricultural production to the USSR.4 In effect the CCP, 
in a way reminiscent of Stalinist Russia, was draining the pea-.santry 
in order to fuel industrial growth. The CCP, however, owed its 
success to the peasants and could not foresake them. The Chinese 
quandary was, therefore, how to increase production in agriculture 
while continuing to expand heavy industry at an intense rate with-
out disaffecting the peasantry. For Mao, the GLF was the answer. 
The GLF began in 1958 and its feverish pace was incredible. 
Mao's belief in the wonders of the Chinese will, his belief in 
the power of voluntarism, was put into practice with some notable 
results. The CCP claimed increases in factory producion of almost 
70% in 1958 alone, though Western analysts put the figure at 
around 35% - an impressive figure in its own right.5 Official 
reports placed agricultural production at 375 million tonnes, 
nearly twice the level of the 1957 crop. This fugure was sub-
sequently revised to 193 million tonnes, a record harvest, but 
pale in comparison to the first reports. 6 The error in estimates 
was blamed on the over-enthusiasm of the cadres, which in light 
of the pressure which the CCP was putting on tte peasants and 
the cadres during the campaign to create People's Communes and 
to increase production is a plausible explanation. At the heart 
of Mao's vision of the GLF was the belief that by tapping the 
strength of the Chinese peasantry through "placing politics in 
command" of a communal system, production could sky-rocket and 
communism could be achieved by the Chinese far before any other 
people of the world - including the Russians. It was during this 
period that the Maoist belief that material incentives were insig-
nificant compared to what could be achieved by a belief in correct 
doctrine began to be emphasized. Mao thought that the answer to 
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the contradictions caused by following the Soviet model could be 
rectified by a mass mobilization campaign coupled with an abm1don-
ment of materialism. On the practical level this could increase 
production without having to give more to the peasants, who would 
. 7 instead recelve a"psychic income" from putting Maoism into practlce. 
At the time the CCP leadership seem to have managed to convince them-
selves of this, as indicated by Liu Shao-ch'i's declaration of 
support for the GLF: "Hard work for a few years; happiness for a 
8 thousand." 
The reasons for the failure of the GLF are many and there lS not 
the space to go into them in detail. There are, however, some salient 
aspects of its failure that should be mentioned for they had implic-
ations for the future. Firstly, 1959 saw the first of the successlon 
of three bad winters that marked the PRC's economic slide. Though 
there were undoubtedly natural reasons for the disastrous harvests, 
manmade factors exacerbated the situation. These factors can be 
attributed to the drastic swing away from the Soviet style of manage-
ment and centralized planning, and towards an almost totally decentral-
ized system which was characterized by planning calculated by the 
commune's party committee. Although there had been earlier moves 
towards a Party controlled economy, such as the introduction of the 
Harbin system of centralized CCP contro1, 9 they did not include the 
destruction of one-man management of enterprises as was the case 
during the GLF. During this drive to collectivize management at the 
local Party committee level, there was a total breakdown of control 
as all operational details and central economic coordination vanished. 
Production was being administered by the production brigade cadres 
who had little ability but an excess of zeal. Consequently, there 
were many instances of improper implementation as operations were 
1; 11 11 • nlO fouled in the name of self-reliance and of redncns over expertlse. 
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The most dire consequences were seen in the water conservation 
drive announced by the Central Committee in 1958 il'hich eventually 
employed 70 million people in canal digging. The p:>:>oduction 
brigade cadres constructed canals without proper geological invest-
igation and eventually destroyed the regular functions of the main 
rivers and.caused roughly 405,000 hectacres of arable land to 
. ll become alkallne. 
As the excesses of the GLF became apparent, the less dedicated 
Maoists became disenchanted with Mao's non-Soviet approach. Many 
were angered by the indirect, and at times direct, critic ism of 
12 
their policies which the GLF represented. The first hint of the 
extent of the Soviets' displeasure was the unilateral abrogation 
of an agreement made in 1957 (and negotiated by P'eng Te-huai) to 
supply the PRC with a sample atomic bomb to aid the Chinese nuclear 
programme. The implication that this had for the military, which 
under P'eng was firmly wedded to Soviet-style "professionalism," 
were immense and the fear of losing access to other modern weapons 
grew. Some of the Party bureaucrats, such as the pragmatic finance 
. . y . f l 13 mlnlster Chen un, also showed slgns o a arm. These anxieties 
finally surfaced at the Lushan Conference of 1959 when P'eng 
strongly criticized the GLF and implied support for Soviet policies. 
Although he was purged for the perfidy, the havoc which the withdrawl 
of the Soviet technicians in 1960 created caused members of the CCP 
leadership who had originally moved against him to look back favour-
ably towards P 1 eng 1 s pronouncements. Mao's position in the CCP was 
tarnished by the post-GFL depression years of 1959-1962 which saw 
China return to the famine conditions that Liberation was supposed 
to have eliminatc:d permanently. ConsequcnUy, in the period between 
Lushan and tlj(' beginning of the Cultural Revec lution, Mao's position 
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worsened in relationship to that of the pragmatlc Liu Shao-ch 1 i. 
Paradoxically, Mao had succeeded in planting his supporter Lin Piao 
in the position of Minister of Defence as P 1 eng 1 s replacement and 
thereby had assured that the waning of his ( M9.o 1 s) influence was 
only temporary. 
It has been argued that Mao voluntarily allowed Liu to take 
the commanding role when he resigned from the position of head of 
state at the Wuchan Conference of 1958. The reasons given for this 
range from the desire to save the supreme leader from the backlash 
against policies that had already proved unpopular to the propos-
ition that Mao wanted to groom Liu as his heir in order to avoid 
the problems of succession that had plagued the Soviets following 
S . I 14 talln s death. Nevertheless, though Mao may have desired a 
less active role in state affairs, it is unlikely that he envisaged 
the disregard for his policies that accompanied the rise of Liu. 
In essence, Liu proved by his actions that P 1 eng 1 s criticisms at 
Lushan had not been forgotten and that the "revisionism" that 
Mao so loathed was gaining strength. 
P 1 eng Te-huai was military professionalism personified and 
it is not surprising that it was he who defiantly stood up to Mao. 
Unlike Mao, P 1 eng's formative years, militarily speaking, were not 
during the Yenan years that Mao idealized, but rather during the 
Korean conflict when he saw at first hand what power arms could 
have over men. It was at that time that P 1 eng realized the value 
of his Russian advisers and modern weapons, and this impression 
• • Mi" • t f D f 15 was to last durlng hls tenure as nls er o e ence. He strove 
to mould the PLA into the shape of the Soviet Red Army and even 
though he paid lip service to Maoist doctrine, in reality.he had 
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dismissed it as irrelevant. Following the Korean demobiliza-
tion he created a conscript army that was run by a hard-core 
professional elite, and many of the veterans of the pre-Libera-
tion days were replaced by young men trained 1n modern techniques. 
His reign was marked by other conditions which were anathema to 
the Maoist ideal: relations between officer and soldier and 
16 between the PLA and the civilian populus both worsened. Finally, 
and possibly most notably, P'eng's copying of the Soviet model 
led him to dismantle the organizational means by which Party 
control over the PLA was achieved. The role of the political 
commissar diminished and by the end of his PLA career large numbers 
of PLA units were without a Party cadre. On the national level, 
P 'eng saw that the function of the Military Affairs Committee (MAC) , 
the CCP's organ of control over the military, became purely symbolic 
and he was later accused of trying to replace it with a military 
. . 17 
comm1ss1on. 
It is clear that P'eng represented a threat to Mao and that 
the Lushan Conference must be remembered when the Cultural Revolution 
and the role of the military in that upheaval are discussed. P'eng's 
avers1on to "placing politics in command," to quote Mao's famous 
adage on the control of the military, was not limited to the PLA, 
but, as Lushan showed, applied to economic planning as well. He 
opposed every aspect of Mao's collective local party leadership 
policy, as was well illustrated by his attitude towards the People's 
Militia. As a part of the. GLF mass mobilization drive, the notion 
of "people's war" and of the universal militia was revived and the 
militia was placed under the control of the local party committees 
and not the military. In a concomitant development that increased 
P'eng's disdain for Party control, the PLA was required to join the 
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mobilization by devoting a great deal of its energy to civil works 
18 instead of to training in sophisticated weaponry. The concept 
of the CCP as the guiding light for the PLA and the entire Chinese 
people was sacrosanct to Mao: it was central to his Leninism and 
to his v1s1on of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, when P'eng 
presented his so-called "Letter of Opinion" at Lushan and proclaimed 
that: "Putting politics in command is no substitute for economic 
. . . . ,19 . . pr1nc1ples, st1ll less for econom1c work .•. , 1 t 1-ras a d1rect 
blow to the legitimacy of Mao's doctrine and, by inference, his 
rule. 
Another key element of P'eng's attack was the implied belief 
that the Soviet leadership of the socialist bloc &~d of China was 
still desirable. This diverged sharply with the Maoist analysis 
at the time that viewed the Soviets as being deficient ideologically 
. . . d Am . 20 because of the1r accommodat1ng att1tu e towards. er1ca. In 
addition, Mao had evidence which suggested to him that P'eng had 
consulted the Soviets before his offensive and had coordinated his 
assault with them. This move was seen as treacherous and it also 
showed Mao and his supporters just how eager the Russians were 
to direct developments within China. Khrushchev's attack on the 
People's Communes four days after P'eng's attack at Lushan was 
evidence of these desires. 21 Therefore, P'eng's attack on the GLF 
and its policies was monumental because it was aimed at the core 
of Mao's image as the man who defined China's national interests. 
It attacked his social policy of "placing politics in command" and 
it scorned the idea that China had a unique means of development 
by implying that Soviet ways were enviable enough for China to 
humble herself by accepting Soviet influence, no matter how unsuit-
able that influence might be. P'eng should be seen as the archetypal 
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"revisionist" and many of the charges law1ched during the CR 
were against those who displayed to some degree the traits 
attributed to him. 
It is interesting to note that following the humiliation of 
Lushan and in the midst of the failures of tht~ GLF, Mao still 
commanded enough respect among his colleagues to have his choice 
named as P'eng's successor. It is possible that P'eng simply 
struck too soon - the discontent a year later might have made 
a more successful attack possible. Throughout the period in 
which his power was eclipsed by Liu's (and some say throughout 
his career), Mao showed an ability to concentr~te all of his 
efforts on key issues and, by virtue of his position in the view 
of the public as the person who symbolized the Revolution, to 
succeed in formulating policies that ran counter to the prevailing 
d . 22 tren s at that tlme. Following P'eng's purge a short while 
after Lushan, it is now apparent that Mao planned to make the 
reform of the PLA such an area. The appointment of Lin Piao 
marked the true beginning of the period of reform, even though 
attacks on "professionalism" had occurred sporadically since the 
mid-1950's. These previous campaigns, however, lacked the concerted 
effort and drive that Lin's had in abundance. 23 Through his 
ability to have such an ally ln charge of the PLA Mao succeeded 
ln forming a power base in a period when his political position 
within the CCP had lessenec; he thereby laid the foundations for 
creating a powerful political and social force with which to attack 
in the future those within the Party who were undermining his 
doctrine. 
Lin Piao's Maoist credentials were impressive and he had 
continued to gain prominence throughout the 1950 1 s, making him a 
~ 
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• • 1 24 log1cal cho1ce by Mao as P eng's successor. Not only did he 
show ideological purity during his reform campaign, but Lin also 
displayed the political skills required to form the PLA into a 
unified, disciplined and loyal Maoist bastion. This does not 
mean that there were not vestiges of P'eng's rule - the Wuhan 
incident in later years would prove that Lin's sway over some of 
the more conservative elements was not tota1. 25 Nevertheless, 
Lin combined aspects of ideological indoct~ination and some 
pragmatic buying of loyalty and thereby achieved the desired end, 
an enclave of Maoist thought throughout the period of Liu's 
greatest power. 
Lin's success in avoiding regionalism in the Field Army 
commands, and in creating loyalty in the high command, has be2n 
attested by John Gittings who points out that the record of 
continual service between 1960 and 1967 of commanders at both 
. . 26 . 
reg1onal and nat1onal level was very good. ~herefore, 1t can 
be deduced that his methods of switching the values of the com-
anders away from "professionalism" and at indoctrinating young 
officers were successful. If he had not succeeded, and if Whitson 1 s 
model lS valid, then factionalism based on Field Army loyalties, 
which was a distinct possibility during the period coinciding with 
the entry into Korea, could have played an impcrtant role during 
this period of reform. 27 There is little doubt that Lin did appease 
the officers and soldiers to an extent. For instance, the yearning 
for modern weapons by some commanders, such as the obviously more 
"professional" Air Force officers, was satisfied by the continued 
importance placed on the nuclear weapons programme and on the 
building of modern aircraft despite the poor shape of the economy. 
In addition, the militia and PLA's civil construction work, 
irritants to many otherwise loyal officers, were praised heavily 
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in the press around 1965-1966, though there lS little evidence 
28 
that they were revived to their GLF level. The average soldier 
had shown increasing displays of disaffection during the disastrous 
years following the GLF, when food shortages caused illness amongst 
the ranks and stories of hardships in the home villages caused 
anxieties. Lin combatted this by raising the status and material 
level of the dependents of soldiers and by increasing rations to 
29 the troops. These practical measures facilitated the acceptance 
of the indoctrination campaign that began shortly after Lin took 
office. 
The landmark in the process of the reindoctrination of the PLA 
and of the reintroduction of "politics in command" within the 
military was the enlarged meeting of the MAC in September and 
October 1960. Its message was the tightening of political control 
throughout the armed forces. This began with the strengthening 
of the MAC and the General Political Department at the upper levels; 
concomitantly, political commissars and collect-ive leadership 
reappeared at the basic unit level. In 1960 Lin had already 
succeeded in making sure that eighty percent of the platoon had 
party cells. 30 Another highwater mark of the campaign of political 
indoctrination was the 1961 publication of the "Regulations Govern-
ing PLA Management and Educational Work at the Company Level" which 
strongly asserted that all tendencies to borrow foreign, i.e., 
Soviet, experiences in military training should be strenously 
"d d 31 avol e . These initial moves were sufficient to raise the PLA's 
morale to a level that enabled the Chinese to defeat the, Indian Army 
soundly in the border conflict of 1962. 
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The political education of the rank and file soldier gre1.,r 
1n intensity until Mao and Lin considered the PLA's ideological 
soundness at all levels to be worthy of emulation by the public. 
The PLA soldier's ability to apply Mao Tse-tung's Thought to every 
aspect of life, and his unyielding sacrifice and conviction were 
first praised in the press beginning in late 1064 and early 1965. 
Lin's ability to use intense political study to ra1se morale even 
through the darkest periods sparked Mao's imagination and led him 
to conclude that such a campaign throughout the nation could 
improve his own image after the hardships of the post-GLF period. 
Therefore in 1964, as soon as the economic situation began to 
improve, the virtuous PLA soldier- the epitome of socialist man 
guided by Mao Tse-tung's Thought and inculcated with the spirit of 
Yenan - was presented to the Chinese as the member of society that 
they should most admire. This public relations drive, under the 
rubric of the "Learn From the PLA Campaign", encouraged people to 
emulate the soldier's philosophy and life style, with special 
emphasis placed on the diligent study of Mao's doctrine. 32 
In a related move, Lin was also in the process of moving large 
numbers of loyal Maoist officers into positions of importance in 
state ministries, especially those concerned with economic planning. 
It is significant that by 1965 Lin had replaced Chen Yun, noted for 
his conservatism and pragmatic approach as Fine.nce Minister, as 
. . . St t C ·1 33 sen1or V1ce Prem1Er 1n the a e ounc1 . One may conclude that 
during the years leading to the CR, the PLA was being manoeuvered 
into a position of domestic political importance and that its role 
was that of Mao's representative 1n the state and in society. In 
other words, it was being placed 1n strategic positions for the 
struggle against "revisionism" that lay ahead: its energies were 
being directed towards political battles within China and, as will 
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be shown below, not towards preparing for a battle with the US 
over Vietnam. The following section will explain how the initial 
mobilization following the massive US bombings of North Vietnam 
were essentially perfunctory. They should be seen as distractions 
from Mao and Lin's primary targets -the "revisionists" represented 
by Liu and the other Party bureaucrats who were taking the PRC 
" down the "capitalist road. 
The period that followed the disastrous years of 1959 to 1962, 
when China was in the grips of economic depression, has been 
described as the time of "recovery and readjustment." The effects 
of those hard years were substantial: three bad harvests had 
reduced many to the brink of starvation and the withdrawal of the 
Soviet technicians with their blueprints had left the industrial 
sector in chaos. Liu and his colleagues in the CCP bureaucracy 
moved in to pick up the pieces. The methods they used naturally 
had to be well planned and coordinated in the face of such adverse 
conditions. Consequently, many Maoist tenets were quietly disregarded, 
and the expertise of the manager and the technician again reigned 
over the "redness" of the cadres, although the opposite virtues 
were being stressed in the PLA at the time. The period was marked 
by a general recentralization of economic planning as Party bureaucrats 
34 l 
regained order. There can be little doubt. that the, M:=wisi;s 
accepted these moves on the grounds of expediency: the discontent 
that was brewing amongst the people was evident and some appeasing 
measures were needed. These included the reappearance of private 
plots for the peasantry. Nevertheless, Mao continued to make 
noises about "class struggle", as he did at the lOth Plenum of 
the 8th Central .Committee in 1962, though it is significant that 
no great political moves against the Liu regime occurred until 1964 
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when the economy was once again placed on a sounder footing. 35 
The five years of Liu's pinnacle of power provided plenty of 
evidence for the Maoists that the "revisionism" caused oy the 
power of rigid centralized bureaucracy was widespread. While 
it cannot be said that Liu and his colleagues made any overt 
signs of reintroducing Soviet aid and influence (the Russian 
actions at the time must have damaged Chinese pride on both 
sides of the burgeoning split), there were subtle hints that many 
Party bureaucrats would not rule this out as a possible future 
expediency. The most famous example of this WE'.s Peking 1 s Deputy 
Mayor Wu Han's play, "Judge Hai Jui is Dismissed", which many, 
including Mao himself, interpreted as a protest against the purge 
of P'eng Te-huai. There were also some indications that Liu was 
36 
not opposed to rehabilitating P'eng. Moreover, Liu was becoming 
increasingly blatant in his attacks on Maoist policies. He 
characterized the post-GLF disasters as being ''70% man-made", 
and his revised 1962 edition of his work "Ho~ to Be a Good Communist" 
removed all mention of Mao's Thought. 37 In 1964, when the economy 
and the PLA were both considered strorig enough, Mao launched his 
first comeback assault in the form of the "Socialist Education 
Movement", a rectification campaign aimed at bureaucratic tendencies 
amongst cadres at all levels. Mao pointedly allowed Liu to direct 
the campa1gn. The vigor with which Liu and his colleagues attacked 
the basic level while ignoring the transgressions of the elite 
added weight to Mao's conviction that his erstwhile associate was 
II • • • II 38 following the Soviet path towards a restorat1on of cap1tal1sm • 
Interestingly it was, in Mao's own words, in 1965, the year that the 
Vietnam escalation occurred, that Mao decided that Liu represented 
a grave threat to the PRC's revolution and would have to be removed. 39 
At that time Mao had definite domestic usage of the PLA in mind. 
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The Maoists did not rely exclusively on the PLA's support 
ln the coming battle against Liu and the CCP bureaucracy. They 
assessed the need of keeping the mechanism of state as intact as 
possible. Therefore, Mao and Lin assiduosly gained the support 
of the CCP' s chief organizer and its most skillful politician -
Chou En-lai. It is possible that they planned to use the state 
organs, as opposed to the Party organs, to shield the economy and 
other vital programmes from the upheavals. Mao realized that 
Chou was needed for his administrative abilities and to safeguard 
the PRC's international standing - presumably to keep it from 
deteriorating even more. Throughout the CR Ma0 and Lin protected 
Chou's position, and Chou, in turn, tried to protect the key state 
. . . 4o . 
mlnlstrles from Red Guard attack. Though Chou was probably ln 
basic ideological agreement with Mao at the time, one of his chief 
concerns was the protection of the ministries. Therefore, although 
Chou should be seen as an ally of the Mao-Lin group, it should be 
remembered that he had his own special administrative concerns. 
The prime example of Chou's protection for key areas was his 
support for the Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi during the 1967 Red Guard 
assault against "revisionism" in the Foreign Ministry. Ch'en Yi's 
position seems to be parallel to Chou's: his foreign policy 
statements were in line with the Maoi$t line, but he opposed the 
extention of the Cultural Revolution into foreign affairs. He 
was an administrator who was striving to retain cordial relations 
if possible with other states during this period of general isolation 
. 6 41 that began ln 19 5. Although he was prone to an elitist style, 
Mao considered him a close enough ally to shield him from any dire 
42 
consequences throughout the CR. 
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The economy of the PRC at the time of the Chinese entry into 
the Korean conflict was in a period of recovery: likewise, when 
strategic decisions in regard to the Vietnam conflict were being 
made it was just regaining the ground that it had lost during the 
depression of the early 1960's. However, the position was fundament-
ally different because, unlike in 1950, the conflict with the 
Soviets meant that there was no chance of an influx of foreign 
capital. All investment was generated solely by the PRC's own 
production and all imported technology from selected Western sources 
was paid for without credits. Beginning in the early 1960's the 
Chinese had imported grain from nations such as Australia and 
. 6 t . t. . 43 Canada, and ln 19 5 Chou s ated that thls prac lCe would contlnue. 
This, in short, was a period of financial constraints and economic 
growth was necessarily limited to certain specific areas. The 
Chinese, who in the 1950's had been able to export food to the 
Soviets, were forced to expend valuable foreign exchange in order 
to obtain grain. Therefore, quite naturally, the focus of economic 
planning was emphatically placed on agricultural production through-
out the years of recovery and during the period of the strategic 
debate over Vietnam. The manufacturing plant imported from France, 
Britain, Italy, Japan, etc., was for the most part planned to 
augment agricultural production. Only a few areas of heavy industry 
were picked for expansion during these years and agriculture-related 
industries, such as chemical fertilizer and tracto~ manufacturing, 
were given top priority. The years of universal. ~xpansion of heavy 
industry had ended with the Soviet withdrawal and in the following 
years, under Liu's auspices, the emphasis was :placed only on those 
. 44 
areas which were the most essentlal. In many of the key heavy 
industries such as steel, however, produGtion was just limping up 
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to the highest levels reached during the GLF. In many respects 
the PRC had lost up to eight years' worth of growth. 45 
One area of outstanding success during the period of interest 
was in the PRC's level of energy production. By 1966 the amount 
of coal produced had doubled, as had the level of electricity manu-
facture. Oil production had increased by a healthy one hundred per-
46 
cent. The additional energy was helpful in that it allowed the 
PRC to be self-sufficient and free frqm a dependence on foreign 
supplies, but it was only sufficient to continue to run an economy 
in a chronically weakened state: it did not allow for any great 
burst of production 1n other than the already specified areas, and 
it was not produced 1n quantities sufficient for large scale export. 
Besides agriculture the only other area into which large amounts 
of capital were being directed was the development of nuclear weapons 
and sophisticated aircraft. As mentioned befo:r:e, this can possibly 
be related to Lin Piao's strategy aimed at buying the PLA's support, 
but nonetheless the amount of resources directed into these program-
mes shows how much support they must have had in all quarters of 
the CCP, indicating international considerations. The nuclear 
programme may have taken between two and three percent of the 
entire GNP, a considerable burden for a developing country with 
scarce technical capabilities and only the minimum of an industrial 
base. 47 
The degree to which nuclear expenditure interfered with 
conventional weaponry development and procurement is noteworthy. 
It has been estimated that the nuclear development programme 
accounted for twenty-five to thirty percent of the military budget, 
so it is unlikely that a conventional force necessary for a 
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confrontation with the US in Vietnam was being funded. 48 This 
is the best explained by the domestic priorities of the PLA at the 
time. 
Western observers waited with anticipation for the official 
announcement of the Third Five Year Plan throughout 1965-1966, yet 
despite all the speculation they waited in vain. (The GLF to all 
intents and purposes was the Second Five Year Pian.) As we have 
seen, the great divisions which culminated in the launching of the 
CR were evident at the time and the attention necessary for pl~nned 
economic expansion was probably being diverted towards the initial 
stages of the struggle. Some of the observers noted that economic 
growth was being foresaken so that the more desirable achievement 
f . . ul . 49 . o revolut1onary pur1ty co d be obta1ned. In a sense th1s was 
true. Even though the economy inherently faced some tangible 
constraints on growth, no concerted effort could be possible until 
ideological consensus within the CCP had been reached. The split 
between the two groupings over the nature of economic growth was 
exemplified by the dispute between Mao and Liu ;ver the allocation 
of tractors: the former favouring ownership by the communes 1n 
keeping with a policy of self-reliance; the latter favouring the 
S . 1 f . 50 ov1et style state monopo y over arm equ1pment. It is this 
issue of copying the Soviet model that was at the heart of the 
conflict and by 1966 the issue had still not been fully resolved. 
There were still elements within the CCP which 3howed signs of 
accepting the foreign model which the Maoists found totally 
unsuitable. It was this struggle which was foremost in the minds 
of the CCP leadership as the US escalated its commitment in the 
Vietnam War in 1965 and 1966 and, as we shall see, influenced the 
Chinese strat~gic debate over the conflict to a high degree. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CCP Policy on Vietnam, 1965-1966: 
The International Political Climate. 
The leadership that formulated the PRO's response to the 
rapidly escalating commitment to the second Indochina crisis 
operated from a radically different perception of China's role 
in world affairs than it had when the decision to enter the 
Korean War had been made • Generally, .· there had not been a 
change of leadership and many of the key figurer, remained the 
. "' same, yet their outlook towards China's position VlS a vis the 
two major powers had altered. This is not to say that they were 
all in agreement over what China's new position ideally should 
be, but there was a broad consensus that the bi-polar world, a.nd 
the subservience to the USSR that entailed, was not in China's 
best interest •1 The primary significance of thi.s period is that 
it marked the final death knell of the Sino-Soviet alliance. It 
also saw overt moves on the part of the PRC towards the formulation 
of a multilateral international system. This meant that the PRC 
was intent on finding its own unique spheres of influence and 
on creating an image of leadership and prestige with which to 
attract support for its desired position of emi.1ence, The CCP 
viewed the prerequisites for the achievement of this task as 
being three-fold: the acquisition of nuclear weapons, mostly as 
the the symbolic gesture of breaking the superpower monopoly; 
·a sphere of influence within the Communist Bloc; and a leading 
position within the developing world. 2 The first of these object-
ives was achieved but it was not, in its own right, significant 
enough to affect the realization of the other two goals. In other 
words, the entire PRC drive towards a unique position in the world 
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was doomed because the CCP simply did not have the political or 
material capital with which to achieve success. The Vietnam war 
was a key link in its strategy because it symbolized both the PRC's 
position in the Communist world and as a champion of developing states. 
Nothing more pointedly displayed the failure of the PRC's strategy 
than its inability to retain its influence over the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV), because it typified the divergence between 
China's desires and its abilities. (See Chapter Eight) • It is 
that divergence that characterized this perind in Chinese foreign 
policy. 
Interestingly, in view of the Sino-Soviet split, this period 
was not marked by a Chinese shift towards the US. In fact, nothing 
could be further from the actual circumstances because the US was 
still said to be the world's most active imperialist powero 3 In the 
eyes of the Maoists it was US imperialism which blocked China's 
ascendency, and it had not yet been concluded that a fellow "socialist" 
ld b . . 1' t f 4 country cou e an ~mper~a ~s · orce. Significantly, it was the 
us that mitigated against Chinese irredenta as it was American forces 
that kept Taiwan separated from the mainland. Also there was an 
American presence interfering in traditional Chinese spheres of 
influence - notably Vietnamo Nevertheless, the USSR had committed 
two cardinal sins: it had placed cooperation with the US above its 
commitment to the PRC's aspirations; and it had shown an inclination 
towards trying to dominate China and towards interfering in Chinese 
internal affairso The Soviet Union had been tinged with a t~aitorous 
hue, and, as always a traitor was viewed with disdaino 
The us had played the role of traditional enemy very well 
during the years between the Korean War and the second Vietnam 
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crisis. No matter how hated "Soviet revisionism" had become it 
did not yet overshadow the US as the primary enemy because it had 
not blocked the Chinese achievement of national goals in the 
direct way that the Americans had done - it had, however, hindered 
achievements by refusing to help. The Soviets' crimes were that 
they bent over backwards to cooperate with the US, which remained 
the major antagonist during this time.5 In addition, the period 
from 1961 to 1966 was seen by the CCP as being characterized by an 
escalation of US aggression. This escalation was nowhere more 
evident than in Indochina where US involvement in both Laos and 
Vietnam had shown that nothing had essentially changed since the 
Korean War - "US imperialism" was still active in China's border 
regions. It is possible that since the Sino-Soviet dispute had 
erupted largely during this period of escalation, the threat o~ 
Soviet betrayal was viewed with greater suspicion and therefore 
the Sino-Soviet rift intensified in direct relationship to the 
· · s· us ·t 6 lncreaslng lno- enml y. 
The US policy towards the PRC was still bc·.sed on military 
containment and diplomatic isolation, as it had been since the 
Korean conflict. Throughout the fifties and early sixties the 
PRC saw itself being progressively encircled by the US. It 
became a primary goal of the PRC to ensure that its neighbours 
were free of the presence of US bases, but its success at blocking 
their spread was limited.? Since the creation of SEATO by 
Secretary of State Dulles, a string of bases had been built from 
South Korea in the north to Thailand in the south, and in the 
early to mid-sixties these bases were being strengthened in 
connection with the VS effort in Vietnam. The deployment of B-52 
bombers in Thailand was one of the more ominous developments for 
'· ,.·
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the PRC because it created a new threat from the southwest, an 
area of recurring problems with another rival, India. 8 The effect 
which the containment policy had on Chinese foreign policy outlook 
was great, For a nation with international aspirations, the 
establishment of a sound sphere of influence within its immediate 
vicinity is of extreme importance,9 The Americ~n military presence 
had placed the US directly in the path of this significant national 
goal. 
Naturally, nothing more blatantly displayed the contempt 
that the US had for what the Chinese saw as their natural right 
to a buffer zone free of foreign interference than the US actions 
in Vietnam. If any one international issue precluded a rapproch-
ement with the US during the 1965-1966 period, this was it. 
Following the beginning of intense bombing of the DRV in 1965, even 
the limited goal of a communist North Vietnamese buffer state was 
threatened. Therefore, the PRC's appraisal of the Vietnam conflict, 
especially that of Lin Piao and Mao Tse-tung, changed drastically. 
The war was no longer a civil war, but a war of fully fledged 
t . 1 . t 10 na lona resls ance. In terms of the immediate security consider-
ations, the possibility of a direct war with the US was feared. 
The CCP recognized its weakness compared to the US, which, at the 
tactical level, created the need to fight a war by proxy with the 
US. The international significance of this was considerable because 
it gave the PRC the opportunity of presenting to the world evidence 
of the invincibility of Mao' s "people's war" in practice, while at 
the same time limiting the amount of direct involvement. Through 
portraying the resistance to US imperialism pya proxy armed with 
Mao's strategy as a victory for the Chinese cause, the CCP was given 
the opportunity to be militarily cautious, but bold and aggressive 
. d 11 ln propagan a. . 
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Though the PRO's military commitment to the struggle was 
kept at a minimum, its stake in the battle was great. The PRO 
had no choice but to battle the US using only the validity of 
Mao's analysis of imperialism and the righteousness of the anti-
· imperialist cause, yet this had certain ad van tE~.ges. If the 
governments of the developing world could see the benefits of 
following this prescribed path, not only of "people's war" ·but 
of anti-Americanism generally, then the PRO could make great 
strides towards her goal of an international sphere of influence. 
Vietnam was to be the PRO's example to the world of the just 
nature of the Chinese cause. If this was wideJ.y accepted, then 
the PRO could make progress diplomatically and, if many Asian 
nations followed suit, remove the US presence from China's 
immediate area. The danger was that the nations which the PRO 
wished to influence would perceive the war as belng the strategy 
of the DRV (as the Vietnamese themselves claimed) and that the 
gains there were made by the use of Soviet armr, and not Mao's 
precepts. The Vietnam War represented a major diplomatic battle, 
but the PRO entered it with very little, protection. Therefore, 
the COP continued to hope that the Vietnamese would engage the 
US in a long war of attrition that would weaken the American 
resolve globally, and allow the Chinese to claim this as a victory 
12 
of Chinese origin that deserved praise for Mao Though the 
Vietnam War increased the possibility of spreading influence in 
this manner, it was essentially an ominous development for it 
proved that the American resolve in Asia had not slackened. If 
the propaganda battle over Vietnam was lost in the·arena of 
international debate, then, especially in view of the rift with 
the Soviets, the CCP faced the possibility of ~.solation and a 
deterioratinp; global position. 
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The US position on Taiwan had considerable implications 
for the PRC's foreign policy, as it had had ever since Truman 
had "neutralized" the Taiwan Straits in 1950. The threat to the 
PRC which this problem represented was, however, mostly symbolic 
in nature. The CCP's inability to unite what it proclaimed to 
be its soveriegn territory marred its pretence of being a great 
power. The threat from Taiwan was that the KMT government still 
existed and, therefore, created a situation in which the PRC 
presented itself as the preminent revolutionary power of the 
day, but was unable even to destroy the last remnants of its own 
indigenous opposition.1J The 1954 US-Republic of China Defence 
Treaty kept Chiang's regime alive and provided a constant reminder 
of US interference in Chinese domestic affairs. It was because 
of the insult which Taiwan represented to the COP's national 
and revolutionary pride that until the Sino~American rapprochement 
of the early 1970's many analysts continued to conclude that "the 
issue of Taiwan will be the most likely casus belli between the 
US and China. "14 As long as the US insisted on recognizing the 
KMT as the legitimate ruler of all China, peacAful coexistence 
between the PRC and the US was impossible. 
Taiwan, through its seat on the US Security Council, represented 
a stumbling block in the way of the PRO's attempts at creating its 
own camp within international assemblies. The one arena in which 
the PRC could simultaneously rally support for its crusades 
against the Americans and the Soviets from both the "socialist" 
\ 
countries and the deve.loping world was the UN. The US, however, 
had annually blocked moves to have the PRC seated in the Security 
Council and continually beat back the PRO's attempts at becoming 
a member of the General Assembly. The result of these consistent 
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defeats was that the PRC began to downplay the importance of the 
UN and to deride it as a forum dominated t;y " US imperialism." 
The CCP, therefore, began to advocate the formation of a new, 
revolutionary international organization. This, in essence, 
was the motivation behind the attempted convening of the Second 
Afro-Asian-Latin American Conference - better known as Bandung 
Two. This will be discussed in more detail below.15 Yet, this 
could be viewed as an example of diplomatic "sour grapes" because 
admission to the UN certainly had an appeal for the CCP on both 
sides of its ideological divide. It was realized that diplomatic 
transactions of the greatest importance were regularly completed 
within the UN and the PRO's inability to participate in these 
exchanges belied its claim to be the effective representative of 
the revolutionary peoples' interests. The COP's absence denied 
it the opportunity of rousing the developing countries and of 
preventing the passage of "non-revolutionary" motions.16 The 
PRO's inability to gain admission to the General Assembly, of 
which the vast majority of members were the very nations that the 
PRC most wanted to represent in a new multilateral world order, 
clearly shows the diplomatic obstacle which this represented. 
If the PRC wanted to disturb the international status quo, no 
better means existed than to gain admission to the·UN. This was 
another goal that the US had effectively denied the Chinese. 
As the above has shown, US policy towards the PRC had remained 
essentially the same since the Korean War and had given the CCP 
little reason for changing its assessment of US intentions. Yet 
the years since the Korean War had seen some evidence of slight 
movements by the US towards de facto recognition of the PRO's 
existence. Not only had the US sat with representatives of the 
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PRC at the Geneva Conferences on Indochina in 1954 and 1961, but 
ambassadorial talks had taken place intermittently in Warsaw through-
out the years since 1954. Long before any detente was contemplated, 
such sensitive areas as a foreign minipters' conference on 
Taiwan and an end to the US trade embargo had been discussed. 17 
The Kennedy administration and the early part of the Johnson 
regime actually showed some inclination towards relaxing hostilities. 
In 1962, when it was believed that the KMT was planning to take 
advantage of the disorder on the mainland in the wake of post-GLF 
disorders, the Kennedy government made it known that the US would 
not support an invasion of the PRC •18 . Subsequently, in December 
1963, Johnson's Assistant Secretary of State Hillman made the 
important remark that he believed that the PRC " was here to stay." 
Though this speech was strongly qualified by pointing to CCP 
belligerence, it was the first step towards a recognition of the 
PRO's right to exist. 19 Unfortunately the Chinese reaction 
towards the growing US involvement in Vietnam precluded the contin-
uation of this trend. By 1966 the Warsaw talks had simply degen-
erated into a platform from which the CCP could attack "US imperial-
ism."20 The US continued to be seen as the world's pariah, though 
the additional domestic reasons for this, i.e., the consequences 
of the increasingly tumultuous CR, should not be ignored. 21 
While there were no dramatic reversals in Sino-American 
relations since the Korean conflict, the foundations of the alliance 
between the CCP and the Soviet Union had been destroyed. A key 
factor in the Chinese strategic planning when the decision was 
made to enter Korea, the belief that the Russians would in the 
final instance act as a safety net, had been removed, and in .its 
place was the open hostility between the two governments. 
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The Sino-Soviet dispute is a complex, and at times confusing 
subject. There is not the space for an in depth analysis of 
its history in this study, but its primary causes and implications 
for the Chinese response to the Vietnam War will be discussed. 
It is important to understand what compelled the PRO to take 
on independent stance from the Soviets and why the idea of some 
sort of "united action" towards this problem was so abhorrent to 
the Maoists. What made those in charge of the PRO decide that 
the threat of Soviet influence was as dangerous as the US military 
actions in Vietnam? The following will show that the USSR had 
proven to be almost as much of an obstacle towards the PRO's 
international goals as had the US and that the ideological polemics 
which marked the split were simply manifestations of the Chinese 
objectives being thwarted. 
The COP's international behaviour, especially with regards 
to the Korean War and the First Indochina confl:Lct, gives evidence 
that its objectives were never totally subservient to those of 
the Soviets. The Chinese came to power 1d. th distinct national 
aims which eventually clashed with those of the USSR. The essence 
of the conflict is succinctly stated by William E. Griffith: 
"The primary cause of the Sino-Soviet rift has been the 
determination of Mao and his associates that China should be a 
superpower, and the determination of the Soviet leadership to 
prevent it. 1122 
In the view of all sections of the CCP, not just the militant 
Maoists, the just world order was one in which the PRC enjoyed a 
position of near equality with the two superpowers. All of its 
actions in international affairs during the first half of the 
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sixties should be judged in the light of this objective: its 
desire for a sphere of influence within the Communist Block, 
the developing world and the international community as a whole; 
plus the perceived need for nuclear weapons, all stemmed from the 
highly nationalistic goal of achieving China's "legitimate" 
position in the world. During the Korean period there was a 
general acceptance of Soviet leadership, due mainly to the prag-
matic need for military and economic aid. But, the period between 
then and the public split in 1960 saw an ever increasing importance 
being placed on these national goals. Khrushchev, however, showed 
reluctance to support the aims of the CCP leadership and therefore 
became a hindrance, and later a threat, to the attainment of these 
goals. 23 The major thrust of Chinese foreign policy between 1963 
and 1966 was designed to lessen this threat by the development of 
a new world order in which the PRC could hope to shape its own 
destiny and to eradicate totally subservience to any foreign power. 
In addition the USSR represented an internal threat to the 
CCP leadership in a way in which the US did no-~. The Soviets 
were much more likely to corrupt the ideological foundations of 
the regime by the spread of so-called "revisionism."24 This, in 
actuality, was simply the spread of opposition to Mao's leadership 
and to his policies. For Mao, the idea of a distinct Chinese 
"road to socialism," as opposed to following the Soviet line, 
was sacrosanct. This .was first displayed duri 1g the GLF when 
the Soviet model was blatantly disregarded in favour of a unique 
approach. 25 Moscow made its displeasure con~erning this deviation 
very well known. Nevertheless, when this displeasure began to 
have domestic consequences it had an effect on the COP's, and, 
primarily,Mao's attitude towards the Soviets. When it became 
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clear that P'eng Te-huai, who had so vociferJusly attacked Mao's 
policies at the Lushan Plenum in the fall of 1959, had previously 
been in contact with the Soviets the danger to Mao and his coll-
eagues that Soviet influence represented must have become 
b . 26 0 VlOUSo 
Another injury to Chinese national pride that the Russian 
had inflicted on the CCP leadership was the indebtedness in 
which the Chinese found themselves through the less than favour-
able terms attached to Russian aid. The PRC was almost totally 
dependent upon the Soviets for the delivery of the complete 
plant and equipment which was the backbone of its industrial-
ization programme. The Soviets themselves claim to have provided 
1,816,000,000 new rubles' worth of aid in the form of long term 
credits between 19.50 and 1962.27 The Maoist dictum of" self-
reliance" gained new importance after the withdrawal of Soviet 
aid in 1960. The CCP began to explain that economic independence 
is the foundation of political independence. This certainly 
implied that the past economic relations with the USSR were a 
direct threat to China's hard won national sovereignty. 28 
One of the more disturbing aspects of the PRC's·relations 
with the Soviets was the refusal of the Russians to support the 
Chinese policy of unyielding opposition to the US. The CCP felt 
that the Soviets valued the development of detente with the US 
over their alliance with the PRC, and that all of the. obstacles 
which their erstwhile ally placed in their way could be traced 
to the growing understanding between the two world giants. The 
Soviets attempts at limiting the Chinese Communists' access to 
nuclear weapons and to spheres of influence, they believed, were 
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designed to protect this new system of Soviet-American cooperation. 
Mao, therefore, felt he had to attack aggressively the premise 
on which the new relations were based: h~ had to show that 
the theory of peaceful coexistence with imperialism was faulty 
and that the superpower monopoly over nuclear weapons was tanta-
mount to subordinating the entire globe to the domination of two 
nations. This necessitated that the Soviets be subjected to 
propaganda attacks that would clearly indicate the loathsome 
depths to which they had sunk. 
The CCP attacked the Soviets by pointing to a substantial 
chronicle of events which they claimed proved that the USSR had 
compromised its support for world revolution in general, and 
Chinese aims in particular. The first major instance in which 
the strategic divergence between the two states surfaced was 
the ~uemoy crisis of 1958, an event which saw a rather limp 
Soviet response to an apparent CCP initiative to regain control 
of the KMT controlled terri tory, 29 This was followed shortly 
afterwards by the "Spirit of Camp David" era of Soviet-American 
summitry, at a time when Mao believed that Soviet superiority 
in rocketry indicated that the time had come for the West to be 
treated in an uncompromising manner.JO In 1962, the two events 
occurred which confirmed the CCP's already strong suspicions 
about Soviet support: the Cuban missile crisis, in which the 
Soviets backed down under US threats of nuclear war; and the 
Sino-Indian border war, during which the Russians stuck to an 
official position of neutrality, yet continued to supply the 
Indians with aircraft. This latter action was said to be betrayal 
of a Bloc member in favour of "reactionary aggressors • .,Jl The 
point of no return, however, was the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
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of 1963. This, it was claimed, was the epoch in which Sino-
American collusion to "carve up the world" had become official. 
A :further explanation of this claim will be found belowo 
The battle against Soviet-American cooperation was fought 
basically on a theoretical level, a possible indication of the 
PRC's inability to bring strong diplomatic or military forces 
to bear. Beginning with the Twentieth Party Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Khrushchev persist-
ently proclaimed that the world struggle had entered a new era, 
that international capitalism could be killed using unobtrusive 
methods, and that war between "socialist states" and "imperialist 
states" was no longer inevitable. He insisted that the strength 
of the Communist Bloc was so great that the imperialists would 
realise the hopelessness of war and that war would therefore 
cease before the death of capitalism. The Chinese found this 
highly unpalatable, especially since its terminology indicated 
a revision of Lenin's theory of imperialism which was one of 
the foundations of the Maoist doctrine.32 
The Maoists in tbe CCP, conversely, argued that while war 
between the socialist and the imperialist camps Was not totally 
inevitable, it was still a strong possibility because of US 
aggression, e.g., as in Vietnam. They stated that the continuing 
struggle against imperialism was inevitable, but that the centre 
of this battle would be in the developing world.JJ It was in 
this area that imperialism would meet defeat; and it was these 
struggles of "national liberation" that deserved the wholehearted 
support of the socialist camp regardless of the risks. This 
proposition is explainable by the CCP's assessment of its future 
strenght as leader of the developing world. Naturally, the 
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Soviets opposed a Chinese role which they could not control, 
but they also had strong anxieties over unlimited support for 
these wars of "national liberation," They believed, and the 
Chinese scorned, the idea that these conflict; 1 could not be 
contained and that a nuclear confrontation with the US was 
possible if prudence was not used, Vietnam was a test case for 
this proposition: the Chinese were convinced that South Vietnam 
could fall without further escalation, while the Soviets, until 
the fall of Khrushchev, viewed the dispute with extreme caution.34 
The root causes of these differing outlooks cLn be found in the 
views which both sides held on nuclear weapons. 
The CCP felt that for symbolic reasons they could not claim 
a leading position in the world without possessing a nuclear capab-
ility. Also, as the Sino-Soviet split worsened, it must have 
been obvious that the Soviet nuclear umbrella would have to be 
replaced. From 1954 onwards they tried to acquire the weapons 
from the Soviets, but a 1957 agreement designed to accomplish 
this was unilaterally torn up by the Russians in 1959· Soviet 
stubborness concerning this matter consequently led to the Test 
Ban Treaty of 1963 being interpreted by the Chinese as a conspiracy 
by the superpowers to deprive them of the weapons and to rob them 
of their legitimate role in the world. 35 Khrushchev was motivated 
by a strong respect for the power of nuclear weapons. He argued 
that the Chinese were ignorant of this power, and that they should 
realize that there would be no world on which to build socialism 
if they had their way. Mao, however, argued that the strength 
of numbers within the" socialist camp" (i.e., theChirtese pop-
ulation) would ensure that socialism would triumph in the ruins 
'that remained , This, in essence, was at the core of the "atomic 
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bombs are paper tigers" theory. Mao felt that there was a great, 
psychological need, on both the domestic and international level, 
to break down the fear of both the great powers and their weapons. 
Only then could China, a country without the bomb until October 
1964, portray an image of strength in her crusade against the 
global status quo,36 
Through his steadfast opposition to the \.JCP's programmes, 
Khrushchev had become hated by the Chinese leadership, and his 
fall in the autumn of 1964 was viewed as the possible beginning 
of better relations between the two nations, Hopes were soon 
dashed, however, as it became obvious that the new leadership 
did not favour capitulation to the Chinese demands but, rather, 
desired a more determined effort at limiting \.Jhinese influence.37 
The CCP began to refer to the Brezhnev-Kosygin policies as 
" Khrushchevism without Khrushchev" and the dispute continued 
to rage with the same amount of intensity as previously. One 
important factor was the new Soviet leadership's refusal, because 
of domestic considerations such as the. popularity of the Soviet-
American detente, to modify the "peaceful coexlstence programme" 
set out at the Twentieth and Twenty Second Party Congresses of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).38 "Peaceful 
coexistence" remained intact, and the Soviets were now more 
aggressively trying to curb the development of the third bloc 
which the CCP so highly favoured, 
The PRO's strategy towards the development of the multi-
lateral system was to persuade other nations that an alignment with 
the Chinese against the two major powers was in their own national 
interests. For a while this campaign was also directed at a 
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third group of nations not included in the "socialist" or 
undeveloped groups. This was the so-called "Second Intermediate 
Zone" which included the capitalist nations of Western Europe 
and Japan. From 1960, when the Sino-Soviet split became public, 
until 1965, the PRO had some success in this campaign. By 
the end of 1965, however, the strategy was in ruins. The initial 
success must be described if the ultimate failure is to be 
understood. 
Any of the Communist parties that favoured autonomous 
development from the Soviet Union (except the ostracized Yugoslavs) 
listened sympathetically to the COP's attacks on the CPSU, The 
parties included those of the DRV, North Korea, Romania, Cuba 
(for a short period), and Albania. There was also some support 
from parties which were not in power, e.g., the Italian Communist 
Party. The Chinese suggestion was that the USSR was subordinating 
their economic needs to its own, as it had done with China, and 
that all economic ties should be based on equality.39 On the 
ideological level, the CCP derided the CPSU's ideological purity 
stating that Soviet "revisionism" was capitulating to the US and 
placing the entire Communist movement at risk. This approach was 
particularly evident during the "Long Live Leninism" polemics of 
of 1960 that marked the surfacing split. This is not the place 
to describe all the machinations of the contending sides in the 
inter-party struggle that occurred during the first half of the 
1960's. Suffice it to say that the Communist Bloc seemed so 
hopelessly divided that by 1964 Khrushchev waR intent on having 
the CCP expelled from the movement. In an indication of the 
amount of support the COP had been able to achieve, all attempts 
by Khrushchev to convene a conference from which to "excommunicate" 
40 
the COP met with little support. 
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In Mao's view, the Chinese-led bloc in the new world order 
would closely resemble the "united front" set-up of the Chinese 
Revolution. He believed that the "Second Intermediary Zone" 
of capitalist nations would fulfil the same role as the "national 
bourgeoisie" during the CCP' s rise to power. It was thought that 
the ruling class of these capitalist nations would react against 
US domination of their economies and join the PRC in opposition 
to superpower preeminence. In the early 1960's some contact was 
made with Australia and Canada who agreed to sell wheat to the 
Chinese to help them through a series of bad harvests. But the 
Chinese moves met with their greatest success in Gaullist France. 
De Gaulle had similar worries about preserving national independence 
and the French recognition of the PRC in 1964 was the highwater mark 
f th. d' 1 t' . 41 o ls lP oma lC campalgn. 
Before 1965 the PRC had experienced limited success in finding 
allies within the developing world. The cordial relations with 
the DRV at the time, and the implications this had for the image 
I 
of Mao's doctrine of "people's war" were a bright spot for the CCP, 
Also, the Chinese had sent advisers to some African nations (e.g., 
Tanzania and Mali) and had drawn praise for the way in which their 
engineers and technicians had insisted on living at the same standard 
as their native couterparts. 42 The PRC' s greatest ally in the develop-
ing world, however, proved to be President Sukarno of Indonesia. 
Its support for his struggle against Malaysia and the amount of aid 
it had provided his nation endeared Peking to him. He patronized 
the pro-CCP Indonesian Communist Party and supp~rted the PRC's foreign 
policy to such an extent that many analysts at the time referred to a 
Peking-Jakarta Axis. 43 
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Nevertheless, the Chinese attempt to consolidate the above 
mentioned gains by convening the Second Afro-Asian-Latin American 
Conference, planned to meet in Algiers in 1965, met with total 
collapse. This missed opportunity to recreate the goodwill 
generated by Chou En-lai at the original Bandung Conference in 
19.54 (which can be linked to the status which the Chinese had 
achieved during the Korean conflict), was only one of the mis-
fortunes which riddled Chinese foreign policy during 1965 - a 
year which saw all the previous gains disappear. 
Bandung Two's death while in the planninG stages was not 
entirly the fault of Chinese diplomacy. The fall of Algerian 
President Ben Bella immediately before the intended starting 
date caused many governments to decline to attend, and, interest-
ingly, the PRC itself used this as an excuse when it realized 
that it was time to cut its losses. But Bandung Two's demise 
was simply a manifestation of a trend that wa;3 draining away 
support for the Chinese from the developing world and the Communist 
Bloc - the ability of the new Soviet leadership to regain the 
influence that Khrushchev had lost when he decided to concede 
certain areas to the CCP. The Chinese insistence that the USSR 
be excluded from the conference placed many nations in the problem-
atic position of avoiding offending the Soviets who were beginning 
to grant increasing amounts of aid. They simply decided to avoid 
44 
entanglement and not to attend. The problem for the PRC was 
that the only incentive it could offer nations to join its plan 
for a new world order, besides very limited amounts 'of aid, was 
the chance of sharing the Maoist doctrine. In 1965, the Soviets 
even succeeded in making this doctrine seem hollow. 
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The blunt Chinese refusal to accept some form of "u:1ited 
action" with the Soviet Union over the war in Vietnam (See Chapter 
Nine, pages 177-185 ) caused many to doubt the sincerity of the 
Maoists' commitment to "national liberation"~ This, coupled with 
increasing Soviet aid, certainly had a disastrous effect on support 
for the Chinese within the Communist Bloc, During 1965 the 
previously pro-Chinese Korean Workers Party, the Japanese Communist 
Party, and, significantly, the DRV, had all begun to return to 
a neutral/pro-Soviet position. 45 This dwindling support within 
the communist movement; the fall of Sukarno in Indonesia; and the 
lack of commitment to the Chinese cause which the collapse of 
Bandung Two represented, all combined to further isolate the PRC 
until the one remaining strong backer of its policies was insignif-
ican t Albania. 
The CCP's response to this trend, probably made with domestic 
politics in mind, was an increasingly militant sounding foreign 
policy stance on the part of Mao's allies who dominated 
the Foreign Ministry. (See Chapter Six, page 107.) This 
stance was typified by Lin Piao's article "long Live the Victory 
of People's War," published on 5th September 1965. This statement 
coupled the theoretical death of the "Second Intermediate Zone" 
with a call for self-reliance and strict ideological conformity 
to Maoist doctrine on the part of "national liberation struggles''. 
Considering the foreign policy setbacks of 1965, this clarion call 
for adherence to Mao's Thought was no more than empty rhetoric.46 . 
It was, if anything, a recognition of the PRC's failure to create 
a bloc of its own supporters. The inclusion of Europe amongst the 
"cities of the world" which the "national liberation" movements 
must encircle and destroy in Lin's article, for instance, represented 
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a tacit admission of the PRC's failure to gain substantial support 
from Europe. The significance of the "self-reliance" theme was 
that it was sufficiently militant in tone for the immediate pre-
Cultural Revolutionary domestic politics, but that it really 
acknowledged a low-risk policy that was totally realistic in the 
light of the inability of Maoist foreign policy to truly effect any 
changes within the international order. Lin's article was symbolic 
of the superficially virile, yet essentially impotent, state of 
Chinese foreign policy at the time. 
The attempt to create a new Chinese-led movement failed because 
the Chinese leadership had nothing with which to attract and then 
retain a large number of supporters. It hardly had the military 
strength to defend itself let alone to give substantial military 
aid to others; 47 it did not have the ability to match the amount 
of economic aid that its adversaries could provide; and its doctrine 
was vulnerable to attack. The PRC had achieved a nuclear capacity by 
1964, but its symbolic attractiveness was severely tarnished by two 
factors: the apparently irrational disregard of the consequences of 
a nuclear war alienated many governments during the period before 
the detonation of the first Chinese device and the hypocricy of 
spending scarce resources on a nuclear programme after years of 
calling such weapons "paper tigers" alienated others. 48 In other 
words, by 1965 few\of the CCP's foreign policy goals had been reached 
and instead of forming its own sphere of influence the PRC was 
rapidly sliding into virtual international isolation. Therefore the 
decisions made concerning the Vietnam war were, unlike the decision 
to enter the Korean War which had a degree of Soviet consultation, 
purely Chinese in origin. These decisions, however, were not made 
from a position of vital, dynamic independence, but were rather 
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made within the constraints of the failures of foreign policy 
that had previously occurred. From this one can conclude that the 
strategic debate over the Vietnam War was, at least in part, over 
whether the PRC should take the opportunity to formulate a new 
approach or whether Chinese foreign policy should continue to be 
burdened by the mistakes of the past. The CR insured that the latter 
was to be the case for a number of years. 
- 136 -
FOOTNOTES CHAPTER SEVEN 
1; Though many of the figures on the right of the CCP wer.e 
not as adamant in thetr condemnation of the Soviets as 
Mao, Lin, etc., they were still critical to a great 
degree. For the position of Liu Shao-ch'i on this matter 
see, Yahuda, Michael, China's Role in World Affairs 
(London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 178-179. 
2. The last two goals are discussed in Lowenthal, Richard, 
"Communist China's Foreign Policy" in Tang Tsou, ed., 
3· 
China in Crisis Vol. II (Chicago:Chicago University Press, 
1968), p. 4. The desire for nuclear weapons is discussed 
in Griffith, William E., "Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-1965", 
The China Quarterly, January-March 1966, p. 4. 
4. The USSR Wds not openly referred to as an imperialist force 
until after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, when 
the CCP began to use the term "social imperialism" to 
describe Soviet policy. See Yahuda, pp. 216-217. 
5. Yahuda, Michael, "China's Foreign Policy since 1963: 
The Maoist Phases", The China Quarterly, October - December 
1968, p. 94. 
9 
6. Halperin, Morton H., "China's Attitude Towards Nuclear 
Weapons", in Tang Tso ed, , China in Cris5.s (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1968), pp. 151-153· -
7. One important piece of evidence that indicates just how 
highly the PRC viewed the absence of US bases as a top 
priority was Chou's willingness to create neutrality in 
Laos and Cambodia at the expense of the DRU's aspirations 
at the Geneva Conference of 1954. See Eden, Sir Anthony, 
The Memoirs of Sir Anthon Eden: Full Circle. Vol. III 
London: Cassel, 19 2 , pp. 129-131. 
8, Hinton, Harold, "China and Vietnam"; in Tang Tsou ed., 
China in Crisis (Chicago: University of r.hicago, 1968), 
p. 220. 
9. Lowenthal, p. 5· 
10. Mazingo, D.P. and Robinson, T.W., Lin Piao on Peo le's 
War: China Takes a Second Look at Vietnam Santa Monica: 
The Rand Corporation, 1965), pp. 3-4. 
11. ibid.,pp. 17-18. The strategic decisions will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Nine. 
12, Zagoria, Donald, The Vietnam Triangle (N''lW York, Pegasus, 
1967)' p. 83. 
13. 
14. 
- 137 -
Limebarger, Paul, "Take Two Chinese", Current History, 
Vol. 47, No, 277, September 1964, p. 162. 
Morganthau, Hans, "The United States and China'', in Tang 
Tso ed., pp. 95-96. The PRC's self-image of being the 
driving force behind world revolution is discussed in 
Zagoria, Donald, The Sino-Soviet Conflict : 1956-1961 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962) ,u pp. 301-310. 
15. Lowenthal, p. 5· Here the author points to the importance 
which the PRO's foreign relations ministers placed on extra-
UN international conferences. 
16. MacFarquar, Roderick, "Comments on Lowenthal's Communist 
China' s Foreign Policy", in Tang Tsou ed, , p, 20. 
Gittings, John, 
Foreign Policy" , 
p. 51. 
"The Great Power Triangle and Chinese 
The China Quarterly, July - September 1961, 
18. Hinton, Harold, China's Turbulent Quest (New York and London: 
MacMillan, 1972), p. 268. 
19. The full text of Hillman's remarks can be found in MacFarquar, 
Roderick, Sino-American Relations: 1949-1971 (Newton Abbot: 
David and Charles, 1972), pp. 201-205. 
20. Hinton, pp. 269-270. 
21. Hinton, Harold, The Bear at the Gate (Washington, D.C.: 
AEI- Hoover Policy Study, 1971) p. 89. There had been 
much debate over whether foreign policy was determining 
domestic policy or vice versa when the first salvoes of the 
Cultural Revolution were launched. See. Chapter Nine. 
22. Griffith, p. 4. 
23. ibid. 
24. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy since 1963: The Maoist 
Phases", pp. 94-95· 
25. This may be a common feature of all communist parties that 
achieved power without Soviet aid, See Chapter Five and Eight. 
Also see Zagoria, The Sino Soviet Conflict, p. 66. 
26. Charles, David A.," The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng te-hual," 
The China Quarterly, October - December 1968, p. 76. 
Charles believes that this shared experience of Soviet 
intrigue was one of the factors which drew the Albanians 
and Chinese together. 
27. Gittings, John, Surve of the Sino-Soviet Dis ute: 1963-1967 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1968 , pp. 135-136. 
28, Kovner, Mil ton, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Communism at the 
Crossroads," Current History, September 1964, p. 133. 
- 138 -
29. Hinton, The Bear at the Gate, p. 87. 
30. Zagoria, The Sino Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961, pp. 152-165. 
31. For details on the Cuban Missile Crisis see Gittings, 
Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp. lbl-183. In an 
ironic twist the Chinese caustically accussed the Soviets 
of "adventurism" when the crisis first began, and then accused 
the Soviets of "collusion" when the tension lessened. When 
the Soviets accussed the CCP of wanting war the Chinese 
responded through Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi by asking, 
"Did we ask you to transport the missiles to Cuba? " 
The Sino-Indian War is discussed in Gittings, ibid, p. 175. 
32. Burin, FrederickS., "The Communist Doctrine of the Inevitab-
ility of War" , American Political Science Review, Vol. 62. , 
No. 2., pp. 344-345. The Leninist ideal that revolts in 
colonial nations could spark the worldwiae proletarian 
revolution is closely related to Mao's dictum that the 
developing nations will be the centre of the world revolutionary 
struggle. 
33· Tang, Tsou, "Mao Tse-tung and Peaceful Coexistence", Orbis 
Vol. 8. Spring 1964, pp. 36-41. 
34. Tai, Sung-an, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute and Vietnam", Orbis 
Vol. 9, summer 1965, pp. 427-428. 
35. Hsieh, Alice Langley, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 
19 63" ~ in Garthoff, ed., Sino-Soviet Military Relations 
(London: Praeger1 1966), pp. 159-166. 
36. Powell, Robert L., "Great Powers and Atomic Bombs are Paper 
Tigers", The China Quarterly, July - September 1965, p. 60. 
Also see Yahuda, China's Role in World Affairs, pp. 135-143. 
37. The increasing aid to the DRV is a good case in point. See 
Chapter eight. Also see Tao, Jay, "Mao's World Outlook: 
Vietnam and the Revolution in China", Asian Survey, Vol. 3, 
No. 5, May 1968, p. 418. 
38. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-1965", pp. 59-60-
39. Kovner, "The Sino-Soviet Dispute: Communism at the Crossroads", 
p. 134. 
40. For the significance of the "Leninism polemic" see Zagoria, 
The Sino Soviet Conflict, p. 315. Khrushchev's failure to 
convene an ante-COP gathering is described in Griffith, 
"Sino-:Soviet Relations: 1964-1965", pp. 25-40. 
41. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: The Maoist Phases", 
p. 99. General de Gaulle's recognition of the PRC is discussed 
·in Erasmus, Stephen, "Genral de Gaulle's recognition of Peking", 
The China Quarterly, April - June 1964, pp. 195-201. 
- 139 -
42. Adie, W.C. "Chou En-lai on Safari", The China Quarterly, 
April-June 1964, p. 189. 
43. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, pp. 117-118. 
44. Griffith, Sino-Soviet Relations: 1964-1965, p. 125. 
45. Gittings, Survey of the Sirto~soviet Dispute: 1963-1967, 
pp. 259-266. 
46. Yahuda, "China's Foreign Policy After 1963: The Maoist 
Phases", p. 103. 
47. For an appraisal of the PRC' s military strenght at the ,time 
see Powell, Ralph L., "Communist China's Military Potential", 
Current History, Vol. 47, No. 277, September 1964, pp. 13~(-141. 
48. Young, Oran R., "Chinese Views on the Spread of Nuclear 
Weapons", The China Quarterly, April-June 1966, p. 155. 
- 140 -
CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Relationship Between the People's Republic of China 
and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: 1949 - 1965. 
Compared with the amount of influence which the COP had over 
the Korean Workers' Party at the time of Liberation, the accept-
ance of Chinese doctrine and policy by the Vintnamese Workers' 
Party (Lao Dong) was very great. Nevertheless, the leadership 
did not continue to adhere to the COP's ways as slavishly as it 
had done during the first years of the Democrati.c Republic of 
Vietnam's (DRV) life, for Chinese influence created problems, both 
domestic and international, and by 1957 the affinity for the 
COP had begun to wane. But, unlike the relat:'".ve inactivity 
which marked CCP-KWP relations prior to the Chinese intervention 
in the Korean conflict, the COP was actively trying to influence 
the DRV's execution of its war while the strategic debate was 
taking place in Peking and the US was greatly increasing its 
involvement in Indochina. This is an essential difference 
between the two cases being studied in this wurk and its ramifica-
tions are important when one considers the changes that had 
developed in the Chinese perception of their world position in 
the years between these two events. This chapter will explain 
the vicissitudes that characterized PRC-DRV relations and 
portray how at the crucial point of 1965 the COP's sway over 
North Vietnamese policy towards the burgeoning war quickly dwindled. 
Though never fully admitted, this was a manifestation of the 
inadequacies of PRO foreign policy at the time. It was a setback, 
and although Chinese aid continued afterwards it was not out of 
dedication to an ally, but simply an action with Chinese defence 
and world image in mind. 
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Anti-Chinese feelings come easily to the Vietnamese. The 
legacy of past Chinese transgressions has produced a traditional 
suspicion that may never be eliminated. The persistent use of 
the heroes of past battles with the Chinese as symbols of national 
identity by the Lao Dong points towards the usefulness of this 
legacy in the building of nationalistic sentiments.1 There were, 
however, many reasons why the traditional enmity was overshadowed 
by the common bonds between the two nationalist movements which 
both nations developed in response to Western imperialism during 
the 19th century. The Vietnamese movement was nurtured by the 
Chinese experience because it was in China that many of the 
exiles from French rule formulated their beliefs. This is typified 
by the revolutionary career of Pham Bai Chau, or.ie of the great 
Vietnamese nationalists of the early 20th century. Pham, a 
traditional scholar, believed that Asia would continue to be 
exploited by the West unless it borrowed western political ideas 
and technical knowledge and combined them with its own considerable 
achievements. This paralleled similar conceptual developments 
runongst the Chinese nationalists at the time and when Pham went 
to Japan in 1905 he was very impressed by the Chinese exiles he 
met there. By the time of the 1911 Revolution he was so influenced 
by Chinese nationalist thought that he favoured a democratic 
republic for Vietnam, not the reformed monarchy in which he 
originally believed. 2 Those who followed Pham in the forefront 
of the Vietnamese movement found China to be a·favourable haven, 
and many participated in the Chinese political scene of the time. 
This was especially true during the period of CCP-KMT collaboration, 
when a similar mixing of Vietnamese nationalism and communism 
also began.J 
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The prominent leaders of the Lao Dong all had varying degrees 
of sympathy with their counterparts in the Chinese communist 
movement, and in many cases the differences between them can 
be explained by the nature of their personal attitudes towards 
the Chinese Revolution. At one end of the spectrum was Truong 
Chinh, a man who found Maoist doctrine extremely suitable for 
Asian countries and was the greatest exponent of Chinese influence 
within the Lao Dong elite. He was probably one of the first two 
hundred youths brought to Canton in 1925 by the Revolutionary 
Youth League, founded by Ho Chi Minh.4 Conversely, many of the 
leaders had attitudes towards the Chi.nese which can best be 
described as ambivalent. One who felt this ambivalence was 
Vo Nguyen Giap, the mastermind behind all the major campaigns 
of the Vietnamese Liberation Army. Although he praised Mao 
heavily and followed his tactics during the war against the 
French, he was extremely nationalistic and suspicious of the 
Chinese. He was an exile in China at the beginning of World War 
Two, but quickly returned to the mountains of Northern Tonkin 
in order to create a guerrilla movement.5 After the war against 
the French, Giap became increasingly intolerant of Maoist 
doctrine and his rejection of Mao's "people's war" strategy 
in 1965 was a critical development of great importance to this 
study (see p.l56). 
The leadership of the Lao Dong th~oughout the entire period 
in question was remarkably stable. (Only the demotion of Truong 
Chinh in 1957 marred this record of consistency. This will be 
discussed below.) The source of this relatively purge-free 
history can be explained by the character of the central, pivotal 
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leadership of Ho Chi Minh. It was Ho who shrewdly balanced all 
the differing degrees of Chinese influence within his central 
committee and forged a policy that he though was best for Vietnam. 
His ability to act as a moderator was apparent on the international 
stage during the early 1960' s,when he exploited the rivalry 
t,/ 
between the Soviets and the CCP in order to reap the most 
benefits for his country. 6 Not surprisingly, Ho's attitude 
towards the Chinese throughout his life was ambivalent, but 
events in his career can be used to explain his vacillations. 
He was active in politics in Canton as early as 1925, where he was 
stationed by the Russians in the position of translator in the 
Soviet consulate, following extensive training in Moscow. 
Nevertheless, his actual experience in revolution began with the 
CCP, and some sources report that he was active within the Eighth 
Route Army for a time. 7 The KMT occupation of.North Vietnam at 
the end of World War Two, as agreed upon at the Potsdam Conference, 
is thought to have soured his opinion of the Chinese; and in 1946 
he removed all the Chinese from his entourage and rebuilt his 
party on more nationalist lines.8 The aid which began to arrive 
from China after PLA forces reached the Vietnam border in 1949, 
however, became a decisive factor in Ho's war against the French: 
it also sweetened his outlook towards the Chinese and facilitated 
the period of Chinese influence which followed the war. 
Liberation in China meant a significant change of fortune in 
the long, arduous war against the French who were trying to regain 
Vietnam as a colonial possession. In the years between 1946 
and 1949 the Vietminh, the national libe;ration movement coalition 
under the de facto control of the Lao Dong, had to rely strictly 
upon small scale guerrilla action. This proved to be a great 
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annoyance to the French, but was incapable of dislodging them 
from their strongholds. With the defeat of the KMT, Ho realized 
the potential ally which the CCP represented: the Chinese were, 
after all, fighting a battle with very similar objectives -
national reunification and independence. The CCP was thinking 
along the same lines, and on 18 January 1950 the PRC became 
the first nation to recognize the DRV. On the.same day, an 
agreement was signed that approved the sale of 10,000 American 
and 15,000 Japanese rifles, plus ammunition, to the Vietminh by 
the PRc.9 
The rapid nature of the PRC's response to the plight of the 
Vietminh when contrasted to the tentative nature of the initial 
Chinese reactions to the events in Korea leads one to question 
what Vietnam represented to the CPP that Korea did not. It is 
particularly striking when the isolation of the CCP from the 
Vietminh during World War Two and throughout the Civil War is 
noted.10 A possible explanation is the apparent lack of Soviet 
interest in Indochina at the time (unlike Korea, Vietnam shares 
no common border with the Soviet Union). The vigorous Chinese 
moves at aiding and eventually guiding the Vietminh were not 
matched by Soviet activities. Apparently the CCP, probably with 
tacit Soviet approval, considered Indochina to be within its 
sphere of influence. In addition, the type of war being fought 
in Vietnam fitted the example of Mao's tactics of protracted 
struggle and added credence to the remark made by Liu Shao-ch'i 
at the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australasian Countries 
in November 1949 that the Chinese model of revolution was the 
best one for colonial and semi-colonial nations to follow. This 
was made even more explicit on 16 June 1950 when "People's Daily" 
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stated that Vietnam and Malaya were the primary countries in 
which struggles best fitted the Chinese mode1.11 This use 
of the Vietnamese to advance the image of Mao was repeated again 
in the 1960's - the Vietnamese, however, were less willing at 
that time to comply with the rules they were being given. 
The aid which the Chinese gave the DRV during the war 
against the French was massive, and few doubt that the Vietnamese 
could have won without it. The aid increased after the Korean 
armistice had been signed, from a reported 16 to 20 tons of arms 
per month during 1951 to a peak of 4,000 tons per month in 
12 May 1954, when the Geneva Conference began. Moreover, Chinese 
influence over the execution of the war grew in proportion to 
the amount of material aid given. From the way in which the war 
progressed it seems highly likely that General Giap spoke 
earnestly in October 1950, when he said after the victory at 
Cao-Bong that: "From this battle we understanc more the greatness 
of Mao Tse-tung. I hope you all will double your efforts to 
study his thought ••• "lJ With the Chinese province of Yunnan 
as a rear base, the war was carried through all the stages of 
Mao's prescribed tactics until the decisive battle at Dien Bien 
Phu when, with the help of thousands of peasants moving material 
and of Chinese manned anti-aircraft guns, the final blow was 
struck. At the Geneva Conference the French knew that they 
had no chance of regaining complete contro1.14 
The Geneva Conference of 1954 saw the Chinese delegation, 
led by ChouEn lai, seated amongst the representatives of the 
world's great powers; and particularly in their handling of the 
DRV delegation, the Chinese behaved more like a major nation 
looking after its own self interests and spheres of influence, 
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than a fraternal ally championing the goals of a less influential 
associate. The attitude of the Chinese at the Conference are 
described in the memoirs of the Foreign Minister Eden, who 
co-chaired the meetings with Molotov, when he recalls the 
Soviet Foreign Minister revealing to him that "the Chinese are 
very much their own men, as far as these matters (i.e., Indochina) 
are concerned."l5 As the Chinese bargained with the great states-
men of the world, the DRV watched as the pressure grew upon them 
to forfeit gains which were militarily within their grasp. 
The DRV delegation went to Geneva in the shadow of the 
CCP. They had little to do with the Soviets (Russian aid only 
began appearing in Vietnam towards the end of the war) and their 
closeness to the Chinese was obvious.16 Yet the Chinese desire 
to begin their own post-Korean War reconstruction and the know-
ledge that the Russians were too concerned with the possibility 
of the creation of the European Defence Community to risk conflict 
in Asia, caused the CCP delegation to pressurize the Vietnamese 
into lessening their goals. Therefore, it was Chou En-lai who 
provided the impetus behind the successful conclusion of the 
conference by agreeing to the withdrawal of the Vietminh troops 
from Laos and Cambodia and to the neutrality of the governments 
in those nations. Elections were postponed until 1956, and the 
boundary between the two divided halves of Vietnam was placed 
at the 17th parallel, not the 13th or 14th as the DRV had demanded.17 
The Vietnamese delegation was reported to feel bitter over this 
blatant disregard of its demands. Both of the major communist 
powers had foresaken the DRV's interests for their own domestic 
economic and political development.18 Both the communist giants 
were equally culpable in the Lao Dong's eyes, so activities at 
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Geneva probably had little bearing on the preferences which 
individuals within the leadership showed vis~ vis the CCP 
or the Soviets following the conference, But, what gains had 
been achieved had little or nothing to do with Soviet aid and 
everyth~ng to do with Chinese assistance. Therefore the DRV 
leadership turned to the Chinese for its doctrine and for the 
material with which to reconstruct their nation. The CCP, having 
cultivated its first major sphere of influence, was very happy 
to oblige. 
Understandably, the admiration which the North Vietnamese 
leadership felt for the CCP in the immediate post-war years 
was substantial. After the settlement, Premi( !r Pham Van Dong, 
a man who in later years was identified with strong anti-PRC 
sentiments, travelled to Peking and dutifully lauded the CCP 
leadership, calling them the "bright sun of Asia."l9 The influence 
of the sinophile Secretary General, Truong Chinh, was concomitantly 
also very high and his position almost unassailable. The belief 
that the Chinese model for socialist developm• mt was inherently 
more suitable for the environs of Vietnam because of its Asian 
origins was prevalent and Truong was given the authority to imitate 
the CCP's agrarian reform movement. The relish with which he 
instigated the process towards collectivizing agriculture was 
intense. Truong proved to be totally inflexible and the results 
were disastrous for the DRV economy. 20 Yet u11til this became 
painfully apparent by early 1957, the CCP enjoyed its greatest 
period of undisputed influence within the DRV. The Soviet Union 
gave economic aid, but had basically paid little attention to 
Indochina during these years. The Russians' apparent indifference 
was evident in, their tacit acceptance of a divided Vietnam after 
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the proposed general elections were blocked ir. 19 56. In 19 57 
they made this official ny proposing that both North and South 
Vietnam be admitted to the UN. 21 There is little doubt that the 
Kremlin viewed North Vietnam as being within the Chinese sphere 
until internal events within the DRV produced a more receptive 
outlook towards the Russians. 
The setbacks to Hanoi's economic plans caused by the rigid 
following of the Mao-inspired land reform programme were sub~ 
stantial; and the DRV, which before the partitioning of the 
country relied heavily upon imports from the South, was forced 
to re--examine intensively both its agricultural pol icy and its 
economic plans as a whole. The slavish adherence to Maoist 
tenets had not only failed to increase agricultural production, 
but had also created such discontent amongst the peasantry that 
they rebelled violently, especially in the previously strongly 
pro-Lao Dong province of Nghe An. 22 By the time of the GLF, CCP 
doctrine was in such disrepute that the Lao Dong made little or 
no official attempt to praise it. Of course, this meant that 
Truong Chinh had fallen into disfavour, but he was simply demoted 
and allowed to remain in the Politbureau after a public self-
criticism. This can probably be accounted for by the leadership's 
desire not to offend their benefactor to the North. The foreign 
policy which developed after this failure of land reform was not 
one of total rejection of Peking, but rather Jf neutrality, which 
allowed the DRV to receive aid from both the Soviets and the 
Chinese and, as it developed in later years, to reap the benefits 
of the Sino-Soviet competition for influence within the DRv. 23 
The DRY's domestic policy developed in a very different 
manner following 19 57, as the leadership realized that reunification 
- 149 -
would have to wait and that the creation of a strong industrial 
economy in the North was of paramount importrmce. Though such 
a policy seems to have blended in well with the Soviet peaceful 
n 
coexistence trend, which was in its formative stages, it apparently 
clashed with the "East Wind over West Wind" foreign policy stance 
which the PRC then displayed. Nevertheless, the CCP did not react 
strongly against the DRV. One can surmise that this was because 
of a reluctance to show the world an ernbarra~sing weakening within 
China's primary sphere of influence. In addition, the moves in 
Hanoi were executed with the utmost tact to ensure that the Chinese 
did not feel totally abandoned. For example, the first moves towards 
Moscow were preceeded by polite appeals to Peking for aid which the 
Chinese could not possible afford. 24 What is certain, however, is that 
the Chinese wanted a channel to Hanoi to re~ain open, even though 
it was now obvious that they would have to compete somewhat for 
influence within the DRV. 
Economically, however, the Chinese could not hope to compete 
against the Soviets, which meant that any diplomatic offensive would 
have to wait until propitious circumstances arose. Though the PRC 
tried in a token manner to back up diplomatic attempts to lure the 
DRV firmly back into the fold with industrial aid, most notably the 
seven long-term trading agreements signed in February 1959, 25 the 
Chinese totally failed to match the amounts of Soviet aid. For 
example, while PRC aid to Hanoi totalled $200 million in the years 
from 1955-57, all in direct subsidies and not loans, it only contributed 
$100 million in the years between 1958-1960, three quarters of which 
were in loans. Notably, although they surpassed the Chinese, the 
Soviets and Eastern Europeans failed to make up the deficit caused 
by the drop in PRC aid. 
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Their figures rose from $119 million, $19 million of which were 
in loans, in 1955-1957, to $1.97 million in 19.51-1960. 26 Of course 
this divergence could be explained by the domestic economic 
needs of the PRC during the GLF and its aftermath, nevertheless, 
these figures show a trend towards Soviet inroads into an area 
which was previously firmly within the PRC's orbit. 
The open split between the Chinese and the Soviets in 
1960 coincided with a period of grave economic setbacks within 
the DRV. This produced a paradoxical situation in which Ho 
strove for diplomatic neutrality more feverishly than ever, 
whilst at the same time becoming more dependent on Soviet aid. 
Once again, the post-GLF crisis may have precluded mass Chinese 
aid. Ho can be seen to have tried to mediate in the increasingly 
hostile dispute in order to eliminate the possibility of a 
total rupture which might have forced the DRV to take sides. 
Though Soviet economic help was necessary, the possibility of 
conflict within Indochina, especially at this point in Laos, 
meant that Ho could not break with the Chinese completely. 27 
The Chinese, during this period of competition for allies within 
the communist bloc, were anxious to receive any support that 
was possible from Hanoi. 
On the economic front the battle for influence can be seen 
most clearly in the negotiations between the DRV and the 
communist giants during the initial stages of the ambitious 
first five year plan, announced in September 1960. A trip 
in early 1961 to Moscow,and Peking by a delegation led by 
Nguyen Duy Trinh succeeded in procuring 101,250,000 new rubles' 
worth of aid from the Soviets and 141,750,000 new rubles' 
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worth from the PRO. This may initially have appeared to be a 
sign of a resurgence of Chinese influence; however, the unexpected 
trip to Moscow and Peking by Premier Pham Van Dong six months 
later revealed that something had gone wrong. The five year 
plan was already faltering and a new injection of funds was 
needed. The lack of sufficient initial funding was attributed 
to Nguyen's pro-Chinese leanings and, not surprisingly, the 
pro-Soviet Pham rectified this and was successful in receiving 
new funds from Moscow. The cancellation of debts and the new 
aid which were the results of Pham's trip amounted to a 
total of 650 million new rubles. The greater part of this 
28 
came from Moscow. 
Nevertheless, from 1960-1962 there was little doubt about 
Hanoi's diplomatic neutrality as it skillfully maneuvered its 
way between Peking and Moscow, with Ho Chi Minh in the role 
of mediator at many points when the dispute w\s reaching 
crisis level. This was especially obvious during the Twenty 
Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
when the issue of Albania, a symbol of pro-Chinese opposition 
to Moscow, caused an upsurge in inter-party fighting. Yet Ho, 
all the time preaching international socialist solidarity, stuck 
solidly to the middle ground, and on 7 NovembJr 1961 the Lao 
Dong party organ, Nhan Dong, made this perfectly evident by 
publicly embr~cing both Moscow and "Albania'~ •29 
The year 1962 was the starting point from which events 
began to make the DRY's neutrality untenable and the Russian 
reactions to these events began to make the Soviet commitment 
to the DRY and its goals seem less than emphatic. Consequently, 
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the PRC's influence again began'to gain ground within the 
Lao Dong elite. In the South the inept Diem regime was beginning 
to show signs of crumbling under the weight of popular discontent 
and Viet Cong guerrilla action,3° Conversely, the US commit-
ment to the South also seemed to be strengthening as more 
American advisers were arriving on the scene. The increased 
activity in the South precipitated a renewed interest in reunifica-
tion on the part of Hanoi, and the increased food supplies which 
reunification would bring must have contributed to the desirabil-
ity of this goal. The Soviets, in line with their "peaceful 
coexistence" preoccupation, successively prodl'.ced policies 
which caused their role as the protector of global communist 
interests to seem open to suspicion; while, at the same time, 
the PRC was following a beligerent line that more suited DRV 
needs. 
The three events which produced the most anxiety in Hanoi 
were the Sino-Indian War, the Soviet backdown over the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, and the agreement reached at the Second Geneva 
Conference on Indochina which primarily concerned Laos. When 
the war between India and China broke out the Soviets swiftly 
found a neutral position, while Hanoi ended its friendly relations 
with Nehru's government and attacked Indian aggression. Nehru's 
announced hope of securing Soviet Migs must have produced worries 
in Hanoi as this conflict had nothing to do with "national 
liberation", and in reality meant that the Soviet Union was 
giving tacit support to a non-communist nation against a member 
of the communist bloc. Though the DRV could not afford to attack 
the Soviet policy, its statements subtly showed displeasure. 31 
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In addition the Soviets' willingness to remove nuclear missiles 
from Cuba under pressure from the US caused the North Vietnamese 
to question how far the Russians would support them in their 
struggles. When in the same year, 1962, Soviet pressure forced 
both the PRC and the DRV to accept the Laos agreement against 
their own interests, it became increasingly clear that Sino-DRY 
policies coincided more than those shared by Khrushchev and 
Ho.32 
From 1963 until after the beginning of the American bombings 
of the North in 1965, it appeared that Sino•DRV relations may 
have been experiencing a renaissance. The similarities with 
the first Indochina war were many, except, notably, that this 
time the Soviets were actively seeking detente with the US with 
little regard for the increasing American activity against the 
South Vietnamese allies of Hanoi. The state visit of Liu Shao-ch'i 
to Hanoi in 1963, which followed admonishments from Peking towards 
Hanoi following the visit of the strongly pro-Soviet Czechoslovakian 
President Novotny and a Soviet military delegation in January 
1963, marked a definite upturn in Sino-DRY understanding. The 
preparations for the visit were immense, and the welcome very 
cordial. Most significantly, however, were the speeches of the 
Hanoi leadership, which came closer to the PRC's line on both 
India and "Yugoslav revisionism", an unfavourable reference to the 
thaw in Soviet-Yugoslov hostilities, which symbolized in their 
eyes the Soviets' increasing willingness to compromise with the 
forces of "reaction".33 Throughout the year the two governments 
found increasing areas of agreement, especially on the Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, which echoed their anxieties over the Soviet 
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backdown during the Cuban Missile Crisis the year before. The 
DRV, which had long favoured the complete abolition of nuclear 
weapons, was heartened by the Chinese acceptance of this policy, 
though it must have been obvious that this was mainly designed to 
improve the PRC's im~ge as an opponent of the Treaty.34 It is 
clear that Khrushchev' s policies were becoming less palatable to 
Ho and his colleagues and that this enabled the Chinese to assert 
their influence within Vietnam in a manner that had been impossible 
for the last six years. 
Chinese support for the increase in guerrilla activities 
grew throughout 1963-1964 as Hanoi's support for the war in the 
South had during the same period. The war in the South was 
progressing favourably and it suited both ihe DRV's desire for 
reunification and the PRO's image as a supporter of "national 
liberation" - especially when juxtaposed with the Soviets' image 
of collusion with imperialism. By 1964 North Vietnam was so 
aligned with the PRC that Khrushchev simply gave up attempting 
to lure them away. Consequently, both military and economic aid 
to the DRV dwindled as the Soviets removed themselves from any 
active interest in the region.35 Conversely, Chinese aid grew 
in a way that was reminiscent of their support given to the 
Vietminh, though on an even greater scale. In addition, in another 
parallel with the earlier war, there were signs of DRV acceptance 
of Maoist military dogma, as exemplified by an article written 
by Deputy Chief of Staff Huang Van Thai in which he decried the 
over-reliance on weapons of the "modern revisionists".36 These 
developments must have proved gratifying to the CCP leadership 
because they represented a gain at the Soviets' expense. In 
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return for this increasing loyalty, the DRV received numerous 
messages of support in the event of a US attack on North Vietnam. 
Neverthless, when the US bombings began in February 1965, the 
actual substance of this support was put to the test and Ho Chi 
Minh and his colleagues may have found it lacking. 
When the authorized bombing of the North started a multitude 
of statements were made by the PRC officials which stressed the 
willingness of the Chinese to fight side-by-side with their 
Vietnamese comrades. Yet typical of these s~atements was that 
of Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi when he announced that the Chinese 
people would fight with the DRV "when required", with the 
emphasis placed on "when". This, in effect, implied that the 
possibility was definitely in the future and not one connected 
with the immediate crisis.J? Any initial worries which these 
vague statements created for the Lao Dong wer) compounded when 
• Lin Piao made the definitive statement on the question in 
September 1965. The significance of his theme of self reliance 
will be discussed below. 
As the bombs fell on North Vietnam, the developments in 
Indochina were being watched from the Kremlin by a leadership 
that had a very different outlook from that of Khrushchev, who 
had so damaged interparty relations and had allowed the frontline 
communist combatant ln the period's most significant conflict 
with the US to slip so markedly into the Chinese orbit. Chinese 
aid for the DRV was far from insignificant in 1965: by the autumn 
JO,OOO to 50,000 Chinese engineers, anti-aircraft crews and other 
support personnel had entered the DRV and arms and Mig fighters 
were being supplied, though admittedly the latter were quite aged.JB 
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Nevertheless, the Russians must have correctly judged that when 
the North Vietnamese faced the awesome air power of the US, they 
would want more sophisticated weapons than the Chinese could provide. 
Through offering the weapons to the DRV, the new Soviet leaders 
believed they could redress the damage done to Soviet-DRV 
relations since 1962. As the Soviets began to offer powerful 
arms the PRO countered with a suggestion of increased reliance on 
Mao's doctrine of "People's War". The North Vietnamese opted for 
the former.39 
There were many reasons for the Chinese pressure on the 
Vietnamese to follow the military course prescribed by Mao, both 
domestic and international, yet it was ultimately seen by the 
leaders of the Lao Dong as more beneficial to the Chinese than 
to themselves. Eventually Chinese advice was explicitly rejected 
and, not surprisingly, this rejection originated from the basically 
pro-Soviet General Giap. During 1965 Giap fired a direct attack 
on the Maoist doctrine by stressing the difference between the 
Chinese experience and the Vietnamese reality. For example, he 
stated, the Japanese could not possibly pacify a country the size 
of China, while Vietnam was very small and could be easily overrun 
by the US. He sardonically added that the Chinese also would have 
found it difficult to triumph against the Japanese without the 
related actions of the major allied powers. 40 Throughout the 
spring of 1965 the North Vietnamese showed strong indications 
that they were determined to find doctrinal m:utrali ty. The 
uniqueness of the Vietnamese revolution was portrayed and the 
originality of the Chinese claim to have devised "people's war" 
was doubted. 41 The DRV was making it plainly clear that it was 
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planning its own tactics and that it would not be pressurized 
into following the Chinese line, 
Lin Piao's landmark foreign policy article "Long Live the 
Victory of People's War" was first published on J September 1965 
and it can be interpreted at various levels - international, 
domestic, theoretical, etc. - however, few were as affected by 
its implicit intent as the Lao Dong leadership. For them it was 
a direct message that they could not expect Chinese intervention, 
as it would lessen the revolutionary resolve nurtured by self-reliance. 
They would have to adhere to the strategy of "protracted war", as 
described by Mao, in order to achieve final victory over the 
United States. For the North Vietnamese, Lin's suggestion that 
they suffer additional years of gruelling conflict for the sake of 
adhering to the Thought of Mao Tse-tung must have been less than 
appealing. 42 The response which the DRV leadership formulated 
was not immediate: the Lin article was totally ignored and the 
Lao Dong never mentioned it directly in its official pronouncements. 
Nevertheless, the policy first stated at the Twelth Plenum of the 
Lao Dong in December 1965 was nothing less than an unequivocal 
rejection of Lin's advice. The Plenum called for "a decisive 
victory in a relatively short time". 4J This was a clear manifesta-
tion .of the Lao Dong's military planners', in particular General 
t 
Giap's, increasing conviction that modern weaponry and conventional 
tactics should be relied upon in order to secure a quick and 
final success. The COP's attempt at determining DRV strategy 
through advice connected with amounts of aid did not work in 1965 
as it had in the early 1950's: this time the DRV had somewhere else 
to turn which could provide greater amounts of material and not 
stipulate tactics which the Lao Dong found unacceptable. 
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It can be deduced from Lin's impassioned call that the CCP 
was not in control of the decisions being made in Hanoi when his 
article was published. It would have been surprising if this had 
' been the case because the ;Lao Dong leaa.ership had developed auton-' 
omously for many years after the CCP doctrine had been rejected 
for the most part in 1957. It cannot be ruled out that the numbers 
of Chinese technicians in North Vietnam had disturbed the Vietnamese 
and had stirred their natural suspicion of the Chinese in much 
the same way that the Soviet presence in China during the 1950's 
had affected the Chinese. The move back to neutrality which 
followed the start of US bombing was a natural move for Hanoi, 
and earlier experience had shown Ho how he could use the Sino-Soviet 
competition to Vietnam's advantage. He astutely analyzed the 
situation and realized that in 1965 the Soviets were anxious to 
counter the Chinese influence that had risen f'.ince 1963; he must 
have also realized that the Chinese were too worried about their 
defence and too conscious of their image as defenders of wars 
of "national liberation" to reduce their aid to the DRV. For the 
Chinese, the rejection of "people's war" was a major setback in 
their attempt to secure a stable sphere of influence and the 
diplomatic isolation in which they found themnelves as the PRC 
entered the Cultural'Revolution can be attributed, in part, to 
Hanoi's rejection of the Maoist model and of the personality cult 
of Mao himself. Soon after the rejection of the Chinese advice, 
the Lao Dong began to praise their own leaders' irn!Jortant place 
in the development of Marxism-Leninism. The cult of Ho transcended 
the cult of Mao in the DRV as its independenc~ was being firmly 
asserted. 44 
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This section has described how the PRC achieved one of its 
great initial successes in its pursuit of a position in the 
world through its relationship with the leaders of North 
Vietnam during a large part of the 1950's; it has also shown 
how the attempts at regaining that sphere of influence when the 
Vietnamese again required aid ended in failure. Though the aid 
which the DRV received from the PRC continued in differing 
degrees of intensity throughout most of the war, it was not a 
symbol of the reestablishment of the cordial relations of the 
1950's. Through the years of the strategic debate within the 
CCP, 1964-1966, it was quite evident that Peking was attempting 
to influence the execution of the war in a way that was unprecedented 
in the months between the outbreak of the Korean War and the 
eventual Chinese intervention. It is probable that if the CCP 
had been less rigid and doctrinaire in its approach towards the 
escalating war then it could have salvaged more of its position 
in Hanoi than it did. This leads one to conclude that this was 
less of a priority than other interests of principle. It has been 
suggested that doctrinaire acceptance of the Maoist line was not 
the determining factor in PRC foreign policy towards a particular 
country, but rather that support for the "Chinese programme for 
radical change in the international system" and the foreign 
policy vis ~ vis the US and the Soviets being pursued by the 
country's government were of the utmost importance.45 In 1965 
the DRV rejected both the doctrine and the foreign policy outlook 
of the CCP. Therefore, the preservation of North Vietnam as an 
entity may have remained important for the PRC, but its position 
as a fraternal ally was impossible. Though the PRC officially 
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praised the struggle in Vietnam as a "war of national liberation" 
for many years to come, the process which ended with the DRV 
firmly in the Soviet orbit, as it is today, had begun on its 
inexorable course. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
The American War in Vietnam: 
The Chinese Response, 1965-1966 
Introduction 
In his discussion of the deveiopment of Chinese foreign 
policy, Melvin Gurtov writes that: 
" ••... foreign policy may as often proceed from unpremeditated 
circumstances as from carefully conceived plans. A foreign policy 
can be not only initiatory but in reaction to such conditions as 
local crises or disturbances, or perceived external threats, as 
in Chinese actions designed to outflank or depressurize externally 
initiated actions. Chinese reaction in Korea was a specific 
instance of reactive foreign policy. 
Secondly, a foreign policy may be highly ambiguous and 
uncertain as well as decisive and calculated. For example after 
the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964 .•. Chinese policy probably 
was as ambivalent as the Chinese statements, since Peking's choice 
of responses depended on a wide range of possible US actions and 
perceived intentions."1 
When the Chinese leadership faced the consequences of the 
events following the Tonkin Incidents which culminated in the 
intense US bombings of North Vietnam in February 1965, elements 
of both the described characteristics were evident. From certain 
quarters statements were released which implied strong decisive 
reaction; from others came pronouncements which have been inter-
preted·as indicating an unwillingness to become involved. This 
evidence of a lack of consensus amongst the high officials of the 
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COP can be traced throughout 1965 and most of 1966, ending with 
Liu Shao-ch'i's last public statement in July. It is not surprising, 
in light of the incipient Cultural Revolution, that disagreements 
should exist because they were obviously present over other questions. 
What is debatable is the amount of opposition to the official 
Maoist line and to what extent this dissension represented an 
organized foreign policy faction. In other words, to what degree 
can the so-called "Strategic Debate" be isolat·1d from the divisions 
already apparent in the hierarchy? This is a key area of investig-
ation because it is critical to discern why the COP failed to unite 
in order to ward off the· common enemy. 
The circumstances at the time were further complicated by the 
arduous task demanded by Mao of formulating an effective response 
to the US threat while at the same time resolutely opposing the 
Soviets. Though once again the amount of dissension over this 
two-pronged attack is hard to gauge, the whole concept of "united 
action" with the Soviets was such a sensitive issue that it can 
be assumed that Mao and Lin Piao felt that there were those in the 
COP who would surrender to the temptation of edging back under the 
Soviet "strategic umbrella". Perhaps the Chinese leaders were 
vascillating over which major power represented a more pernicious 
threat to China's national security. This was an element of 
uncertainty that was absent during the formulation of the reaction 
to the events in Korea. At that time there was no question about 
which nation was the greater threat: the only uncertainty was over 
2 how committed an ally the Soviets would prove. By 1965-1966 Mao's 
battle against "revisionism" in the COP, the disease that he felt 
was endemic in Soviet society, was reaching new heights and any 
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attempt at letting Soviet influence slip back into China under the 
guise of aid for Vietnam was to be fervently resisted. As previous 
sections have shown, the Maoist fight against this "revisionism" 
had many domestic implications and to that extent the specific 
issue of "united action" cannot be viewed outside the context of 
domestic political iss~es. 
Generally speaking the years 1965-1966 were marked by a 
swing away from aggressive pronouncements about the immediate 
possibility of Chinese intervention and toward:s a less combatant 
tone. Although official statements were consistently phrased in 
passionate declarations of support, it is widely accepted that 
the degree of PRO commitment actually declined.J Analysts have 
mapped out the course of the "strategic debate" by linking 
individuals with speeches that have been interpreted as aberrations 
in this trend. Legitimate anxieties over thic use of Kremlinology 
have been raised and, therefore, it is impossible to accept blindly 
the clear-cut explanations that some have devised. 4 One must 
accept that ambiguities did exist, as Gurtov pointed out above, 
and that the situation was replete with paradox, This is not 
surprising insofar as inconsistencies in public statements did not 
disappear until late 1966, notably when many Gf the leading victims 
of the Cultural Revolution had been purged or were tottering on the 
brink of their downfall. Undoubtedly, during this long procedure 
some key figures found themselves caught in the middle, possibly 
on the wrong foot, as the domestic situation became polarized. 
The length of the discussion over Vietnam was remarkable, especially 
when one considers the massive escalation of ~he US role that had 
occurred. Post-1949 Chinese foreign policy had generally been 
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aimed at limiting the US presence in Asia: the lack of an 
immediate resolute stance in 1965-1966 testifies to the complex 
interchange of domestic and international factors involved in the 
decision-making process during those years. Consequently, 
black and white explanations must be avoided. 
One factor that may account for some of the ambiguities is 
the possibility that Mao, and the group he led, were caught off-
guard by the rapid escalation of violence in Indochina. In his 
interview with Edgar Snow in January 1965 Mao said that the war 
might continue for one or two years, but ~hat the US troops 
would get bored and finally go elsewhere. He even conceded that 
the US might settle the conflict by negotatio:1.5 The massive 
bombings just a month later may have thrown doubt upon his 
judgement in the minds of his CCP colleagues. This occurred 
during a period when Mao was being virtually worshipped by his 
supporters and any questioning of his judgement .that existed on 
such a sensitive issue as Vietnam was of great concern. The 
vision of Mao's infallibility and of China's ?lace in history 
as a strong independent force in world affairs clashed with 
pragmatic concerns by some over the implications of Mao's judge-
ments on national security. If the Maoists gave in and intervened 
. 6 
in Vietnam then his opponents' position could have been confirmed. 
The incipient Cultural Revolution gave the Maoists every reason 
to make sure that Mao's position on this and all issues remained 
intact. 
The Strategic Debate Over American Threat7 
. There are two broad theories on the nature of the 1965-1966 
strategic debate which must be mentioned at the outset. Although 
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they both tend to be of the clearcut nature dismissed earli~r, 
they provide a convenient starting point from which an independent 
judgement can be devised. Firstly, the simple bipolar split 
described by Uri Ra'anan in which he links Liu Shao-ch'i, 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Chief of Staff of the PLA, Lo Jui-ching 
together as proponents of a tough line against the US should 
be explained. He asserts that they concomita~tly favoured 
antagonism towards the US and closer links with the Soviets 
over the matter of Indochina. On the other side he places Lin 
Piao, Mao, and Chou En-lai. He defends his inclusion of Chou 
by pointing to the marked difference between speeches on 
Vietnam made by Chou and Teng in April 1965. While Teng emphatic-
ally supported Vietnamese reunification, Chou stuck to the hitherto 
accepted line of simply demanding US withdrawal. In addition, 
Teng is shown as pledging support, "No matter what happens and 
no matter what cost is involved".8 The official Maoist line 
was typified by P' eng Chen's cautious remark that, "We will go 
a step forward in supporting them according to their needs."9 
Donald Zagoria's view is rather more complex but just as 
structurally rigid. He splits the CCP's divisions into three 
parts: the "doves," the "hawks," and, what Yahuda calls that 
"strange ornothological creature", the" dawks". 10 The"doves" 
are described as being economic pragmatists, such as Teng, who 
stressed the need for modernization and for non-intervention in 
Vietnam because of the detrimental effects it .could have on 
China's economic growth. 11 They did, however, supposedly support 
strengthening ties with the Soviet Union in order to extract aid 
for industrial development. The "hawks", on the other hand-, were 
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the military hardliners and were represented by Lo Jui-ching, who 
felt that the US threat was great enough to warrant the utmost 
vigilance and preparation, even to the extent of accepting 
Soviet aid. 12 The "dawks," or more commonly referred to as the 
Maoists, demanded strict ideological conformity and strenuous 
opposition to both the US and the USSR. Although at the time 
they thought that US imperialism instrinsically represented a 
greater threat, Zagoria explains cogently that they perceived 
it to be moribund and as being easily containe.ble in South 
Vietnam. The need to be alert against the spread of the "cancer 
of Soviet revisionism" was uppermost in their minds. 13 The 
"strategic debate" in Zagoria's view can be seen as a battle 
between these three well defined groups, yet in both his analysis 
and Ra' anan' s there is a lack of flexibility that produces analytical 
"blinkers" which can hinder a proper understarding of the 
decision-making process at the time. 
The apparent need to place every key member of the Politbureau 
concretely in one camp or another during 1965-1966 clouds the issue 
at the centre of this study: how did those in control of foreign 
policy in China avoid international conflict over Vietnam 
while the nation was enter~ng a period of domestic instability? 
To say that there was an organized opposition is also misleading. 
It is quite probable, as Japanese observers in 1966 noted, that 
those who had gained power after the Great Leap Forward debacle, 
e.g. Liu and Teng, saw no need to fight Mao, only a need to make 
up for Mao's lack of constructive thinking by "recasting his 
revolutionary philosophy". This could be achieved by modifying 
his orders before passing them down. In the extreme cases these 
1 b . d 14 orders could simp y y lgnore • 
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Without a perceived need to organize an opposition faction, 
the main actors in the "debate" were constrained by bureaucracy 
and policy-making procedures that only a few uniquely endowed people, 
such as Mao, could escape. As A~an Whiting has observed, "···only 
when procedure breaks down under the pressure of crisis is thP-
personal element likely to play an important role as the circle 
of participants in the policy process narrows and rises to the 
1.5 highest level." The highest level in this case was Mao and Lin, 
who had carefully cultivated the support and urocured the skills of 
Chou En-lai throughout this period, as described in earlier sections. 
There is evidence of disagreement over the course of the two 
years in question, but there is no tangible evidence that it 
ever realistically altered Maoist policy. Even by March 1966 
Chou was able to summarize the state of Sino-American relations 
without even mentioning Vietnam. He continue~ to state that as 
long as the US did not attack China, the PRC would not initiate 
a war, but he did not directly refer to the Vietnam situation.16 
The Maoists, it can confidently be said, were in control of the 
implementation of the policy towards Vietnam the entire time and 
their hold was never seriously in jeopardy, even though dissen-
sian could be heard until Liu's final speech nn 22 July 1966. 
The skilful means employed to deter the US, which will be 
discussed below, required a carefully executed strategy that might 
have been unsuccessful if it had run an erratic course caused by 
dissent over policy. TheMaoist actions against those who disagreed 
can be seen as a means of preserving the strategy that was to 
save China from US attack. 
In order to understand fully how Maoist policy developed it 
is useful to explain how they dealt with the arguments of those 
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who felt a need for a different course of action. This is 
typified by the response to the statements by Lo ·Jui-ching that 
appeared during 1965. Though evidence suggests that there were 
domestic issues involved in his eventual purge, since these issues 
directly concerned the domestic role of the PLA in China, they 
are related to Vietnam insofar as while the M< ~oist ideal precluded 
a major counteroffensive on foreign soil, Lo' s model did not. 
During this period of ideological purity the Korean precedent was 
irrelevant. 
At the heart of the differences between Lo and the Maoist 
interpretation of the situation in Vietnam is the appraisal of 
the strength of US imperialism and to what extent it should be 
feared and prepared against. Mao often remarked that US imperial-
ism was a "paper tiger"~ and he reiterated these sentiments in 
his discussions with Snow in January 1965 when he said that 
"the more American weapons and troops brought into Saigon the 
faster the South Vietnamese liberation forces would become armed 
and educated to win victory". He insisted that already the South 
Vietnamese had no need of Chinese troops. 17 Even though the 
February bombings may have caused others to doubt this prognosis, 
statements attributed to Maoist sentiments continued to stress 
the relative weakness of the US forces, even when compared to the 
imperialist forces of the past, namely those of Germany and Japan. 
In May 1965 two articles in commemoration of VE Day appeared side-
by-side in Jen-min Jih-pao, one by Lo Jui-ching, and the other 
by the editorial staff of the paper, generally believed to have 
been controlled by Mao's close associate Chen Po-ta. The Jen-min 
Jih-pao editorial insisted that in presenc circumstances the US 
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was in a worse strategic position than German fascism in World 
War ~rwo, and that the possibility of averting a world war had been 
greatly increased. 18 Lo's position, however, was that although 
the US was indeed weaker in many respects than the Germans were 
during the last world war, it could become frustrated by the 
successes of national liberation struggles and lash out irrationally 
at China, thus initiating a war which should be prepared for in 
advance. His assessment of US strength did net drastically differ 
from the Maoists' - basically he just believed that the threat 
of US air attacks was more serious than the others would admit. 19 
For the Maoists, who were trying at the time to deter the US 
from expanding the war further by using calculated signals, the 
suggestion that the US should be treated as an unstable nation 
that would "go mad to .try to save itself from defeat" m\].st have 
been distinctly unwelcome at that time. 
In view of La's proposition that the US threat should be taken 
more seriously, it is not surprising that he should have advocated 
different strategies to those of the classic Maoist model. In 
recognizing China's military weakness it is probable that many in 
the CCP had cause to doubt the advisability of "people's war". 
Although Lo Jui-ching had impressive Maoist credentials when he 
took office in the wake of the purge of P'eng Te-huai and his 
associates, his views may have been transformed by the nature of 
his position: bureaucracy may have nurtured more pragmatic views 
than he previously had held. 20 Mao's opponents had some convincing 
reasons for doubting the expediency of the Chairman's military 
thoughts, especially if they agreed with Lo that US airstrikes 
were a probable outcome of events in Indochina. What deterrent 
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was "people's war" if the US forced the Chinese to defend the 
supply lines to North Vietnam? Also without -:_he Soviet umbrella 
which was enjoyed during the Korean conflict the US could not 
be stopped from destroying China's metropolitan areas at will 
without ever having to send one soldier onto Chinese soil to be 
"lured in deep and drowned."21 The Maoist retort to this suggestion 
was that industry was in the process of being decentralized and 
that bombs were no use against an agricul tura:_ society. Neverthe-
less, they also proved that they did not relish the thought of 
seeing Shanghai, etc., reduced to rubble by the adroit means that 
they employed to deter the US. Moreover, while Lin was praising 
the virtues of "people's war"~ the PLA which he controlled was 
strengthening air defences. 22 Therefore, one should look at the 
domestic implications of Lo's strategic propoLals in order to 
comprehend fully the reason for the Maoist opposition to his 
beliefs. 
Lo Jui-ching's call for preparedness was a reflection of how 
he viewed the role of the PLA. In his VE Day article he suggested 
that China prepare for an "active defence" in the face of US 
aggression: regular army forces should be prepared to fall back 
to defensible positions and to defend cities, while the militia 
should simply harrass the invaders' lines of communications. This 
was at variance with the Maoist strategy of retreating to a rural 
rear base where the army could mix with the populus until the 
stage when conventional operations were again possible. This 
was the image of "people's war" portrayed in the Jen-min Jih-pao 
VE Day article and given further backing by Lin Piao's "Long Live 
the Victory of People's War" published in September 1965. ZJ 
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The Maoist stress on deprofessionalizing the FLA had some 
practical aspects with regards to the domestic political campaigns 
that were brewing. Lo's implication that a strengthened regular 
army was necessary produced evidence that he would not be a very 
reliable ally for the coming confrontations with "revisionism".24 
Harding and Gurtov have argued that the Maoists, who believed that 
the US could be deterred from expanding the war into China and 
that the PLA could remain free for domestic purposes, saw Lo as 
more of a threat because of these domestic factors, rather than 
strategic considerations. 25 It is significant that two years after 
his purge articles in condemnation of him fail~d to mention his 
position on Vietnam, yet cited his perfidy in "pushing the 
bourgeois military line" and stressing competitions and military 
26 
tournaments over the study of Mao Tse-tung Thought. 
The reply to Lo's dissent was embodied in Lin's "Long Live 
the Victory of People's War", released in September 196.5, ostensibly 
to commemorate the victory over the Japanese twenty years earlier. 
It can be interpreted in many ways and at many levels and it 
prompted some Western commentators to remark that it was the. 
Chinese edition of Mein Kampf. Nothing could have been more· 
mistaken. It was essentially a call for self-reliance directed at 
both the Vietnamese and Chinese people. On the domestic level 
it was a call for adherence to Mao's Thought by the PLA, but it 
was also a strong sign that the Vietnamese would have to fight 
alone, unless China was directly attacked. It was confirmation 
that the Maoists had assessed the Vietnam situation in light of 
the American escalation and had had their initial judgement 
confirmed - the war could be isolated in·Indochina and the PRO 
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could fight a revolutionary struggle by proxy, as it were. 27 
The Maoists believed this to be the final authoritative remark on 
the subject and it received a great fanfare and coverage. In an 
indication of the authority which Mao and Lin had over foreign 
policy matters, Lo Jui-ching gave deferential treatment to the 
ideals of "people's war" in his speech commemorating ·VJ Day a few 
days later. Gone were any allusions to an alternative strategy 
and his doubts about the strength of the US were replaced by the 
resounding exclamation that, " •.• US imp.erialism can definitely 
be defeated because the US is now beset by all the revolutionary 
peoples waging anti-imperialist struggles ..... 28 Nevertheless, Lo's 
hitherto stated uncertainties over the worth-of "people's war" and, 
by extention, Mao's Thought, had already made him suspect in the 
eyes of his superiors. He disappeared from public view a few 
months later. 
In view of Mao and Lin's plans to mould the PLA into a 
domestic political force, it is unlikely that Lin's article did 
not have some pronounced domestic political implications. His 
remarks concerning the transgressions of Wang Ming in the 19JO's 
can be taken as a case in point. This could be seen as a warning 
to those in the CCP who were influenced by Soviet ideology, as 
was Wang. But its more important domestic message was that it 
ruled out "leftist opportunism" against the US. Though it has 
been suggested that this was intended as advice to the Vietnamese, 
and in view of the Maoist desire to use Vietnam as a working model 
of "people's war" for propaganda purposes this is quite plausibl~, 29 
its other intent was to show that attacks against the US were 
untimely and that the PLA's proper place was in China. In the 
context of the general portrait of the international situation 
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put forward in the article, the idea that the major divisions in 
the world were between the global "countrys~de", the developing 
nations, and the "cities", Europe, North America, and "counter-
revolutionary Russia" ,JO a reference to Wang Ming' s mistakes is 
important. It must be remembered that Mao's argument with · 
Wang was over inopportune (or "opportunistic") attacks against 
the cities during the First Civil War Period. Surely, with 
regards to the US presence in Vietnam, Lin's message was clear: 
an attack against one of the "cities" of the world at this time 
will end in disaster.Jl It is a clear indication that a war 
with "metropolitan" US had been ruled out. 
The last evidence of a noticeable divergence from the Mao-Lin 
line can be seen in Liu Shao-ch'i's last public speech in July 
1965. When compared to s~milar statements by Chou En-lai and 
Chen Yi, both reliable mouthpieces for official policy, Liu shows 
an inclination for declaring greater support for the Vietnamese 
than the others. In his words in reply to a plea for support by 
Ho Chi Minh, he unequivocably says that "the Chinese people have 
made up their minds" to come to the aid of the DRV "as the Chinese 
and Vietnamese people deem necessary."32 Conversely, Chen Yi, in 
a speech delivered on 10 July, quotes Ho's willingness to "undergo 
sacrifices for 10 to 20 years" in keeping with Mao's vision of 
protracted war. In addition he stresses the PRC's policy to come 
to Vietnam's aid "when we deem necessary."33 This· is a clear 
manifestation of the Chinese acceptance of a struggle that continued 
indefinitely and their determination to be the sole arbiter of 
when Chinese aid was necessary. Liu's sentiments were obviously 
different, showing more of a desire to jump t1 the Vietnamese side. 
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Though his domestic policies were of the greatest concern to the 
Maoists, his opposition to the official line on Vietnam had 
implications that, when coupled with his more favourable attitude 
towards "united action" with the Soviets, showed him to be totally 
outside of the mainstream foreign policy line. The Maoists, who 
essentially retained control of foreign policy, wanted to avoid 
a showdown with the US over Vietnam and desired a protracted war 
in Indochina that would, inter alia, provide evidence of the 
universality of Mao's strategy that could be useful ammunition 
in the coming campaigns against "revisionism" in China. In this 
sense Chou was being quite frank when he said: "At the present 
moment it is primarily the Vietnamese people's struggle against 
US imperialism that is a support to us.".34 
THE QUESTION OF "UNITED ACTION" 
In 1965-1966 it must have been painfully obvious to the CCP 
leadership that China did not have the military or economic 
strength with which to wage an effective war against the US over 
Vietnam without some form of outside aid. Her air force was 
predominately made up of outdated fighters anl bombers; her tanks 
were also insufficient in numbers and sophistication. Logistically, 
the route into North Vietnam would be untenable, and an effective 
response to a US invasion of the North would require amphibious 
assaults which were also beyond the PLA's capability.35 China 
did possess a token nuclear stockpile, but she lacked any means 
of delivery that could threaten the US or its forces. In addition, 
the development of these weapons drained valuable resources away 
from conventional weapon procurement. In these respects the 
Maoist policy of non-intervention was a realistic assessment of 
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the PRC' s ability to confront the US, Praising "people's war" 
may have been an attempt to show strength in weakness. 
Economically, the industrial output necessary for a sustained 
war on foreign soil was also out of reach. Such a war would 
require a degree of centralization within the economy which was 
in complete opposition to the ideals that Mao favoured.J 6 
Consequently, for those who disagreed ivith the Maoists' appraisal 
of the chances of the war spreading and who believed China must 
be prepared for such an eventuality, it became evident that the 
PRC should at least entertain the idea of joint action with the 
Soviets over the Vietnam question. Once again, this opposition 
should not be seen as an organized attempt by a faction to fight 
the Maoist line, but simply as key individuals who were reacting 
to events by reaching conclusions that diverged from those of 
Mao and Lin. 37 For Mao, however, any hint of jeopardizing his 
strong anti-Soviet position was totally unacceptable because an 
agreement over Vietnam risked a new source of Soviet influence 
in China which could place his entire domestic strategy at risk. 
When Mao told Snow while discussing Vietnam in a 1971 interview 
that "compromising with either of the superpowers could then only 
lead to a split on the home front", he showed how important these 
domestic considerations were to him.38 Presumably the split he 
was referring to meant the weakening of those forces loyal to him. 
He did not trust the Soviets, whom he now regarded as counterrevol-
utionaries in collusion with the US, and he had no intention of 
seeing China returned to the Soviet orbit. He therefore favoured 
a policy which would retain a safe, yet antagonistic relationship 
with both of the major powers. Non-intervention in Vietnam was a 
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means of preserving this position and, par ado: :ically, in this 
time of ideological dogmatism, a very practical course in terms 
of the PRO's abilities. 
To say that the argument was between those who wanted Soviet 
aid for modernization and those who did not is over-simplified. 
The men who had seen the PRO through to relative recovery after 
the "three bad years 11 , 1959-62, may have considered the possibility 
of Soviet aid, but they were also wary of aid leading to control.39 
Though these individuals, specifically Teng, Liu, and P'eng Ch'en, 
have been linked with favouring "united action 11 ; they did have a 
history of anti-Soviet remarks implying that any of their moves 
towards Sino-Soviet cooperation were simply tentative and exploratory. 
Their nationalistic pride had no doubt been bruised by the Soviets 
as well: they simply tended to be less obsessed by their suspicions 
than Mao. Yet Mao and Lin Piao saw any lack of resolve over this 
matter as unacceptable. Hence Mao's exclamation, "Your weak-kneed 
people in Peking!" at a meeting near Canton arranged to discuss the 
matter of "uniteii-action" with a delegation from the Japanese 
Communist Party (JCP).40-
The meeting with the JCP in March 1966 climaxed a series of 
intra-party summits including delegations of the Korean and 
Vietnamese parties in which the JCP tried desparately to persuade 
the COP to accept the concept of "united action" over Vietnam. It 
seems that they had succeeded in assuaging maLy of the fears held 
by the Chinese and that a joint communique in favour of the 
proposition was about to be released_when Mao lashed out and 
squashed it. The JCP, previously one of the CCP's strongest 
supporters, had been shocked by the debacle in Indonesia in 1965 
- 180 -
and had concluded that no progress could be made in Asia without 
some form of Soviet assistance. They devised a theory in which 
the world was divided into the US-led "warmongers" and the 
" peace-lovers", which included the USSR. Mao countered by 
saying that the USSR was in collusion with the US and that a 
,_ 
war between the PRC and both nations was inevitable. (Obviously 
this was bravado to make the point perfectly clear.) He graphically 
portrayed his prediction that both the US and the USSR would 
invade China, but he emphasized battling the USSR across the 
41 Yangtse. He made it emphatic that the Soviets were as much of 
an enemy as the US and that no compromise was possible. 
The JCP delegation returned to Japan without any success. 
By August of that year they issued a lengthy justification of 
their stance and blamed the setbacks in Vietn1m at that time 
entirely on the Chinese. They pugnaciously accused Peking of 
thinking that the US action was merely a preliminary step towards 
an invasion of China and of making imperialist aggression against 
the PRC, and not Vietnam, the decisive issue. 42 Although he 
could not publicly tarnish his internationalist image, privately 
Mao may have agreed. 
Before they left the Japanese had convinced some "weak-kneed 
people in Peking" that " united action" was necessary for the 
preservation of North Vietnam and of Chinese safety. Neverthless, 
Mao easily had his way over the final communique at the March meeting 
and his views were respected with deference. Moreover, those who 
believe that an organized, pro-"united action" faction existed 
in the CCP, such as Zagoria and Ra'anan, should take note of the 
official JCP account of the proceedings. The Japanese claim that 
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Liu and Teng, who have been portrayed as the greatest advocates 
of working with the Soviets, were not even present at the crucial 
meeting.43 This does not mean to say that such sentiments did 
not exist, only that Mao had the final say on these foreign 
policy matters and that those who disagreed with him did not feel 
the need or the ability to resist him actively. 
There are those who believe that Mao's position in foreign 
policy making was consistently preeminent and that his statements 
44 
on such matters always carried immense weight. But diverging 
views over "united action" were indeed evident and even Chou En-lai 
was said to favour this approach during the March meeting. He 
quickly found his footing, however;' and by tr'3 11th Plenum of 
the Eight Central Committee he was again emphatically aligned 
with Mao and Lin.45 At the Plenum in July Chou was ranked third, 
immediately after Mao and Lin in the Party hierarchy and was 
frequently seated next to them in pictures released during the 
occasion. The significance which this has for Chou's position 
on Vietnam is clear because the final communjque of, the gathering 
gave firm approval to all the actions so far taken by the CCP in 
regard to the Viet.nam situation. The communique gave Mao and 
Lin a virtual "blank cheque" for dealing with all aspects of aid 
and support for the DRV. A general consensus had been formulated 
over the related issues, 46 yet some future victims of the 
Cultural Revolution, e.g. Liu, may have hint(d at their misgivings 
until they were finally purged. 
On balance the evidence of consistent support for a rapproch-
ement with the Soviets by those who according to Zagoria and 
Ra'anan belonged to a definable opposition group is rather 
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circumstantial. Lo Jiu-ching, for instance, 'has been portrayed 
as a convert to the professional military ethic who had long 
advocated closer ties with the Soviets for the sake of acquiring 
modern arms. His VE Day article has been characterized as being 
very soft on "revisionism", 47 Yet Yahuda, while admitting that 
Lo had developed a fetish for modern weapons, interprets Lo's 
statement as castigating the Russians for being too soft on the 
Americans. 48 It is quite likely that his purfe can be linked to 
a rather paradoxical combination of views by the Maoists: although 
his overall outlook towards the Soviets may have been acceptable, 
his inclination towards military professionalism - the foreign, 
non-Yenan inspired doctrine that the Maoists so abhorred - was 
probably the main factor in his downfall. The one individual who 
does seem to have developed a consistently favourable attitude 
towards the Soviets, however, was the Mayor of Peking, P'eng Chen. 
P'eng Chen had impressive anti-Soviet credentials, but by 
the time of the JCP "united action" moves he had shown himself 
to be in support of a modified, less acrimonious relationship 
with the USSR. It is striking that it was P' eng who coined Ute 
concept of the "cities and the countryside of the world", but 
seemed to favour the blatantly anti-Maoist move of politically 
resurrecting P'eng Te-huai.49 Nevertheless, it seems that the 
disaster that befell the Indonesian Communists c·aused P' eng to 
draw the same conclusion as the JCP about the need for Soviet 
assistance and it was he who was the primary patron of their 
. •t• t• 50 ~n~ ~a ~ve. If he was working in concert with Liu on this 
matter, it seems odd that Liu should leave the country for Burma 
when he could have remained in China to lobby for the motion. 
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Though this may have been a ploy by Mao to spllt the opposition, 
the Japanese reported that the leaders present at the meeting 
followed his word because they could see no alternative.5l There 
is no reason to believe that Liu, if present, would have reacted 
differently. 
Mao and Lin had indications that Liu Shao-ch.' i was leaning 
towards a softer approach towards the Soviets, but since Mao 
told Snow that he had decided in January 1965 that Liu had to be 
removed, it is doubtful whether Liu's position on "united action" 
in 1966 was a decisive factor in his imminent downfall. It probably 
only served to corroborate opin~ons already formed. One salient 
indication of Liu's soft line is his support f0r sending a 
Chinese delegation to the March meeting of communist paJrties .. held in 
Moscow. The Maoists remained adamant over the issue, however, and 
refused to budge from their hitherto stated position on the "counter-
revolutionaries".52 Once again there is little sign of strenuous 
opposition. Liu, nevertheless, probably retained misgivings and 
in his final public speech in July there was a notable lack of the 
obligatory reference to "Soviet revisionism, n5.3 
It is a commonly held view that Teng Hsiao-p'ing was closely 
aligned with Liu over the issue of renewed contacts with the 
Russians. Zagoria and Ra'anan have pictured him as a modernizer 
ready to sacrifice ideals for economic growth. Conversely, Yahuda 
has mentioned that Teng was a major actor in the Sino-Soviet polemics 
and that his statements were not far from the mainstream policy at 
the time.54 Teng's commitment is indeed highly questionable, as 
is his membership in a faction organized around the issue. 
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While Liu and others may have sympathized with the concept of 
"united action" with the Soviets, there is no evidence that they 
supported the actual proposals put forward by the Russians in the 
spring of 1965. The Soviet scheme raised questions about Chinese 
territorial integrity that most of the CCP would find unacceptable. 
The Russian proposals included: a free access air corridor between 
the USSR and North Vietnam over PRC territory which would have 
ended the PRC's ability to monitor the flow of arms then being 
sent by rail; the building of Soviet air bases in South China; 
and the garrisoning of up to 4000 Soviet troops for the repair and 
maintenance of DRV aircraft.55 This was a reminder of the foreign 
bases and the extraterritoriality of the past that all Chinese 
found distasteful. Mao had resisted Soviet requests for access 
to PRC soil in the past with the full support nf his colleagues. 
It is unlikely that any CCP member would have persistently fought 
for this arrangement in 1965-66 when the Soviets were Mao's sworn 
enemies. As a pro-Chinese Vietnamese has recently said of the CCP'. s 
stand on this issue: "••• no country would forgo its sovereignty 
and let a foreign country do things of this kind."56 
There was a practical consideration concerning the Soviet 
proposals that should not be overlooked. Throughout 1965-66 the 
Chinese had combined a series of statements and strong, yet 
restrained, military tactics to show the PRC's commitment to the 
DRV but to stress to the US their reluctance to engage in a war 
over the issue. A Russian presence ran the risk of an escalating 
~piral of conflict that would have been out of the PRC's control. 
It.could have caused the Americans to resent the existence of a 
Soviet China sanctuary (as MacArthur had in regard to Manchuria 
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during the Korean War) and encourage them to adopt a policy of 
"hot pursuit" of North Vietnamese a:Lrcraft seeking refuge in 
China. 57 This would have placed the entire strategy of deterence 
in jeopardy and therefore would have meant that the conflict 
would necessarily draw the Maoists' attention away from the 
domestic concerns which they then found so pressing. 
The Implementation of the Deterence Strategy and the Reasons for 
its Expediency 
Having delineated some of the arguments used by the controlling 
foreign policy makers, and of those who may have disagreed with 
them, it is desirable that the process by which the PRC extricated 
itself from the possibility of direct conflict with the US 
while preserving the credibility of its commitment to the DRV be 
analyzed. This was accomplished by a rather <droit balance of 
manifesting an extreme reluctance to fight while, simultaneously, 
convincingly showing their resolute determination to fight if the 
preservation of the DRV was imperilled, or if there were persistent 
acts of aggression against the Chinese state. During 1965-66 this 
strategy was established and it set the pattern by which Sino-
American relations could actually improve des~1i te the even heavier 
bombings of North Vietnam to come. 
The US, after balancing out the relative costs and gains of its 
commitment, ruled out a war with China as an unacceptable price to 
pay almost from the very beginning. This is an indication of a 
growing awareness of the Chinese as an independent, vital force 
for, unlike the Korean situation, it could not be argued that the 
PRC was the Kremlin's "puppet". During the earlier stages some, 
like Secretary of Defence Rusk, believed that an all-out war in 
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Indochina was necessary despite any threat of Chinese involvement, 
yet this was squashed by President Johnson from the outset. He, 
like others, believed that a level of bombing in the North could 
be achieved without an adverse Chinese reaction. 58 The PRC Foreign 
Ministry had been signalling the US through the mouth of Chen Yi 
since 1964 a mixture of toughness and calm, retional reluctance 
to battleo In July of that year, in an interview with the 
Austrian magazine Kurier, he stated that China had neither the 
capability nor the intention of starting a war, but that she 
would enter if the US threatened the Sino-Vietnamese border 
region. Extra weight was added by the declaration following the 
Tonkin Gulf Incident of August that "aggressic1 against the DRV 
. . h' n 59 h' db means aggress1on aga1nst C 1nao T 1s was note . y the US and 
the Johnson Administration accepted the CIA analysis that the PRC 
would not intervene unless North Vietnam was invadedo By the end 
of 1964 - early 1965 they had concluded that the Chinese response 
would be limited to supplying anti-aircraft guns, jet fighters 
and naval patrol craft. The avoidance of war 1ith the Chinese 
did, however, remain a high priority. In fact, one chief Department 
of Defence analyst, when weighing the relative values of certain 
aspects of the US commitment, gave the value of "keeping South 
Vietnam out of Chinese hands" a rating of 20% - but the importance 
of avoiding a humiliating US defeat was given a 70% rating. This 
was a marked shift from MacArthur's attitude L1 1950. 60 The US 
had learned to read the PRC's signals and the Chinese continued 
to reinforce their message. 
The CCP leadership may have been lulled into a false sense 
of security during the lull between August 1964 and the start of 
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widespread bombings in February 1965. Nevertheless, the Chinese 
reaction to the bombings was to reinforce their vocalized commitment 
to the DRY and the period between February and December should be 
viewed as the time in which bellicose statements and actions 
intended to deter the US outweighed the signs of restraint in the 
two-levelled strategy. Yet an unwillingness to fight was always 
apparent, no matter how pugnacious the superficial image appeared. 
The prime example of this approach during 1965 was a March 
1965 statement by Chen Yi in which he declared: 
"The Chinese people will exert every effort to send the 
heroic South Vietnamese people the necessary military aid and 
to dispatch their men to fight shoulder to shoulder with the 
South Vietnamese people whenever the latter required." 61 
The belligerent aspects of this statement were the PRC's 
pledges of all out support for the Viet Cong in the South, not 
just for the territorial integrity of the DRV, and that Chinese 
' . 6 
entrance was said to be a Vietnamese prerogative. 2 There were, 
however, some important qualifiers - some of which were present 
in Chinese statements during the Korean War period. For instance, 
Chen pl(.,iged the support of the Chinese "people", not the government; 
and he stressed readiness for a future imperative, not for the 
immediate crisis. 63 A few months late~ when the Chinese statements 
had reached a high level of virulence, there were persistent signs 
of a desire to avoid escalating the crisis. Take, for example, 
the Jen-min Jih-pao editorial that accompanied Lo Jui-ching's 
VE Day article. Although it camouflaged its intent by warning 
against trusting imperialists by relying on negotiated settlements, 
it made it clear that negotiations were acceptable and cited the 
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Korean armistice amongst others to show that "the basic interests 
of the people have not been violated when negotiations have been 
used." 64 
This basic pattern continued until the last quarter of 1965 
when some extremely bellicose statements by Chou En-lai and 
Chen Yi were issued around the time of Lin Piao's "Long Live the 
Victory of People's War which itself stressed self-reliance 
amongst national liberation struggles. In view of the tone of 
the former statements, it is not surprising t~t some observers 
misinterpreted Lin's article. Chen and Chou both talked of the 
strong possibility of war and an important communist newspaper in 
Hong Kong reinforced this by writing articles that stated that 
war was inevitable. It cheered its readers by optimistically 
referring to the fact that from out of the ashes of Pyongyang 
had risen one of the most modern cities in A~ia. 65 Yet Lin's 
article, the watershed statement of the period, had been widely 
interpreted as an indication to Hanoi and the US that the Vietnamese 
would have to fight alone. As Edgar Snow has said: 
"Read carefully .•• Lin's article is a restatement of Mao's 
basic strategy in meeting a threatened attack on China itself, 
rather than any doctrine China intends to im1ose by force on the 
Third World . " 66 
Throughout 1966 official PRO statements on Vietnam became 
less frequent arid less vitriolic. Obviously the Maoists had 
become confident that the US had received the message. They were 
then free to turn their attention to China's domestic situation. 
The statements on Vietnam parallelled this inward turn: they 
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became increasingly " Sino-centric" and the sLift of emphasis was 
placed on Vietnam being an initial step towards acts against China, 
not on the aggression against the DRV itself. 67 This lends credence 
to the JCP's contentions at the time, but it provided a useful 
reminder to the US that while the PRC would not condone excessive 
attacks on the DRV, its chief concern was China herself. The PRC 
would not let Ho Chi Minh's government fall- but the US could 
batter it indefinitely as long as the PRC was not directly threatened. 
One important aspect of Sino-American interchange lacking in 
1950, but present in 1965-66, was a direct line of communications 
by which intentions could be voiced. The Warsaw Ambassador-level 
talks were a means by which both sides could ensure that their 
counterparts had a clear understanding of eachothers' beliefs, 
While every indication is that no secret deals could have been 
reached because of Polish/Soviet bugging of the rooms used for the 
interchanges, it is certain that each side used the opportunities 
to map out the parameters of the conflict. They enabled a tacit 
agreement limiting the extent of each side's participation to be 
reached: the US made it known that it had no intention of 
destroying the DRV or attacking the PRC, while the Chinese were 
not only able to communicate their desire to avoid war but also 
their commitment to the DRV. Though not the sole tool by which 
the PRC delineated its position, the Warsaw Talks were a useful 
accessory to the process by which war was avoided. 68 
In order to· give validity to their threats to intervene, the 
CCP had to manifest a willingness to fight by constrained, yet 
' forthright military actions. Significantly, alluding to the 
·Korean precedent was a useful means by which the Chinese were 
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able to suggest that their words were not hollow. During 1965 
the threat of a "Korean-type war" was heard frequently in official 
CCP statements. The message that the US should not forget the 
Chinese willingness to do battle with a far superior force in the 
past was clearly just as potent in present circumstances. 69 This 
attempt to stir the Americans' collective memory was coupled with 
the selective downings of US planes and the deployment of )0,000 
PLA troops to North Vietnam for engineering, logistic and anti-
aircraft purposes. This left no doubt about the Chinese commitment 
to the preservation of the DRV, yet at every step of the way the 
PRC made it emphatically obvious that their intention was deterrence, 
not a catastrophic engagement with US forces. 
The first evidence the US had of the PRC's resolve was when 
Chinese planes began to attack American aircraft that had pursued 
DRV fighters over Chinese airspace. But although many planes were 
downed, the Chinese made it clear that they understood the sensitive 
nature of their actions and that they did not wish any further 
entanglement. Although they proved that the~ were prepared to 
accept the risk of US retaliation, they refrained from excessively 
publicizing any direct action that occurred with the Americans so 
that there was no public perception of an increased commitment. 
This would have been detrimental domestically because it would 
have strenghthened the calls for unity, which Mao and Lin simply 
could not accept. Therefore, when a US plan~ was shot down after 
being pursued over Vietnam the Chinese were at pains to stress that 
the Vietnamese had destroyed it, though they knew that the Americans 
realized the truth. Also, when a US plane was accidently hit by 
"friendly fire" while over Chinese airspace in April 1965, the 
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official PRC statement wentto great lengths to explain the circum-
stances of the mishap. Finally, while openly providing repair 
and relaxation centres for DRV pilots, they made Vietnamese pilots 
land in Vietnam after combat before flying over the border - thus 
lessening the chances of US planes straying over China. 70 The 
warnings to the US were made obvious, but so was the genuine 
desire by the Chinese not to become involved in an escalating 
spiral of violence that could lead to a confrontation which both 
sides wished to avoid. 
The PRC linked these danger signals in the air with a similar 
deployment of 50,000 technicians and anti-aircraft gunners to 
North Vietnam. Once again, while this was a considerable commitment 
it was totally unpublicized, as were similar preparations for war 
in South China which included the building of airstrips in the 
province of Yunnan and a limited evacuation of civilians. No 
attempt was made to hide the presence of the PLA from US reconnais-
san~e, and the use of rails instead of tunnels points to the 
desire for the Johnson administration to know the size, and the 
limitations, of the Chinese involvement. The open allocation of 
men to specific locations clearly defined1 for the US exactly what 
the Chinese leaders considered out-of-bounds, i.e., the Hanoi-
Haiphong area and the rail links in the border region. 71 
It has been established that the Maoists iesired a policy 
towards Vietnam by which they could preserve an antagonistic 
stance towards both major powers while not becoming directly 
involved in the'conflict. Through Lin's article' they expressed 
a desire for a "protracted war of national liberation" in Vietnam 
that could last indefinitely. Though the basic arguments used by 
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the Maoists have been referred to previously, the possible tactical 
considerations which lay under them have not been sufficiently shown. 
A brief description of some of those considerations may help 
clarify why they evolved. 
It is apparent that domestic political considerations ranked 
high in Mao's list of priorities in a way which is incomparable 
with the Korean period. In the earlier conflict there was a 
general consensus over the priorities of nation building, but 
1965-66 was characterized by manifestations of the inter-Party 
conflict that would eventually plunge the nation into turmoil. 
Mao and Lin had definite domestic uses for the PLA in mind and 
a war on foreign soil would preclude this desired role. Moreover, 
a protracted war in Vietnam could fit these domestic plans in a 
utilitarian manner. By providing Mao with a living example of the 
power of "people's war" the Vietnam War became a testament to the 
72 correctness of Mao Tse-tung Thought. With the collapse of the 
Communist Party in Indonesia the Maoists had few other struggles 
which could show the correctness of Mao's strategy. Hence the 
PRO rejected the stance on a negotiated peace discussed in the 
Jen-min Jih-pao VE Day article and the Chinese began to strenuously 
oppose all moves to settle the war at the conference table, even 
neglecting to mention the Paris Peace T~lks in the press for almost 
six months after they had begun. 73 The Maoists were reluctant to 
lose one of their most potent propaganda weapons. 
The Vietnamese now refer to the Chinese policy of supporting 
a prolonged war in Indochina as a betrayal of the Vietnamese 
Revolution. They claim that Mao followed hi.; thesis of "sitting 
on the mountain to watch the tigers fight" in order to weaken the 
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two belligerent parties while he carried on his Cultural Revolution 
undisturbed. 74 With hindsight this now seems plausible. The 
Chinese assiduously tried to use the conflict for propaganda 
purposes against the US and the USSR, and, surprisingly, it now 
seems possible that they intended the war to drag on in order 
to weaken any expansionist tendencies which Hanoi might have 
fostered. By bogging down the US and the DRV in a long war the 
CCP could watch the two belligerent parties damage each other and 
simultaneously blast the USSR for the perfidy of colluding with 
the US over the conduct of the war. In fact, it must have been 
apparent to the Chinese that the one victor in a war between the 
US and the PRO over Vietnam would have been the Soviets. By 
avoiding conflict and by trying to keep the w~ raging, the Maoists 
wanted to watch attrition take its toll of the combatants while 
China reserved her strength for vigilance against the Russians. 
That vigilance necessitated the moral strength that Mao hoped 
the Cultural Revolution would provide. 
In the recent white book on Sino-Vietnamese relations the 
Vietnamese have charged the PRO with trading the US a divided 
Indochina for an agreement over Taiwan. 75 While this may have 
exaggerated the amount of quid-pro-quo arrangements in the initial 
Sino-US rapp~oachement, there is evidence that the COP did have 
worries about the strength of a united Indochinese federation. 
In a 1964 interview in Kurier, Chen Yi showed that the COP was 
quite willing to accept a neutral South Vietnam along with the 
continuation of a neutral Cambodia and Laos. 76 Ironically, it was 
the US Under-Secretary of State George Ball who in 1965 first 
expressed the notion that the DRV's victory would simply allow the 
' ~· 
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reemergence of traditional Sino-Vietnamese enmity. He stated, 
while arguing against the so-called "domino th8ory": 
"The most likely result (of a diplomatic solution to the war) 
would be a vietnamese negotiated deal under which an eventually 
unified Communist Vietnam would reassert its traditional hostility 
to Communist China and limit its own ambitions to Laos and Cambodia."?? 
Additional evidence of the PRO's desire to fragment the situation 
in Indochina is t~e way in which the National Liberation Front of 
Vietnam (VietCong), the guerrilla movement in the South, was treated 
as a separate entity within Chinese foreign policy, insofar as the 
Chinese could attract a group so dependent upon Hanoi. Although 
the CCP did not launch a concerted, relentless campaign to drive 
a wedge between the DRV and Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese had 
misgivings about the dealings between the CCP and the permanent 
Viet Cong mission in Peking. They obviously felt uneasy about the 
COP's commitment to a unified Vietnam and were suspicious of any 
attempts by the Chinese to influence the Viet Cong and thwart the 
plans of the DRV leadership. 78 
Some observers in the late 1960s postulated that Mao's relation-
ship with Ho Chi Minh parallels that between Stalin and Tito in the 
1940s. 79 They concluded that Hanoi's tendency towards lndependence 
caused Mao to worry about the creation of a "little Balkans" sphere 
of influence for Hanoi in Indochina. A protracted war could 
certainly delay this eventuality, yet this strategy depended upon 
the Vietnamese retaining a reliance upon the rhinese for arms and 
supplies. But the Vietnam~se had begun to turn towards the Soviets 
as a source of sophisticated weapons in 1965 following the start of 
the US bombing campaign. This second source of support for Ho 
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meant that the Chinese could not control the conflict enough 
to ensure that it was protracted in length. But the fact that 
they may have desired a North Vietnam drained by attrition as 
opposed to the expected wish for a stable communist buffer state 
is an ironic twist which does not match any of the evidence 
shown about Mao's attitude towards North Korea. There was however 
no precedent for an expansionist Korea; there was for an expansionist 
Vietnam. In essence the Maoist strategy towards Vietnam was an 
elaborate balancing act that makes the Korean decision seem simple 
in comparison. Domestic, international, and regional factors all 
combined to produce a policy of what could be called "active 
isolationism"·. It was a question of how to remain aloof while at 
the same time preserving and protecting areas of national interest. 
The PRC succeeded in avoiding involvement in the conflict but, 
when one views the resulting Soviet-Vietnamese bonds and the recent 
Sino-Vietnamese border war, and assesses the questionable value 
to the PRC of the final US withdrawal from the West Pacific, it is 
debatable whether or not national interests were in fact served 
by the PRC's detachment. China may have simply replaced old 
adversaries with new. 
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CONCLUSION 
This study has been an exercise in which the elements that 
affected the response of the leaders of the CCP to two important 
conflicts of international consequence within bordering former 
vassal states have been identified and alalyzed. From this exercise 
one can begin to understand the traumas of a developing nation 
state confronted with threats from its primary adversary to its 
sense of rejuvenation and newly found independence. One can also 
see that the foundations of the ideology which provided the guide-
lines for the Chinese response to these conf~icts, the ideology of 
Maoism, were firmly grounded in Chinese nationalism. Hence, an 
insight has been gained into what motivated the leading figures 
within the PRC during the periods in question. From that it is 
possible to deduce certain concepts about the reemergence of China 
as a vital nation in terms of global significance after years of 
foreign domination, including to what extent imperial precedents 
affected modern Chinese international behaviour - especially 
the ~egree to which attitudes towards former vassals were influenced 
by the imperial past. Moreover, the gap of fifteen years between 
the two conflicts provides a measure for gauging any maturation 
in the handling of complex international crises as an essentially 
bi-polar superpower matrix crumbled with the intensifying of Sino-
Soviet enmity. The essential question of how and why the conflagra-
tion in Korea was avoided in Vietnam a decade and a half later can 
then be confronted with more certainty. 
In addition, it has been made apparent that the debates and 
deliberations over the two crises occured within very different 
internal political climates. The pivotal figure in all policy 
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making, be it domestic or foreign matters, was, of course, 
Mao Tse-tung. His attitude towards issues was a key determining 
element in policy making output, therefore his concerns with regards 
to matters relevant to the conflicts in question as revealed in 
this study can provide a greater understanding of how the CCP 
leadership viewed the historical significance of the "New China" 
both internationally and in terms of internal development. But, 
the views of Mao and some of his colleagues diverged radically 
during the years between the conflicts and therefore foreign policy 
debates also reflected this trend. The two distinctly variant 
sets of internal conditions provide one with clear vantage points 
to judge the degree to which internal considerations can affect 
international relations with great and lesser powers alike. 
It is difficult to state with any certainty the amount of 
consideration given by contemporary decision makers to historical 
background, especially when that background stretches over thousands 
of years. For instance, what importance are the Napoleonic Wars 
to modern British statesmen wrestling with the current state of 
Anglo-French affairs? There comes a point in history when old 
circumstances crumble under the weight of the new, yet there is 
always an aspect of an awareness of the past in contemporary deliber-
tions. However, that awareness can be shaped and moulded to suit 
particular needs as yet another situation begins to make its presence 
felto This is the case when the CCP response to the American 
centred conflicts in Korea and Vietnam are analyzed within the 
background of China's new assertiveness after years of foreign 
domination. Therefore, one must remember that policy towards both 
conflicts were formulated during a period of immense pride in 
the Chinese nation and that much of that pride was fuelled by' an 
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appreciation of China's past greatness. The most important 
historical reference point for the leaders of the CCP was not the 
imperial past, but their own personal experiences during the Civil 
War and the Anti Japanese War. For the new leaders of China the 
imperial past represented proof of China's rightful position in the 
world, but it was also tarnished by the old social relations 
which fettered the initiative of the Chinese people anc. allowed 
the years of subjugation by foreigners. The CCP leadership 
believed that their struggles were restoring China to its former 
position and a prerequisite of that restoration was seen as removing 
dangerous aliens from their border regions, including those of 
d . t 1 Korea an v~e nam. It is at that purely regional strategic level 
that imperial precedents have their greatest relevance to this 
study. 
The handli.ng ·of both crises shows the keeness with which the 
Chinese leadership.acted to preserve their secure· borders against 
intrusion by the Americans, the power in both cases that represented 
the biggest obstacle to their goals. They showed resoundingly that 
Western encroachment in post-1949 China would not be tolerated. In 
the case of Korea this meant a massive military action and in the 
Vietnam period this was manifest in a skillful use of deterrence -
but neither action had anything in common with the theory of 
imperial foreign policy as described in Chapter One. There was no 
calculation that the dangerous alien could be "transformed" through 
the greatness of Chinese civilization. The Chinese response in both 
modern cases was a mixture of the lessons of Chinese humiliations in 
the past and an appreciation of the realities of twentieth century 
international power politics. The relative resolve with which these 
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conflicts were handled offers an interesting comparison with the 
equivocable nature with which Li Hung-chang handled western 
advances in the two vassal states during the nineteenth century. 
He tried to develop a degree of flexibility but was constrained by 
some reluctance to admit the superiority which Western weaponry 
represented. For all of his pronouncements to the contrary about 
the superiority of men over weapons, Mao's a~tions in Korea; the 
development of nuclear weapons in the 1950's and 1960's; and the 
deployment of air defences to South China during the initial 
US escalation in Vietnam proved that Western standards were being 
employed. 
The CCP leadership measured Chinese greatness using many guide-
lines which were strictly Western in origin, the achievement of 
socialism being a prime example of the adopting of an ideal originating 
from Europe. But the Maoists within the CCP also copied the 
imperial ethic stressing the superiority of Chinese civilization 
through the correctness of its ideals, e.g., the wide applicability 
of Mao Tse-tung's Thoughts. The people towards whom this message 
was directed were more specifically identifiable than during the 
days of Confucianism, with the main emphasis being placed on the 
nations of the developing world, especially those in Asia. The 
Chinese leadership had identified a global constituency which they 
considered to be their legitimate sphere of influence, abandoning 
the "all under heaven11 ·imperial claims to world-wide hegemony. 
Yet, the actual receptiveness of other nations to Maoism was not 
widespread and as explained in Chapters Six and Nine many of the 
foregin policy proclamations on the use of Mao's Thought in other 
nations were for domestic consumption and were designed to protect 
the adherence to Mao's Chinese path of internal socialist development. 
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The cases of Korean and Vietnamese conflicts with the us-led 
West indicate that receptiveness to Mao's Thought was not an 
essential prerequisite for PRC support. Many thousands of Chinese 
died in Korea where Kim Il-sung's Kapsan faction paid only marginal 
attention to the Chinese doctrine; while in Vietnam during the 
mid-1960's the CCP stated that the struggle in Indochina was a 
prime example of Maoism in Action, when in actuality the DRV was 
moving steadily towards using more conventional military tactics. 
This shows that the CCP, like their imperial predecessors were 
very willing to let pragmatism eclipse dogma when it came to the 
actual application of foreign policy. Just as the imperial dynasties 
would allow vassals the status of "non-barbarian" after the most 
cursory proclamations of acceptance of the tributary system, and 
despite flagrant non-Confucian practices (e.g., the patronage of 
shamanism in Yi Korea and the creation of an independent sphere of 
influence by various Vietnamese dynasties through southward expansion) , 
Maoist China developed a pronounced tendency to shape doctrine 
to fit events. 2 The way in which the doctrine fluctuated over time 
reveals much about what actually motivated a foreign policy response 
at a particular period and also gives an indication of the perception 
which the CCP had of China's position in the world. In addition, 
attitudes towards the former vassals of Korea and Vietnam are clearly 
explained when placed within their broader global context. 
During 1950, leading up to the intervention in Korea, the 
doctrine being expressed by the CCP was one of national salvation and 
"socialist internationalism". Paradoxically, these two seemingly 
separate goals were very related. The theme of national salvation 
had mobilized the peasantry since the Anti-Japanese War, imbuing 
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them with a sense of national identity whicl: they had not previously 
2 possessed, and carrying through to the period of reconstruction 
following the proclamation of the People's Republic in October 1949. 
The "socialist internationalism" was not the alliance with the 
world proletariat as envisaged during the days of the First and 
Second Internationals, but was rather a practical means of 
procuring the economic and military means of consolidating 
national rejuvenation through a necessary, but always distasteful, 
period of Soviet tutelage. T.herefore Maoism faded slightly 
into the background and "leaning towards the side of the Soviet 
Union" predominated. National salvation and rejuvenation was 
limited to liberal management of the economy backed by some 
Soviet aid in order to salvage the disastrous wreck left by the 
years of war and KMT bungling. This, plus the irredentia which the 
nationalistic goal of reuniting all of the once great Chinese 
empire required, but which was thwarted by US intervention regarding 
Taiwan, were the realistic expectations that the CCP could have 
for China in the short-term. A marginal amount of deference 
towards the Soviets was reqUired, and spheres of influenc~ in 
Asian areas which were not of much concern to the Russians were 
allowed to be established • Notably, Korea was firmly within the 
Russian sphere and active Chinese influence within Kim Il-sung's 
ruling faction was nominal; the only area left open to the CCP 
being the anti-French resistance movement in Vietnam led by HQ Chi Minh. 
At that time China's greatness was judged by its position of importance 
within the "socialist bloc", which was seen as an achievement in its 
own right after decades of utter humiliation through the domination 
by the Western powers and Japan. 
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This study had shown that there is no proper evidence for the 
CCP trying to recreate any sort of suzerainty relationship with 
North Korea, which was left under the Soviets' sway. This is not 
to say that Kim Il-sung was a mere Soviet puppet: he and his 
Kapsan colleagues simply had much closer contact with the Russians 
and, like the DDP, depended upon them for aid. The Chinese, in 
keeping with the 11 Socialist internationalism. .. doctrine at that 
time did not challenge the leader of the bloc in a competition 
for spheres of influence. Therefore, the Chinese involvement in 
the conflict in Korea was quite straightforwardly an attempt to 
preserve a buffer between the important Manchurian industrial 
heartland and what was thought to be an aggressive imperiali1;t 
power which was threatening the attainment of. Chinese national 
goals. The behaviour of General MacArthur seemed to add credence 
to these fears, as did the protection of the KMT redoubt on 
Taiwan provided by Truman's deployment of the Seventh Fleet. The 
circumstances had altered drastically, both in terms of doctrine 
and the strategic importance placed on the former vassal, when, 
fifteen years later, the US once again seeme~ to threaten PRC 
sovereignty through a war in a border region. 
In the mid-1960's a Maoist inspired wave of nationalistic 
fervour was staged to sweep the nation, and the concomitant doctrine 
of international relations bore its hallmark. The interim between 
the two conflicts in question had seen the complete rejection by 
the Maoists of Soviet policy - including both its internal and 
external consequences for China. The prime example in the eyes 
of the Maoists of the current insidious stage of Soviet socialist 
development was its marked characteristic of compromise with US 
imperialism. The legacy of foreign violations of Chinese social 
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and territorial integrity in the past had made imperialism - and 
not necessarily capitalism - the main enemy •)f the CCP and most 
of the Chinese nation. This variance from orthodox Leninism which 
firmly labelled imperialism as a characteristic of capitalism 
manifested itself inthe courting of relationships with "intermediate" 
capitalist nations in Western Europe and Japan that were not considered 
to be in league with the imperialist US but more or less under its 
domination. This was evident until 1964, but the onset of more 
intensive Maoist campaigns ended this trend after 1965, as shown in 
Chapter Seven, when all nations that did not openly pay homage to 
Mao's Chinese road to socialism were ostracized. This was also in 
a sense recognition of the failure to secure an independent 
global sphere of influence in the Third World and the communist 
bloc after the open split with the USSR in 1J60. Therefore in 
1965-66, when Chinese policy towards the war in Vietnam was being 
designed, the foreign policy doctrine being expounded was the 
Maoist dictum of self-reliance, with no pretence of being allied 
with the Soviet Union in an international socialist movement. 
Unlike its relations with the North Koreans in 1950, the CCP 
desired that Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong be influenced by the 
teachings of Mao and the degree to which the Vietnamese received 
their advice had an effect on the relationship between the two 
countries. The Maoists who controlled foreign policy through 
an alliance with Chou En-lai wished to portray to the world the 
image of a vibrant, independent Chinese people advancing to socialism 
through the guidance of Mao and showing the way for the rest of 
the developing nations. It is quite certain that through their 
involvelllent in the Vietnamese war against the French, and the gap 
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caused by general Soviet indifference to Indochina, the CCP felt 
that the region should be a sphere of influence which could add to 
their international prestige. Indeed, by allowing them to sit at 
the conference table in Geneva with many important nations it 
already had increased the PRC's international standing. As Chapter 
Eight indicates, the CCP openly competed with the Soviets using 
aid as an inducement for Vietnamese during the late 1950's and 
early 1960's, after the Russians had decided that any CCP international 
successes were .intolerable. In the mid-1960's, for internal reasons, 
it became even more desirable that through its war tactics the DRV 
be portrayed as a showpiece of the applicability of Mao Tse-tung's 
Thought. 
As the American escalation of the conflict in Vietnam began 
with the bombings of North Vietnam in February 1965, the CCP 
retained a strong sense of encirclement and encroachment by US 
imperialism - the same sense that had provoked such a strong 
response in Korea fifteen years earlier. The feeling of seige was 
even more intense because of the growing threat from the Soviet 
11 collaborators 11 to the north. Although the Chinese had accomplished 
the impressive feat of designing and detonating a nuclear device, 
this was mostly a bid for international prestige and a fillip to 
national pride. They were by their own accounts militarily weak -
hence Mao's insistence of the strenght of men armed with the 
correctness of thought being more powerful than weapons. Unlike in 
1950 when a sacrifice could be backed by military aid from the 
Soviets, the Maoists firmly rejected any compromise on their 
rejection of Soviet tutelage implied by the acceptance of Russian 
assistance. Then the sacrifice may have proven their worthiness 
to Stalin through their defence of the "socialist bloc's" ·interests 
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and led to increased Soviet support for the Chinese goals of 
national rebirth and reconstruction; in the mid~l960's a war which 
led to the need for Soviet aid would have totally negated the Maoist 
tenets which were being pro~agated as symbols of that rebirthe 
Therefore, while in 1950 the CCP's aim was totally to remove US 
military activity within a border state, in 1965-66 the whole thrust 
of Chinese policy was to allow a limited amount of such activity 
in Vietnam - and even to prolong it for as long as possible so 
that the US nemisis could be weakened through a protracted conflict 
and the Chinese people could be presented with living proof of 
the power of Maoist doctrine. 
Of course it could be argued that a prolonged conflict could 
never be tolerated in the case of Korea because of its traditional 
strategic value and that prevaricating over Vietnam had its roots 
in Chinese history. The legacy of Hideyoshi remained strong in 
the late nineteenth century, as the actions of Li Hung-chang as 
discussed in Chapter One have shown, and they could plausibly 
have affected the thoughts of a man with such a keen sense of history 
as Maoo .Li Hung-chang's actions vis a vis Vietnam's domination 
by the French is a clear historical precedent for equivocable attitudes 
towards the defence of that former vassal. Yet, while there may 
be historical parallels with the former strategic importance of 
Korea, motivation during the crisis in Vietnam in the mid-1960's 
represents a clear break with any previous policy on the defence of 
a bordering nation within the Chinese sphere. 
In the period fo the strategic decisions that set the pattern 
for the Chinese attitude towards the American aggression in Vietnam, 
China for the first time since the Opium ·wars shaped an effective 
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and skillf~l reply to Western aggression in an area traditionally 
within its orbit free from any foreign domination or interference. 
The 1950 action in Korea was taken with a degree of deference towards 
Soviet wishes; in 1965-66 the CCP formed a policy from a totally 
independent stance. The PRC acted as a modern, twentieth century 
state managing an international crisis with a series of objectives 
of both domestic and wider strategic significance. Although 
Korea or Vietnam were not being preserved as vassals in the traditional 
mould, they had a modified significance in that they both served as 
symbols to the world and to the Chinese people themselves that the 
"New China", the resurrected China, had an independent place in 
the world. The Korean intervention proved that China was no longer 
in a state of chronic decline and this undoubtedly affected events 
fifteen years later. The Americans acted with a greater degree of 
respect towards the Chinese in that the avoicJ:mce of a Korean-like 
war in Vietnam was given a high priority. This time, however, they 
showed an even greater recognition of the Chinese reemergence for 
they were fully cognizant of the fact that the 1950 myth of "Soviet 
puppet" had to be discounted. 
This study has shown that the CCP was evidently more adept at 
international crisis management and the use of deterrence during the 
Vietnam conflict than in 1950 when it attempted to halt the advance 
of MacArthur's troops by diplomatic signalso Nevertheless, one must 
take into account the fact that the nature of the advance towards 
its frontiers was coloured by the general belligerence of the Cold 
war era, making deterrence more arduouso Also, except for a few 
negotiations with the Allies during the Second World War, the CCP 
leaders were novices at dealing with international diplomacy during a 
conflict. However, they did try some rather skillful attempts at 
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conununicating their resolve coupled with their general desire for 
peace through linking their willingness for peace, as transmitted 
through the Indian ambassador, with their ultimate intention to 
combat the UN forces if they did not halt their advance - the latter 
being subtly displayed through the tentative military contact which 
preceded the full scale intervention of the Chinese "volunteers". 
Where their judgement seems to have been faulty was in the interpret-
ation of American attitudes through the ambiguous signs being given 
by Washington. As indicated in Chapter Five there were quite a few 
reasons for the Chinese to believe that the US would become entangled 
in Korea or intervene to save Chiang Kai-shek, bU:t these were largely 
ignorede Hence, the CCP was caught offguard when the US acted. 
In the crucial period of the American escalation of hostilities in 
Vietnam, however, this was not the case. The Chinese, under the 
direction of Chou En-lai, adroitly analyzed the situation and 
succeded in extraditing the PRC from the threat of involvement while 
still leaving the US in no doubt that the North Vietnamese buffer 
state must remain. 
The foreign policy experts in the CCP had had fifteen years in 
which to acquire the necessary skills with which to. handle the 
Americanso Through diplomatic activities at the Geneva Conferences 
and at the ambassadorial level talks with the Americans in Warsaw 
insights were gained - and the 1962 war with India had shown how 
to use limited military action effectivelye The chances of.misreading 
3 American intentions were thereby greatly lessened. 
In Vietnam the CCP showed the consumate skill in balancing 
signs of military readiness, such as the deployment of logistic 
support personnel; support for the integrity of North Vietnam; and 
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military resolve, as in the downing of US planes over PRC airspace; 
with a public posture designed not to force the US to escalate 
further in a bid to save face. Hence, everything was done without 
publicity that could create domestic political pressures within 
America that could have led to demands for greater US force. As 
Chapter Nine has shown, this pattern emerged between 1965 and 1966 
and established an equilibrium that lasted throughout the conflicto 
The CCP did enough from then on to show support for the Vietnamese 
struggle, thus helping its claim to the Chinese people and the world 
of its leadership in national liberation causes, yet concurrently 
succeeded in avoiding antagonizing the USo The ability at reading 
the signals from the Americans remained constantly high. 
One of the greatest differences between the two periods lay 
in the area of domestic political situations, yet this also reflects 
a shift in attitude towards China's position in the world. In 1950 
the acceptance of a degree of Soviet leadership clearly manifested 
itself inside China. Besides continuing the process of reuniting 
all of the territories considered to be rightfully Chinese, the main 
thrust internally was to create economic and political stability. 
This was based on sound fiscal management and Soviet aid, plus the 
building of a political concensus within the CCP which overshadowed 
any disputes over the exact worth of Mao's Thoughts. National 
greatness was displayed through the unification of China; any 
claims to world or Asian leadership were weak as yeto 
At the domestic level, all indications are that a war in Korea 
was considered detrimental to the process of national reconstruction, 
although the promise of greater Soviet aid through the sacrifice and 
the unity that a war could create within the nation may have been 
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factors. But there is little doubt that during a time when internal 
needs were so great a war was not desired. But when the threat 
became so great that war was thought unavoidable, the Chinese 
response gives a strong indication of the state of Chinese domestic 
politics at the time. There is no reason to believe that there was 
any dissent within the CCP at the decision to intervene, nor is 
there any evidence that there was any opposition to the totally non-
Maoist tactics deployed on the battlefield. There is no indication 
of organized factionalism at the time, and the general mood of 
concensus appears to have been engendered by Mao himselfo It is his 
change in attitude towards China's domestic political scene that had 
such an effect on CCP policy on the war in Vietnam. 
This study has placed heavy emphasis on the nationalistic elements 
in the doctrine which is loosely called Maoism. Although Mao was 
definitely influenced by Marx and Lenin (notably with great emphasis 
on the anti-imperialism of the latter), as far back as the 1930's 
he recognized a need to create a completely Chinese version of Marxism-
Leninism.4 The result was eventually to be an ideology which was 
in many ways very non-Marxist. All emphasis on Marxist socialist 
internationalism gave way to the primary objective of building a strong 
Chinese state. As shown above, this was also the objectiye of the 
alliance with the Soviets: the goal was Chinese reconstruction, 
not the furthering of the international proletarian revolution. 5 
This does not mean that the Maoists believed that human progress was 
not measured by the creation of socialism - but it was the creation 
of socialism in China, not globally, that was of the paramount 
importance. It was Mao's struggle for the purity of the Chinese way 
to the new social order that was the cause of so much strife within 
China, culminating with the opening rounds of the CUltural Revolution 
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in 1965-66. As Chapters Seven and Nine have shown, the fight to 
preserve a wholely Chinese process of development dominated Mao 
and his followers and greatly influenced the course of the CCP's 
attitude towards the war in Vietnam. The battle with the internal 
revisionists predominated over that with US :i"mperialism. In 
addition, any hint of using the crisis as an excuse for reestablishing 
ties with the Soviets was categorically out of the question because 
of the possibility of opening channels for the reintroduction of 
foreign revisionist influences. Therefore involvement in Vietnam 
had to be absolutely minimal in order to disarm any domestic 
opponents of Mao who had sympathy with the concept of such actions. 
Through analyzing key decision-making factors in the Chinese 
response to two different international crises in former vassal 
states, this study has shown that these nations remained of significance 
to Chinese foreign policy. · Yet nothing more than the most superficial 
resemblance remained with the old imperial relations between Peking 
and the two other capitals. Importantly, it must be remembered that 
although the PRC has symbolized the rebirth of an independent China, 
the Chinese have not recovered their predominating influence over 
these two states. Even the small gains made in influencing ideology 
in Vietnam never truly recovered from the debacles of 1957 described 
in Chapter Eight. Maoism did not replace Confucianism in Korea and 
Vietnam - but Russian military and economic aid may have. The age 
of post-Mao pragm·atism has done nothing to reverse this trend. 
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FOOTNOTES CONCLUSION 
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